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Note:
In transliterating Arabic, I have used on the system preferred by the International Journal
of Middle East Studies. Non-Western terms are italicized and bolded and are defined
either in the text on first occurrence or in the glossary.
Non-Western terms specifically as used in Lebanese context:
`amma: public.
`Ashura: the tenth day of Muharram. This day represents in the Islamic calendar
the death of the Prophet's grandson Imam Husain at Karbala in Iraq in 680 CE.
`ayan: notables.
`uhda: something to be looked after.
'ulama: learned men of religion.
Al: one's family or kinsmen. Not to be confused with the definite article al-.
amir liwa: governor of a sanjaq.
amir: prince, governor, tribal leader.
fatwa: religious edict.
fiqh: religious jurisprudence.
hakim: governor.
hawzat (pl of hawza): Shi'ite religious schools.
ijtihad: using reason to interpret the law.
imam: a man who leads a prayer or a community.
imamate: religious leadership of a community.
imami Shi'ism (Twelver Shi'ism): Shi'ites who believe in the succession of twelve
imams.
iqta': a grant of land revenues under the Ottoman.
Jabal `Amil: Mount 'limn.
jihad: holy war.
jizya: special poll tax paid by Christians and Jews under Muslim rule.
kuttab: primitive type of school
marja' al-Taqlid: source of emulation.
marajia' (p1 of marja'): an authoritative religious scholars.
VII
matawila (pL of mitwali): sobriquet for the Shi'ites in Lebanon.
millet: religio-national communities.
miri: belonging to state.
mufti: official expounder of religious law.
muhafaza: administrative unit.
mujtahid: one who carries out ijtihad.
Mulk: state property.
multazim: Ottoman tax farmer.
muqata'a: renting contract.
muqata'ji: holder of the right to an iqta'.
mutasarrif governor of a mutasarrifiyya.
mutasarrifiyya: subdivision of a wilaya in Ottoman times. A special term used in
1861 in Mount Lebanon.
nahiya: an Ottoman administrative unite (locality).
qa'immaqamate: sub-district.
qada: sub-district.
risala: thesis.
Sanjaq: district.
sayyid: in Shi'ite lexicon, a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad who is
identified by his black turban.
tapu: ownership registration document.
taqiyya: dissimulation of true belief in the event of danger.
timar: grant of revenue from specified area of land in lieu of salary.
wajib: religious duty.
wujaha (pl of wajih): local notables.
wulat (p1 of wali): governor of a wilaya.
awqaf (pL waqf): religious endowments.
wilaya: province in Ottoman times.
wilayat al-faqili: the rule by a jurisprudent.
zu'ama (pL of .za'im): political leader.
zariba: a barn.
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Abstract
Political Awareness of the
Shi'ites in Lebanon:
The Role of Sayyid `Abd al-Husain Sharaf al-Din
and Sayyid Musa al-Sadr
By: Hussein Gharbieh
There has been little serious academic study for the Shi'ite community in Lebanon. Most
research on the Lebanese Shi'ites dates only from the late 1970s, stimulated by three
events of major significance to the community: the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr
in 1978, the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
However, none of the research conducted so far deals with the development of the
community over time, and thus lacks a crucial depth of understanding of its historical and
contemporary status. The first objective of this thesis is to provide a much-needed
historical framework. Study of the social and economic status of the Shi'ite community
under Ottoman rule and the French Mandate assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the
community and how it developed vis-à-vis the other major communities in Lebanon.
However, social and economic factors alone are insufficient to explain the reasons for the
Shi'ite revival of the later twentieth century. The principal objective of this thesis is to
show how socio-economic factors have influenced the modem development of the
community, and in particular how these have been utilized to the community's benefit.
This utilization began in the early twentieth century by the Shi'ite `ulama, above all by
Sayyid `abd al-Husain Sharaf al-Din (d.1957), the most learned `alim in Jabal 'Anil His
efforts to maintain a Shi'ite leadership for the community were of immense importance,
particularly at the height of the power struggle for the leadership between two well-
established and reputable families, the Shi'ite family of al-As'ad and the Sunni family of
al-Sulh, both from Jabal `Amil. It was Sharaf al-Din's priority to secure a Shi'ite
leadership by supporting al-As'ad and to strengthen the community by launching a series
of welfare organisations through which to raise socio-economic levels. His most
important achievement was the establishment of the modern school of al-Jafarlyya in
Tyre. This school played a major role in the 1958 revolution, and constituted a nucleus
for the resistance movement against President Chamoun.
After Sharaf al-Din's death, his successor Sayyid Musa al-Sadr continued the process of
establishing charity organisations. He also established more wide-ranging, political
institutions which came to play a major role in reforming the community, including the
Shiite Council, Harakat al-Mahrumin, and Afwaj al-Mu qawama al-Lubnaniyya
(Amal). Through these he brought the Shi'ite community onto an equal political footing
with the other major Lebanese communities. After his disappearance in 1978, al-Sadr's
successors capitalized on these institutions and became key players in Lebanese politics
today.
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Map 1: Shi'ites concentration in Lebanon today.
This map has been adapted from Majed Halawi, A Lebanon Defied. Musa al-Sadr and
the Shi' a Community, Westview Press, Oxford, 1992.
Introduction
Introduction
The Shiites of Lebanon are today a forceful partner in administration of the country, in
contrast to their position upon independence in 1943, when they were neglected and
marginalized. The process of transformation, from being marginal to essential partner, has
been poorly researched. Most writing about Lebanon has concentrated on the role of the
two sects which dominated its politics since 1943, the Maronites and the Sunnis. Little
attention has been paid to developments inside the Shilte community. As a result, there is
much confusion about the reasons behind their present revival.
Those few studies which did discuss the Shiites of Lebanon were concerned mainly with
the development of the community only from the late 1960s onwards. The majority of
research has been conducted since the beginning of the 1980s mainly as a result of the
Iranian revolution's influence. Some academics, for example Deeb, referred to the
revivalism of the Shilte community in Lebanon as being dependant largely upon external
factors; that is the Islamic revolution in Iran, the attitudes of President Asad of Syria and
finally the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. 1 Deeb also adds another factor, that is the
disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in 1978, which became a major rallying point for
the community. 2
 Ajami on the other hand, despite his research on Musa al-Sadr, 3 and his
1 Marius Deeb, Militant Islamic Movement in Lebanon: Origins, Social Basis, and Ideologies,
Georgetown University, 1986, p. 3.
2 Deeb, 'Shi'a Movements in Lebanon: their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with
Iran and Syria', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 10, no. 2, 1988, p. 685.
3 Fuad 'Ajami, The Vanished Imam, I.B. Tanis, London, 1986.
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acknowledging the socio-economic changes within the community, attributes Shiite
resurgence to the Israeli invasion in 1982. 1 More encouragingly and in a more detailed
work, Norton2 and Cobban3 looked at the background reasons affecting the Shfite
community, and then lead us to the role of Musa al al-Sad?s movement, Amal, analysing
its role vis-a-vis the key events in 1978 and 1979. In contrast to Deeb, both Norton and
Cobban reject the claim that Shiite revivalism was due to external factors but relate it
rather to indigenous factors.
My attempt here is to show that the real cause of Shiite revivalism goes further back to
the late nineteenth century. The formation of the Mutasarrifiyya in 1861 and the
establishment of the Ottoman Parliament in 1876 were two major factors which forced
the Shiltes to interact with other communities, thus signalling the beginning of a political
and social revivalism that led to the position they occupy today.
The socio-economic factors which affected the Ottoman Empire generally are important
to consider because they also affected various communities in Lebanon. However, this
would not be sufficient without knowing how these effects were capitalised upon by these
communities. The economic weakness of the Ottoman empire vis-a-vis Europe prevented
her from abolishing the old system of trade 'Capitulation', which gave European powers
l 'Ajami, 'Lebanon and its inheritors,' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 63, no. 4-5, 1985, p. 778.
2 Augustus R. Norton, AMAL and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, University of
Texas Press, 1987, pp. 13-37.
3 Helena Cobban, 'The Growth of Shi'i Power in Lebanon and its Implications for the Future', in
J. Cole and N. Keddie, (ed.), Shi'ism and Social Protest, Yale University Press, New haven, 1986, pp.
137-155.
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considerable leverage for interfering in Ottoman internal affairs. This interference was
conducted through participation in the affairs of local communities, such as Christians
and Druzes. In Lebanon for instance, French ties with the Maronites were strong enough
to enable the latter to push, whenever possible, towards achieving their aspirations for
independence. 1861 was a crucial year as the Maronites succeeded with European help to
attain a distinguished position under the new administration of Mount Lebanon known as
Mutasarrifiyya.
Promoting the economic ties of Mount Lebanon and later Beirut as a port with France
created a strong economy for the Maronites and the Sunnis in particular. Political
developments from the turn of the twentieth century to the beginning of World War I,
caused the defeat of the Ottomans as well as later the failure of the Sharifians in achieving
independence. These events were a direct cause for the dismantling of Arab territory
under colonial powers. Subsequently, this gave the Maronites what they had dreamt
that is, independence and the rule of Greater Lebanon.
Being occupants of relatively remote areas in the Biqa' and Jabal 'Amil, known today as
the south, the Shiites were hardly affected by the economic changes which were going on
in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Thus, in contrast to the Sunnis and to the Maronites the
Shiites failed to develop a modern class structure. Lack of external patronage was an
added factor that contributed to their inferior position vis-a-vis the Maronites and the
Sunnis. It was their incorporation into Greater Lebanon in 1920 by the French which
3
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proved to be the catalyst signalling the beginning of change. The French continued to
control Greater Lebanon under the mandate until 1943. The Maronites who had been the
strongest group in the previous regime in Mount Lebanon remained the strongest local
group in Greater Lebanon. The major threat to the new French-backed regime emanated
from the Sunnis of the coast, who agitated to resume their previous links with the Syrian
interior. The Shiites were not generally thought to constitute as strong a threat as the
Sunnis.
The Shiite population is concentrated in three areas of present-day Lebanon: the south
(Jabal 'Amil), the Biqa' on the eastern part of Lebanon, and the capital Beirut. The
Shiites in Jabal 'Amil were settled and dominated by a handful of zu'ama. However,
their power was balanced to a small degree by that of the local Shiite `ulama. The
Shiite `ulama played an important role in the life of Jabal 'Amil throughout the
centuries. They retained and transmitted religious beliefs and they kept the community in
touch with Shiltes in different parts of the world. Jabal 'Amil has had many important
religious teachers whose fame spread throughout the Shiite world. Their importance was
evident in converting Persia in the early sixteenth century into Shi sism. The Shilites of the
Biqa' were different from the Shiltes in Jabal 'AmiL The former were tribal people, living
under the same kind of honour code that regulated the life of semi-nomads throughout
the great deserts of the Syrian interior. Lastly, in Beirut, the Shilte community was very
small but began to develop in greater numbers from the 1960s onwards. The main reason
for this was the constant migration from Jabal 'Amil and the Biqa'. The differences
4
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between the Shiites in Jabal 'Amil, Beirut and the Biqa' did not help them to develop as a
community.
In this thesis my main concern will be to discuss the essential role that the `ulama played
in the improvement of the Shi'ites' status, with especial reference to Sayyid 'Abd al-
Husain Sharaf al-Din and Sayyid Musa al-Sadr. The former's activities began in the early
twentieth century; his main sphere of action was in Jabal `Amil. The latter's activities
began in the 1960s. His sphere of action exceeded Jabal `Amil to include the whole of
Lebanon. Despite various other factors which also contributed to the development of the
Shiite community, it was principally these two individuals who utilised the means
available to them to improve Shiltes status in Lebanon.
Primarily, my main focus will be Jabal 'Am& for several reasons. It was a settled society
with a steady form of social structure represented by relationships between zu'ama,
peasants and `ulama. The geographical position of Jabal `Amil forced the Shi'ites to
become an essential part of the conflict which was going on between the various wulat,
governors, and amirs, local princes, under the Ottomans. Lastly, Jabal 'Amil was
distinguished by possessing a number of prominent `ulama who played an important part
in Shiite teaching throughout the Shilte world.
'The borders of Jabal `Amil, according to the Shi'ites historians, are those south of Awwali
River as far as the borders with Palestine. On the West is the coastal strip which includes Sidon and
Tyre. On the east is Wadi al-Tim and east Biqa'. Muhammad Taqi Faqih, Jabal 'Amil fil-Tarikh, Dar
al-Adwa', Beirut, 1986, pp. 15-16. Muhsin al-Amin, laitata Jabal Amil, al-Dar al-'Alamiyya,
Lebanon, 1983, pp. 61-67. Muhammad Jabir Al-Safa, Tarikh Jabal `Amil, al-Nahar, Beirut, 1981, p. 24.
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As the thesis progresses, from 1960 onward, the focus will not remain on Jabal 'Ara but
will include Beirut and the Biqa'. The reason for this is that al-Sadr began to establish a
number of institutions with objectives broader than just the interests of Jabal `Amil.
Chapter One will focus on the social structure of the Shi'ite community, and how it was
affected by Ottoman administrative policy. It discusses three main issues. Firstly, it
discusses the origin of Shi'ism and its domination in Lebanon in general and Mount
Lebanon in particular, and how this domination declined. Secondly, it will discuss the
Ottoman taxation system and the development and expansion of private control over
land which had once been largely state-owned. This development had serious
consequences on the social structure within the various communities, and produced a
number of dominant families Thirdly, the chapter will discuss the Ottoman administrative
distribution of various wilayas which had immense effect on interaction between the
various communities, in order to show how the Shiites fit into such administration.
Chapter Two will focus on two main issues. On the one hand, it will discuss economic
development in the early nineteenth century, in order to show how the Shi'ites came to
hold an inferior position vis-a-vis other major communities in Mount Lebanon and Beirut.
On the other hand, this chapter will discuss the major Shi'ite political responses towards
various nationalist ideas that emerged in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
6
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century, in order to know how these responses affected their position when Greater
Lebanon was established
In practice it was the Egyptian occupation in 1832 and the French support for Mount
Lebanon and Beirut in the mid-nineteenth century which set the foundations for the social
and economic strengths of the population of these two areas, and as a result a middle
class was developed which was to play a major role in the social challenge that took
place, particularly, in Mount Lebanon. This development did not reach Jabal `Amil,
which therefore, did not develop a middle class. The Shi'ites thus, remained under strict
control of the zu'ama.
Chapter Three will discuss how the roots of change among the Shi'ites began to develop
toward creating a Shi'ite identity in the Lebanese context which has its own interest
distinguished from other communities. The main feature of Jabal `Amil in 1900 was an
intense power struggle between the coastal cities of Sidon and Tyre on one side, and the
interior on the other. Although Jabal 'Amil was a Shiite dominated district, the power
struggle was primarily between the Shiite family of al-As'ad, dominant for almost 400
years vis-a-vis the Sunni family of al-Sulh. The former's power base extended all over
Jabal 'Amil except Sidon. The al-Sulhi power base was also deep rooted in Sidon and
enjoyed Ottoman support. The al-Sulh family was also famous for its activities in the
Arab movements of Syria which attracted many Shiite `ulama and intellectuals,
7
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especially from Sidon and Nabatiyya. This division was to polarise Jabal 'Amil into two
groups: the As'adis, and the Sulhis. This power struggle set the motion for change.
However, it was not feasible for such change to occur without the presence of someone
determined enough to bring it about. This duty manifested itself through the `ulama of
the community, most of whose attempts were unsuccessful, with the notable exception of
one individual, Sayyid 'Abd al-Husain Sharaf al-Din. He achieved his prominent position
in the community through his reputation as a widely respected 'alim whose books were
taught in prominent Shiite schools such as Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran. His awareness
of the need to create a sense of communal identity started in the first decade of the
twentieth century in particular, when the Ottoman call for elections to parliament in
1908 triggered the power struggle between al-As'ad and al-Sulh.
Having a Sunni as a potential leader in Jabal 'Amil was a notion totally rejected by Sayyid
Sharaf al-Din. For him it was inconceivable to hand over the community's leadership to a
Sunni. Therefore he supported al-As'ad. This support was a matter of principle rather
than a matter of choice. At this stage, preserving a Shiite leadership for the community
was his main objective.
Chapter Four will discuss Sharaf al-Din's main objective which was to preserve an al-
As'ad leadership for the Shi'ites. He was also aware of the need to promote modem
education, as an essential means of bringing the community into a parallel position with
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other communities. He worked relentlessly to achieve this objective. His school, al-
Japriyya, became a nucleus for political activity in Tyre in particular and Jabal 'Amil
as a whole, and played a major role in the 1950s' crisis in Lebanon. However, this
political awareness was not to be utilised to advance Shi'ite interests vis-64-vis other
communities, but rather to advance wider issues, such as the Arab cause generally. The
reason for this was spread of revolutionary ideologies among the Shi'ites. As a result,
despite this new political awareness, the Shi'ites did not pursue their own interests as
strongly as did the other major communities and therefore, remained in an inferior
position in Lebanon.
Chapter Five will discuss al-Sadr's arrival in Lebanon and how he managed to
consolidate his position and overcome the opposition he faced. al-Sadr's first few years,
despite the fact they were extremely tense because of this opposition, set the pace for
change within the Shi'ite community. The position which he came to occupy, that is,
imam of Tyre following the death of Sharaf al-Din, was a major advantage which he used
to assert his position in the country in order to undertake certain social reforms.
Becoming the successor of Sharaf al-Din, provided al-Sadr with the motivation to
improve his own position, and to work towards becoming spiritual leader of the Shi'ites.
Chapter Six will discuss the essential steps taken by al-Sadr in order to create an official
Shi'ite identity. Although he began by establishing a series of benevolent organisations, it
was clear to him that the Shiite community would not be equal to others unless a Shiite
9
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council was established similar to the Sunnis and Druzes. By 1967, the Shiite community
was the last to establish its own council of which al-Sadr was the focal point and dynamic
force.
However, as a by-product of this development al-Sadr, unlike his predecessor, became
part of the power struggle against the main Shi'ite za'im Kamil, the head of al-As'ad
family. For al-Sadr, having a Shiite council meant that the affairs of the community were
no longer dominated by a handful of zu'ama. The reason for this power struggle could
also be attributed to the socio-economic modernisation that was affecting Lebanon as a
whole and the Shilites in particular. This process of modernisation caused migration from
villages to cities, and destabilised the relationship between the zu'ama and the peasants.
These changes provided the opportunity for al-Sadr to strengthen his authority within
the Shiite community. Having established a Shiite council, he began establishing a
Lebanese reform movement, Harakat al-Mahrumin, aiming at improving social and
political life in society. Finally, he established a resistance movement called Amal to
defend the south against Israel particularly when the government neglected this part of
the state's responsibility. In the 1980s and 1990s Amal became a major partner in running
Lebanon.
Chapter Seven will discuss al-Sadr's political involvement in Lebanese politics and his
attitude towards various parties. The background reasons for his co-operation and
conflict with the Palestinians, the progressive parties, the government, the Syrians, the
10
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Shiite zu'ama and the Shiite `ulama will be examined. This is in order to find out
whether he was committed to preserving the integrity of Lebanon and the interest of the
Shi'ite community.
Finally, the conclusion will show the essential influence that the `ulama, mainly Sharaf
al-Din and al-Sadr, have had on the life of their followers and consider whether the
development that the Shiites experienced would have happened without their activities.
The `ulama's activities were affected by the social, political and economic circumstances
which dominated the Lebanon. As will be shown, these circumstances dictated the way
that the `ulama acted in society. Certainly, Sharaf al-Din and al-Sack's activities were
essential in the life of the Lebanese community, which without the Shi'ites would have
remained fragmented and under the control of their zu'ama well into 1990s.
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Chapter 1 Ottoman Administration
Map 2: Main towns and villages in Jabal 'Amil mentioned in chapter one, along with the
main villages bordering Palestine and Syria.
This map has been modified from Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, Yale
University press, 1985, p. 271.
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The Ottoman Administrative System and the Autonomy of
Jabal 'Amil
In general, for much of the period between the sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the
manner in which the Ottomans administered their provinces gave local communities a certain
measure of autonomy with which to run their own affairs, as long as they recognised
Ottoman rule and paid the required taxes. Development of the taxation system eventually
transferred control over land from state to private thus providing certain families with strong
power bases which allowed them to control the affairs of their communities.
This chapter is going to discuss three central issues: firstly, the origins of Shfism and its
domination in Lebanon in general and Mount Lebanon in particular, and how this domination
declined; secondly, the development of control over land and its effect upon the autonomy of
the local Lebanese communities; thirdly, in view of the two previous issues, the Shiite
relations with Mount Lebanon and the Ottoman pashas will be discussed in order to find
whether the Shi'ites managed to achieve their autonomy.
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1. The Origins of the Shi'ites in Lebanon
The Shiites of Lebanon are almost all Ithna Ashari, Twelvers, and are believed to be among
the oldest of all Shiite communities. One of the earliest Shiites was Abu-Dharr al-Ghafari, a
companion of the Prophet, and who was one of the first supporters of the claims of Imam
'Ali to be the Prophet's successor;' Jabal 'Amil was where he recruited support for the
Imamate after the Prophet's death. There are two mosques bearing his name in Sarafand and
Mays al-Jabal, although it is doubtful whether Abu-Dharr built them himself2
Shilsm was particularly dominant in the Muslim world in the 10th Century, at a time when the
Shiite Buwayhids were ruling in Iraq and Persia, the Hamdanids in Syria, and the Fatimids
(who were Ismallis) in North Africa, Egypt and Syria. 3 However, the downfall of the
Fatimids and the conquest of Syria by Salah al-Din in the eleventh century began to change
things radically. Subsequently, the military expeditions launched by the Mamluks between
1291 and 1305 expelled the Shiites from many areas in Lebanon. Initially, the Shiites of the
coast were replaced by Snnnis4 because the coastal cities constituted vital trade centres for
the Mamluk and it was important to clear threats of pressure from any potentially hostile
'Muhammad K. Maldd, al-Haraka al-Fikriyya wa al-Adabiyya ft Jabal 'Amil, Dar al-Andalus,
Beirut, 1963, pp. 16-17. Albert Hourani, 'From Jabal 'Amil to Persia', Bulletin of the School of
Oriental and African Studies, 1986, p.133. Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi7 Islam, Yale
University Press, 1985, pp. 264-272.
2 al-Amin, Khitat ..., p. 84. Moojan, op.cit., pp. 264-272.
3 a1-Amin, Khitat ..., pp. 85-91. Hourani, From Jabal ..., p. 133. Muhammad H. al-Miwnffar,
Tarikh al-Shi'a, al-Zahra Press, Beirut, 1979, pp. 139-192. M. H. Tabatabai, al-Shi'a Fil-Islam, al-
Ta'ruf Press, Beirut, pp. 66-73.
4 Kamal Salibi, Modern History of Lebanon, Weidenfeild & Nicolson, London, 1965, p. 4.
Iliya Hank, 'The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East', International Journal
of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 3, 1972, p. 313. Omar A. Tadmuri, Tarikh Tarablus al-Siyasi w'al-
hadari 'Abr al-'Usur, Vol. 1, Dar al-Bilad, Tripoli, 1978, p. 176.
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elements. Having established this, they turned to the mountains overlooking the coastal
highway in order to secure the various trade routes. Three separate Mamhik expeditions were
sent to subdue the ShAtes in Kisrawan, the last of which was successful Subsequently, "the
Mamluks brought Turkoman clans and settled them in the lower parts of Kisrawan to keep
watch over the region and the coastal highway, and also to secure the mountain roads leading
inland to Damascus." These expeditions forced the Shiites to resort to taqiyya,2 and
accordingly they declared themselves to be Shafi'i Sunnis in order to escape annihilation.'
After Ottoman rule was established in 1516, Shiite decline in Mount Lebanon continued
unabated, as land and authority was lost to the expanding Maronite and Druze presence. The
Maronites pushed south from the north and settled in Kisrawan driving out the Shiites
completely from the region, so that by the end of the seventeenth century they sought
employment as agricultural workers among the Druze in al-Shuf as well as settling in villages
alongside them.4
The period of Druze dominance began in about 1585 when the Ottomans appointed Fakhr
al-Din Main II (1585-1633) to administer the two sanjaks of Beirut and Sidon on their
behalf leaving it to him to establish control of the coastal and mountain territories involved.
1 Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, I.B. Tauris, London, 1988, pp. 3-14.
2 Taqiyya is an Islamic concept but only recognised by Shi'ites-whom allows Muslim to conceal
their true belief and declare another so as to avoid oppression.
3 Majed Halawi, A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shi'a Community, Westview Press,
Oxford, 1992, p. 31.
4 William Polk, The Opening of South Lebanon 1788-1840, Harvard University Press, 1963,
p. 81.
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By 1605, this Druze leader, whose official title was Sanjak Beyi, or Amir Liwa, came to
control the whole territory of these two sanjaks, which included Jabal Kisrawan along with
the different parts of Jabal al-Shuf Due to the resumption of war between the Ottomans and
the Safavids in the early seventeenth century, the Ottomans had also assigned to Fakhr al-Din
the sanjak of Safad, which included the whole territory of Galilee and Jabal 'Mill along with
the coastal towns of Tyre and Acre.'
The Druze influence increased when an alliance between the Maronite and Druze
communities was concluded in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. As a result,
northern Lebanon was incorporated into the imarate of the Druze Fakhr al-Din of southern
Lebanon, and thus the establishment of the imarate of Mount Lebanon in 1627.2
Despite these development in Mount Lebanon, the Shiites in the north did make a comeback
to Mount Lebanon under the leadership of the Hamadeh shaikhs from the Balbek region.
Since the mid-seventeenth century the Maronite districts of Bisharri, Batrun, and Jubayl, as
well as the Melchite district of the Kura had fallen under the control of the Hamadeh shatihs
who had held these Christian districts under licence from the Ottoman Pashas of Tripoli
However, they enjoyed this renewed influence only for a brief period. In the Ki&rawan,
Maronite sheikhs of the Klrazin family, backed by the Mans, had succeeded in recovering a
1 Salibi, A House ..., pp. 66, 126.
2 Leila Meo, Lebanon Improbable Nation, Indiana University Press, 1965, p.12.
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considerable expanse of land from the Shiites who had resettled there since late Mamluk
times.'
Map 3: Shi'ite presence in Tripoli and Mount Lebanon
Before Mainluk and Ottoman rule.
This map has been drawn according to the information presented by al-Amin, Khitat
pp. 85-91. Hourani, Prom Jabal ...., p. 133. al-Mnzaffar, op.cit., pp. 139-192. Tabatabai,
op.cit., pp. 66-73. Salibi, Modern History..., p. 4. Hank, The Ethnic Revolution ...., p.
313. Tadmuri, op.cit, p. 176. Polk, The Opening	 1963, p. 81.
The Shfites decline continued when the Shiliab family tookover the imarate in 1697. The
Maronites in Jibbat Bisharri rose up in aims against their Shiite lords in the middle of the
eighteenth century and proceeded to join the feudal system of southern Lebanon headed by
the Shiliab dynasty, which by 1764 had united Mount Lebanon under their authority. 2 By the
mid nineteenth century the Shaes had become the second smallest community within Mount
1 Salibi, Modern ..., p.4.. Hourani, 'Lebanon: the Development of a Political Society', in Leonard
Binder, (ed.), Politics in Lebanon, John Wiley, London, 1966, p. 19.
2 Harik, 'The Ethnic Revolution ... pp. 313-314.
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Lebanon. The aggregate population of Mount Lebanon, excluding the Sunnis,' was 213,070
out of whom 95,350 were Maronites, 41,090 Greek Catholics, 35,600 Druzes, 28,500 Greek
orthodox, 12,330 Matawilah (Shiites) and some 200 Jews.2
As a result of Maronite-Druze expansion in Mount Lebanon, the Shi'ites became
concentrated only in the Biqa' and Jabal `Amil on the East and the south of Mount Lebanon
consecutively. Being confined in these two areas, the fortunes of the Biqa' became more
closely involved with those of the Syrian interior. As for Jabal 'Anil, its geographical
position between Mount Lebanon and North Palestine put the area in the heart of the conflict
which was going on between the various Ottoman wulat and governors of sanjaks mainly
Mount Lebanon.
Our concern here will be Jabal 'Anil as the Shrites there interacted much more with
neighbouring areas than did the Shi'ites of the Biqa'. This increased interaction came about
due to changes in the Ottoman taxation system which gradually transferred control over land
from public to private. This interaction began when Jabal `Amfl, which was a nahiya in the
Sanjak of Safad, was put under the authority of the amir of the Mountain, Fakhr al-Din, to
administer. As the amir was responsible for tax-collecting, conflict with the Shrites arose
when they refused to pay taxes in time of crisis.
'The Sunnis were not considered part of the minorities.
2 Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History, Macmillan, London, 1967, p.435.
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2. The Ottoman Taxation System and the development of land control
The Ottoman taxation system greatly affected the relationships between the communities of
Mount Lebanon and the neighbouring areas, causing extensive social change and the
development of a new landlord class.' Due to the militant character of the early Ottoman
state, cultivated lands in newly-conquered areas were always declared state property and their
revenues assigned in the way most efficient to support the military-administrative organisation
of the state. However, the archetypal Ottoman timar system was not introduced into
Lebanon. Instead the Ottomans attempted from the first to impose state control through use
of short-term tax-collecting contracts (muqata'a) held by local Lebanese notables. By the
end of the sixteenth century such contracts had begun to develop into longer-term
appointments in the hands of a few increasingly prominent local families, leading eventually to
the rise of influential muqata'ji notables. 2 Until the late eighteenth century, Ottoman control
in Lebanon was exercised largely through this system, and resulted in a relatively large degree
of autonomy.
2.1 Development of control over land since the eighteenth century
The Ottoman empire passed through a serious crises during the period 1768-1839 which
prompted the empire to initiate major reforms (the so-called tanzimat) promulgated by a
firman in 1839. From 1847-1858, the extension of hereditary rights on miri lands allowed
1 Wajih Kawtharani, al-Ittijahat al-ljtima'iyya wa al- Siyasiyya fi Jabal Lubnan wa al-
Mashriq al-'Arabi, Bahsun Press, Beirut, 1986, p.13.
2 R Inalcik, & D. Quataert, (eds.), An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire,
1300-1914, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 55, 139-40, 170-71.
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certain families to consolidate and extend their control over large areas and population. These
developments were more evident in the case of Mount Lebanon than elsewhere. Due to the
Ottoman taxation system the two major communities in Mount Lebanon, the Druzes and the
Maronites, enjoyed considerable freedom in the running of their own affairs under the
leadership of the Ma'ns (1516-1697) and the Slnliabs (1697-1842). Moreover, sometimes the
amirs, because they were intermediaries, were given authority which far exceeded Mount
Lebanon. In return the Mains and the Shiliabs made sure that the Ottoman treasury received
the taxes for the areas under their control. However, it was also the case that the autonomy of
Mount Lebanon fluctuated according to the strength of the Ottoman central government at
any given time. The autonomy of Mount Lebanon has been thoroughly documented, 1 but
what is known about the Shi'ites of Jabal 'Amil is minimal 
3. Shi'ite relations with Mount Lebanon and the Ottoman Pashas
As shown above, iqta in Mount Lebanon developed due to Ottoman administration. Iqta
denotes:
a system of socio-economic and political organisation composed of
muqata'as in which political authority was distributed among quasi-
independent feudal families (muqata'jis). Now unlike other areas, the
muqata'as in Lebanon were not organised as military fiefs, in the sense that
1 Yusuf Choueiri, 'Ottoman Reform and Lebanese Patriotism', in N. Shehadi, (ed.), Lebanon,
I.B. Tauris, London, 1988. Mas'ud Dahir, al-Intifadat al-Lubnaniyya did al-Nizam al-Muqata'ji, Dar
al-Farabi, Beirut, 1988. Dahir, al-Juzur al-Ta tifiyya Lil Masala al-Lubnaniyya 1697-1860, Beirut,
1981. Dahir, Tarikh Lubnan al-Ijtima'i 1914-1926, Dar al-Farabi, Beirut, 1974. Leila Fawaz, Merchants
and Migrants in Nineteenth Century Beirut, Harvard University Press, 1983. Carolyne Gates, The
Historical Role in the Development of Political Economy in Lebanon, Center for Lebanese Studies, No.
10,1989. Yusuf Hakim, Beirut wa Lubnan fi rAhd al-Othman, al-Nahar, Beirut, 1980. Hank, Politics
and Change in a Tradition Society: Lebanon, 1711-1845, Princeton University Press, 1968.
Kawtharani, al-Ittijahat . Samir Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament, Culombia University Press, New
York, 1987. Meo, op.cit, Polk, The Opening .... Salibi, Modern	 Salibi, A House .... John Spagnolo,
France & Ottoman Lebanon 1861-1914, London, 1977.
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the fief holders were not expected to perform military duties in return for the
mulatto's allotted to them. The muqata'jis of Mount Lebanon lived on rural
estates and not in garrison towns.'
The various muqata'jis of Mount Lebanon were subservient to the amir or hakim who
occupied an office that was naturally vested in a particular family. The amir received his
yearly investiture through one of the sultan's representatives, the pashas of either Sidon,
Tripoli, or Damascus under whose administration Lebanon and its dependencies were divided.
Through the pashas, the amir also forwarded his annual tribute, miri, to the Ottoman
treasury. In effect, however, neither the sultans nor most of the pashas until the time of
Ahmad Pasha al-Ja77ar of Sidon (1776-1804) meddled very much in the internal affairs of
Mount Lebanon, with the result that the amirs of Mount Lebanon enjoyed considerable
autonomy in exercising their authority. They had the double task of dealing with the demands
of the Ottoman pashas and acting as arbitrator between the muqata'jis in cases of internal
conflict.
The specific duties of collecting taxes, maintaining peace and order,
extracting a limited annual amount of unpaid labour from the peasant, and
exercising judicial authority of first instance over local, civil, and criminal
cases involving penalties short of death were all part of the traditional
authority of the muqata'jis.2
The importance of each amir varied according to the size of the territories he commanded and
for whose taxes he was responsible. At various times the amirs extended their influence over
more territory and reached as far north as the hinterland of Syria and Palestine and even
1 1thalaf, Lebanon's ..., p. 25.
2 Ibid., p. 24. E. Hagopian & S. Farsoun, (ed.) South Lebanon, special report No. 2, AAAUG,
August, 1978, p. 12. Polk, op.eit, p. 10. Dahir, al-Intifadat ... pp. 32-34.
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towards the borders of Damascus.' It was therefore the size of the tax farm which
counted. 2
 However, the influence that the Mans and later the Slnlabs enjoyed put them in
direct conflict with the neighbouring nahiya of Jabal 'AmiL The Shi'ites of Jabal Vilna
therefore had to deal with them directly. Being of different religions and because the memory
of the Mamluk and the Ottoman expedition against the Shi'ites was still vivid, tension between
the Mountain and Jabal `Amil developed.
In view of the development of the taxation system, two issues will be examined. First is
Ottoman attitudes towards the Shi'ites and their effect on the interaction between the Shiite,
Dnize and Maronite communities on the one hand and with the Ottoman pashas on the
other. Because of these interactions a Shi'ite leader was needed to protect the interests of
Jabal `Amil. The powerful Shiite family of 'Ali al-Saghir assumed this role from 16493
onwards but its influence had diminished by the mid twentieth century. The second point for
examination is how the Shi'ite autonomy was established.
3.1 Ottoman attitudes towards the Shi'ites and their effects on inter-communal
conffict
The role of the Shiites in inter-communal conflicts in Lebanon has been generally overlooked
by historians,4 and whenever Shiites are mentioned it tends to be not for their own sake but in
1 Kawtharani, op.cit, p.14. Spagnolo, France & Ottoman ..., pp. 10-13. Basim al-Jisr, Mithaq
1943, Dar al-Nahar, Beirut, 1978. p.121.
2 Kawtharani, op.cit, p. 17.
3 al-Faqih, op.cit., p. 370.
4 Some of these studies are: Dahir, 	 . Salibi, Modern Meo, op.cit. Polk, The
Opening .... Salibi, A House .... Spagnolo, France & Ottoman....
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a wider context in order to complete, for instance, study of a Druze-Maronite relationship in
Mount Lebanon. These historians and their studies often refer to battles between the Man
and the Shilab Amirs of the Mountain and the Shiite leaders of Jabal 'Amil and the Biqa in
the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
It is important to understand the attitudes of the Ottomans towards the Shiites, so as to
establish how it affected the latter's relationships with other communities. There were two
major factors which formed the basis of the Ottoman-Shfite relationship which subsequently
contributed to the deterioration in relations between them. The first factor was external and
related to the war between the Ottomans and Safavids, while the other was due to the
Ottomans' perception of non-Sunni Muslim sects in general.
Because of Ottoman-Safavid conflict, early sixteenth to eighteenth century, the Ottomans
were automatically suspicious of the loyalty of any Shile community within their territories.
In addition, Iran's invitation to a number of `ulama from Jabal `Amil was an added factor in
Ottoman attitudes to Lebanese Shi'ites.
The accession of Shah Abbas I (d.1629) to the Iranian throne in 1587 renewed the Safavid
threat to Ottoman territories.' Salibi relates antagonism towards the Shi'ites to some co-
operation between the Safavids and the Shiites of Lebanon, but he does not mention the
nature of this co-operation and what assistance the Shiites of Lebanon received and how
'Salibi., A House ..., p.126.
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effective it was. He claims that the Safavids could use local Shiite political leverage against
the Ottomans not only in Jabal 'Amil but also in the Belbek region. He says:
There, it seem, they had long been associated with the house of Harfush, to
whom the Ottomans normally entrusted the management of the Nahiya of
Ba'lbek With the resurgence of Safavid power in Persia, the Harfush Amirs
began to seek an extension of their power to the strategic town of Mashghara
in the southern Biqa valley in order to secure contact with their fellow Shiites
within Jabal Amil. 1
In fact, as far as Jabal 'Amil was concerned it does not seem that there was any diplomatic co-
operation with the Safavids. On the contrary, Shiites' opposition to the Ottomans was
locally motivated, as shall be explained later.
Due to the Ottoman-Safavid conflict it was important that the former protect their trade
routes from any possible Shiite threat. In order to do so, the Ottomans chose Fakhr al-Din 11
who was appointed in 1585 Amir Liwa, governor, of the Sanjak of Sidon within the wilayat
of Damascus. Fakhr al-Din's authority stretched over the sanjak of Beirut, Sidon and Safad.
As a result, this gave him direct control over the Shiites of Jabal Amil which was a nahiya of
Safad. 2 Relations between the Druzes and the Shi'ites began to deteriorate during Fakhr al-
Din's imarate.
Shaikh Ahmad Rida describes the situation of the Shiites in Jabal 'Amil under the rule of the
Ma'ns:
Ibid.
2 Ibid.
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The rule of Barn Man squeezed all of the resources from Jabal Prince
Fakhr al-Din occupied the area surrounding Kawthariyya, which is the centre
of the 'Ali al-Saghir family. His soldiers killed and plundered there for three
days. Then they attacked the surrounding villages ... The Mutwalis were
suffering ... In 1638, Milliim ibn Ma'n entered Ansar, looking for his opponent
Prince 'Alam al-Din. 1,500 Mutvvali were killed in the attack ... This situation
made the Mutwali aware of the importance of independence, and during the
rule of Prince Ahmad al-Ma'n, they announced their independence from
Lebanon. The prince opposed this move and in 1665, attacked Nabatiyya
The fire was kindled between the Ma'ns and the Matawila leaders ... The
people had reached such a high point of solidarity, that even a farmer shooting
an animal brought a response.'
The Ottoman policy of granting such a wide authority to Fakhr al-Din who was a muqata'ji
inevitably lead to conflict with other muqata'jis.
The expansion of the authority of the Amirs of Mount Lebanon was closely connected with
the process of tax-collecting. Shiite leaders generally refused to pay taxes to the amirs
whenever possible. According to Dahir, this had the effect of making members of the
community feel that they would be more secure if they remained grouped in their
communities under the leadership of a strong leader, and would thus explain the muqata'jis'
exploitation of the peasants. 2
 On the other hand, Khalaf and Hank have both mentioned that
political allegiance was by no means always based on religious or ethnic considerations and
that political loyalty often cut across sectarian lines. 3
 Certainly the statement by Khalaf and
Harik was still very much applicable to the Maronite-Druze relationship before it was
disrupted in 1840. On the other hand, Dahir's view is very much applicable to the Shiites in
Ahrnad Rida, 'al-Mutwali	 fi Jabal 'Arnil', al-7rfan, Vol. 2, June 1910, p. 15.
2 Dahir, al-Juzur	 p. 495. Muzaffar, op. cit., p. 155.
3 Harilc, Politics and Change...., p. 42. Khalaf, Lebanon ..., p. 29.
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Jabal `Amil, whose experience of Ottoman rule was very much alive in their minds as they
were expelled from various areas in Mount Lebanon and were replaced by Maronites. In
addition, other factors also forced the Shiles to rally behind a Shi'ite leader. Such factors
were that Jabal 'Amil was predominantly a Shiite area with the exception of few Christian and
Sunni villages, that the Shi'ites lacked an external patron to advocate their interest, and that
the region is quite remote and the Shiites therefore lived in isolation from the other major
communities. In such circumstances, it was the family of 'Ali al-Sag,hir that acted as
protectors of the Shi'ites.
There was also an added external factor which further enhanced the cohesiveness of the
Shfites, that is, the Ottoman millet system. This system allowed Christians and Jews to live in
the Ottoman Muslim state under their own religious laws which covered personal and
property matters, and administered by their own clergy.' However, non-Sunni Muslims in the
Ottoman Empire were not granted a similar arrangement. The Shiites were considered
heterodox by the Ottomans and this placed them under the direct jurisdiction of Sunni
courts in personal status matters.2 Even Shile 'nlama were not speared from conscription in
times of wars like the Sunni 'ulama 3
1 Hourani, A Vision of History: Near Eastern and other essays, Khayats, Beirut, p.72-3. A.
Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World, Oxford University Press, 1947, p. 21.
2 Meo, op.cit., p. 60. al-Amin, Khitat... , pp. 135-6. Hank, Politics and Change..., pp. 272-273.
This was apparent in the 1840s when Mount Lebanon was divided into two qa'immaqamates, one headed by
a Maronite and the other by a Druze. In addition, in 1845 an elected council was established to assist the
governor. Each council consisted of twelve members, two for each sect living in Mount Lebanon and each
community was represented by a councillor and a judge, with the exception of the Shi'ites who were to elect a
councillor only, while their judicial affairs were handled by the Sunni Muslim judge.
3 al-Amin, Khitat ..., p. 126.
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Due to this Ottoman treatment, the Shiites were suspicious of their policy. Being confined
and isolated in Jabal 'Amil they were in no position to extend their authority outside their area
but rather they were preoccupied with trying to protect themselves. Shi'ite reaction against
this lack of recognition as a separate millet thus contributed to their increasing cohesiveness
Other non-Sunni Muslims such as the Druzes also did not fit within the framework of the
Ottoman millet system.
While the Ottomans treated people of this community as Muslims for
administrative purposes and taxed them on that basis, they never looked upon
them as genuine Muslims Also occasionally, the Ottomans would levy a
special tax on the Druzes, a poll tax similar to Jiga collected from the
Christians and Jews, which was also imposed on the Nusayris.1
In general it may be concluded that the Shiites could enjoy a measure of non-interference on
the part of the government as long as they recognised the authority of the Ottomans and paid
their taxes. Additional factors contributed to this autonomy, such as the alliances the Shi'ites
conducted with different sanjak Beyi and walls in the eighteenth century. However, the
geographical location of Jabal 'Anal brought the Shi'ites straight into a conflict between the
wilayas and sanjaks which subsequently affected the Shi'ites' autonomy.
3.2 Shi'ite autonomy and communal conflict 1768-1865
The Shae territory of Jabal 'Amil was never a wilaya or even a sanjak but was always part
of the sanjak of Safad which belonged either to the wilaya of Damascus or to that of
I Abd al-Rahim abu-Husayn, 'Problems in the Ottoman Administration in Syria During the 16th
and 17th centuries: the Case of the Sanjak of Sidon-Beirut, IJMES, Vol. 24, 1992. p.666.
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Sidon. Jabal `Amil being between Mount Lebanon and north Palestine, became a battle
ground particularly when fighting broke out between the amirs of the Mountain and the
governor of Safad. Such circumstances allowed the Shi'ites to manoeuvre and take advantage
of the situation, such that for much of the period 1768-1865 the community was autonomous.
This autonomy was only briefly interrupted twice in 1780 due to the ascendancy of Ahmad
al-Ja77ar Pasha (1775-1804), and in 1832 due to the Egyptian occupation.
Between 1768 and 1780, the Shiite leaders formed alliances with Zahir al-Umar (1686-776)
governor of the sanjak of Galilee, and with the walis of Sidon at the end of the eighteenth
century. In 1840, somewhat ironically, Shiite leaders would periodically form alliances with
the Ottomans themselves against the Amir of the Mountain in order to maintain their
autonomy as will be discussed shortly.
The issue of Shi'ite autonomy has always been controversial among the Shi'ite historians.
Makki and Al-Safa discuss the conditions of the Sh?ites under the Ottomans in some detail
The former suggests 1660 as the beginning of Shi'ite autonomy, that is, when Jabal 'Anil
was included into the wilaya of Sidon.' In contrast Al-Safi suggests 1705 when Bashir
Pasha of Sidon gave autonomy to the Shiites after some of their leaders were captured by
Bashir I Shiliab. Both Makki and Al-Safa however, do agree that the first period of Sh?ite
autonomy ended under al-Ja772r in 1780.
i Makki, al-Haraka al-Fikriyya	 p. 138.
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However, the years mentioned by Makki and Al-Safa cannot be considered the beginning of
Shiite autonomy, because at these dates the Ma ins controlled the sanjak of Safad to which
Jabal 'Amil belonged. Moreover, the Shiites do not seem to have been able to achieve
autonomy under the Ma ins and even under the Shillabs. They suffered devastating defeats in
1698 and 1705 when orders were sent by Arslan Pasha and later Bashir Pasha of Sidon to
the Slitlabs to end the rebellion of the Shiites who were refusing to pay the taxes.'
Although it is true that the Shiites never accepted Ma in rule and that they always launched
guerrilla attacks, they nevertheless failed to achieve the autonomy they were hoping for. The
first indication of Shae autonomy appears only in 1768 when they rose against Zahir al-
'Umar the governor of the Galilee and later established an alliance with him under which they
administered Jabal 'Amil until 1780. This autonomy was established under the leadership of
Nasif al-Nassar 'Ali al-Saghir (d.1780) 2 who challenged Zahir al- iUmar when the latter
attempted to extend his authority over some Shiite villages.
Under the leadership of Nasif al-Nassar the Shiite community fought
successfully through four major campaigns and defended itself Zahir al-Umar
wanted to extend his control into the Shiite villages of al-Bassa and Marun
claiming that they were part of the territory of Palestine. al-Nassar responded
by declaring war on him, and fighting broke out at the borders of Dulab
Tarbikha in 1767 where the Shiite gained the upper hand and al- iUmar himself
was captured. After the fighting, the two leaders settled the dispute and
entered into a strategic alliance. 3
Salim Hashi, Tarikh al-Umara al-Shihabiyn Bkalam Ahad Umara'ihim, Department of
Heritage, Beirut, 1971, pp. 87-90.
2 His date of birth is unknown.
3 al-Faqih, Jabal 'Amil ..., pp. 206-208.
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This alliance between al-Nassar and al-'Umar was a necessity for the Shi'ites to maintain
autonomy because they did not have an external patron to assist them diplomatically. Their
only significant outside connections were with the Holy cities of Najaf and Karbala and those
were only religious in nature. They also could not seek assistance from European powers
because most Shi'ites genuinely believed that the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state which
should be defended against any foreign power. As a result, the Shi'ites in Jabal 'Amil were
left with no choice but to try to enter into local alliances in order to protect their interests.
For al-Umar his alliance with al-Nassar was also a necessity. This is because his influence
began to increase when he joined forces with the governor of Egypt 'Ali Bey in his campaigns
against Urfunan Pasha of Damascus and his son Darwish Pasha of Sidon. Conflict between
the Ottoman governors inevitably dragged local communities in Mount Lebanon and Jabal
'Amil into the fray. 9Uthman Pasha sought assistance from the amir of Mount Lebanon
Yusuf SHIA, against al- rUmar and his allies the Shiites.' Al-Umar realised that an alliance
with the Shiites would prevent any attack from the northern front while he concentrated his
efforts against his rivals Darwish and 'Uthman pashas.
Both al-Umar and al-Nassar posed formidable challenges to the walls of Damascus and
Sidon, and as a result of the alliance the ShPites found another opportunity to stop paying
taxes to Sidon. This gave the incentive for Uthman Pasha, Amir Yusuf and Darwish Pasha to
begin their military campaign. In 1771, two campaigns were launched. The first was in August
1 Hashi, op.cit, pp. 112-113.
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against Uthman Pasha in the south of Jabal 'Amil near Hula lake known as al-Babra. 1 The
other was in October against Amir Yusuf and was known as Kafr Rumman-Nabatiyya. 2 The
eighteenth-century traveller, Baron de Tott, captured the spirit of the Sh?ite community:
The Mutualis who inhibit the Anti-Lebanon, from Sidon to Acre, are less
numerous than the Druses; but the castles they occupy render them as swift to
rebel and as difficult to subjugate ... [and] the cavalry in the pay of their Chedis
are much more warlike ... The expedition which advanced the glory of the
Mutualis to its highest pitch was when 40.000 Druzes, aimed to assist the
Porte, and animated by the hope of plunder, issued from their mountains to lay
waste the country. The Cheik Nassit at the head of 3000 horsemen, supported
by some auxiliary troops from Cheik-Daher, Governor of Acre, advanced to
meet them under the walls of Sidon; he attacked them in good order, and put
them to flight at the first onset. This celebrated victory rendered the name of
Mutualis formidable, and deprived the Druses of that superiority they had
always maintained in Syria.3
In June 1772, both Amir Yusuf and Uthman Pasha once more tried unsuccessfully to subdue
the Sh?ites and al-Umar.4
For a while, the Shiites and al-Umar played an essential role in determining the fate of the
Amir of Mount Lebanon. Late in 1772, tensions began to develop between Amir Yusuf and
Uthman Pasha due to the misconduct of the Amir's brother, Sayyid Ahmad, who raided trade
caravans coming from Damascus to the Biqa. Yusuf s reluctance to punish his brother
angered the Pasha who ordered his forces to move to Dayr al-Qamar in the Mountain. As a
result, Amir Yusuf turned to al-Nassar and al-Umar for assistance. The Shi'ites saw this as a
1 A1-Safa, op.cit, p. 122.
2 Hashi, op.cit, pp. 113-114.
3 Halawi, op.cit., p.33.
4 Al-Safa, op.cit, p. 132.
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good opportunity to weaken the Pasha's authority as they joined forces with Amir Yusuf and
subsequently were victorious. On his way back to the Galilee, 'Ali, son of al- Umar looted
the villages while al-Nassar avoided such action and maintained good relations with his
neighbours.'
In 1776, al-Umar was killed and in the same year Ahmad al-Jamr was appointed Pasha of
Sidon.2 A1-Ja77ar worked relentlessly to control Jabal 'Amil and managed to do so in 1780
after the battle of Yart.m where al-Nassar was killed. He then sent his forces to ransack the
SIgite libraries in various villages in Jabal 'Amil which were rich in valuable manuscripts.3
With the death of al-Nassar the early autonomy of the Shi'ites ended. In 1783, due to the
heavy-handed policies of al-Jaz7ar, the Shi'ites held a meeting at Shuhur village to organise
guerrilla attacks against him and as a result, the attacks continued throughout his rule. In 1804
al-Ja77ar died and was succeeded by Sulaiman Pasha who signed a treaty with the Shiites in
the same year in order to end their attacks. The agreement was signed at Bayt al-Din as a
result of the mediation of Amir Bashir IL (1788-1840). This agreement restored the
autonomy to the Shfites and granted a general amnesty for all Shae rebels, compensation for
their losses after the battle of Yarun, and granted the community the right to solve its internal
problems without interference from the Ottomans. 4
 This treaty was later renewed5 by
Abdullah Pasha who faced a rebellion in Mount Lebanon because of his excessive taxation.6
1 Hashi, op.cit, pp. 125-126.
2 Salibi, Modern ...., p. 46.
3 Salibi, a House ..., p. 105. Dahir, al-Juzur ..., p. 409.
4 Al-Safa, op.cit, pp. 141-142.
5 Ibid.
6 Polk. The Opening ..., p. 20.
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In return the Shiites agreed to submit to conscription when and if necessary, and
subsequently they joined 'Abdullah Pasha in his fight against the Wali of Damascus, Darwish
Pasha, at al-Mazza and fisr Banat Yasqub. 1 It may be said that generally the Shiites retained
their autonomy until the invasion of Syria by Ibrahim Pasha in 1832.
The Egyptian occupation of Syria not only ended the autonomy of the Shi'ites in Jabal Vimil
but also had far more serious consequences. This occupation paved the way for European
intervention in Ottoman affairs through the various Lebanese communities, and caused social
and economic differences between local communities.
Egyptian policy in Lebanon caused considerable conflicts between the local communities
some of which only emerged after the Egyptians departure. Jabal 'Amil came under the
control of Bashir 11 Shiliab whose family had often attacked the Shiites in the past. The
Shilabi-Egyptian alliance overturned the balance of power under which the various
communities had lived, 2 and also contributed to other trends which profoundly affected the
Middle East, making it generally much more open to foreign influences.3
Amir Bashir ll allied himself totally with the Egyptians and followed a policy that had
devastating result. The main lines of this policy were that taxes were increased many times,
the communities were forbidden to keep their weapons, and universal conscription and corvie
1 Al-Safa, op.cit, pp. 141-142.
2 Salibi, Modern ...., p. 36.
3 Cobban, The Making of Modern Lebanon, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, p. 38. Polk, The
Opening ...., p. 10.
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labour were imposed. The Shiites felt themselves and their interests under threat, and
considered themselves discriminated against in favour of the Shiliabs and the Maronites
generally. This encouraged the Shiites to rebel in 1839 under the leadership of Hamad al-
Mahmud of the al-Saghir family.' His leadership was enhanced when the Ottomans entrusted
him with the task of ending the Egyptian occupation in Jabal `Amil and Safad. The Ottomans
rewarded al-Mahmud by restoring the autonomy of the Shi'ites which lasted from 1840 until
1865 when the Ottomans began to rule Jabal `Amil directly.
3.3 The beginning of the decline
The restoration of Ottoman in Syria, and various commercial conventions between the
Ottomans and other European powers between 1839-1840 opened the region to increased
European economic penetration. This intervention was assisted considerably by intermediaries
from the local religious minorities, 2
 particularly when European powers claimed protection
over any one of the minorities. The British gave support to the Druzes, the French had long
and well established ties with the Maronites, and the Russians supported the Orthodox. The
foreign protectors were to play a vital part in promoting and advancing the interests of
these minorities. However, the Shiites had no external patron and therefore had to establish
relations with the Ottomans.
Mount Lebanon was a major recipient of both Egyptian and European attention which
eventually put an end to the old iqtal system in the Mountain. As a result, soon after the
Al-Safa, op. cit., p. 150.
2 Tabitha Petran, Syria, Ernest Bean Ltd, London, 1972, p. 46. Polk, The Opening ..., p. 213.
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Egyptian withdrawal tension between the Maronite and Druze communities began to surface
and culminated in armed clashes which broke out between them in 1841. It was suggested that
Mount Lebanon should be partitioned into two qa'immaqamates, one to be run by a
Maronite and the other by a Druze. 1 This division did not spare the two communities further
conflict because the qa'immaqamates had mixed populations, and conflict was bound to re-
occur and take the shape of a sectarian conflict, which indeed did result in a large scale civil
war in 1860.2 The conflict in Mount Lebanon had affected neighbouring areas. The Shiites of
Balbek joined the Druzes,3 while the Shaes of the village of Shiyah in Beirut 4 and most of
the Shiites of Jabal 'Anil' protected and defended the Maronite refugees.
Following the massacre of the Christians in 1860, the French intervened militarily to put an
end to the conflict. A conference of representatives of the European powers convened in
Beirut to initiate the reorganisation of Mount Lebanon as a political entity of special standing
within the Ottoman system. The outcome was the abolition of the double qa'immaqamate of
the 1840, and the establishment of the privileged Ottoman sanjak or mutasamfiyya under the
guarantee of the six major powers: Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia and Sardinia.
The mutasarrifiyya was to be governed by a Christian from outside the Mountain, who was
to be nominated by the powers represented in the commission. This in fact meant that this part
1 Salibi, op.cit., p. 97.
2 Hai*, Politics ..., pp. 273-276.
3 Ibid., P. 138.
4 Fuad Khuri, 'Sectarian Loyalty Among Rural Migrants in two Lebanese Suburbs: a Stage
Between Family and National Allegiance', in R. Antoun & I. Hank, (ed.), Rural Politics and Social
Change in the Middle East, Indiana Press, 1974, p. 203.
5 al-Faqih, op.cit, p. 311.
35
Chapter 1 	  Ottoman Administration
of Lebanon was officially and internationally recognised as territory of special administrative
character within historical Syria. Europe's relations were mainly confined to Mount Lebanon,
and brought to it economic prosperity. As for Jabal `Amil, life remained unchanged. In
general the Shi'ites maintained their good relations with the Ottomans, as shown when the
Shi'ite leadership took part in the commission which was set up by Fuad Pasha to investigate
the causes of the civil war. He appointed the Shiite leader 'Ali al-As'ad, who succeeded
Hamad al-Mahmud in 1852, to the commission and put him in charge of maintaining order in
east Lebanon, around Damascus and in the Hawran. 1 The leadership of al-'Ali al-As'ad was
disrupted when Thamir al-Husain, his cousin, competed with him for the leadership of the
community in Jabal 'AmiL
Continuing rivalry between 'Ali and Thamir provided the Ottomans with the opportunity to
control Jabal 'Amil directly. This happened in 1865 when Khurshid Pasha of Sidon arrested
'Ali al-As'ad who was sent to Damascus and later died of Cholera. Later that year the wilaya
of Sidon was abolished and Jabal 'Amil became part of vvilaya of Syria which was divided
into three qadas Tyre, Sidon and Marj'ayun, and subjected to direct rule until the end of
World War 12
It is worth noticing that the first and the second periods of Shiite autonomy came to an end
because of external factors, while the third ended after an internal conflict between Shfite
1- Al-Safa, op.cit, p. 160. al-Faqih, op.cit., p. 311.
2 Khalaf, Lebanon's..., p. 6. Al-Safa, op.cit., 1981, pp. 55-60.
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factions. The Ottomans benefited from the situation and took over the direct control of Jabal
'Amil in 1865 after the death of 'Ali al-As'ad.
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The Effect of Economic Development and
the Rise of Nationalism on the
Shi'ites of Jabal `Amil 1800-1943
The main objective in this chapter is to discuss whether the Shi'ites benefited from the
economic development which Lebanon experienced in the nineteenth century and the first half
of the twentieth century. This is in order to establish how the economic development affected
the status of the various Lebanese commimities and its effects on their social structure before
and after the establishment of Greater Lebanon. Secondly, this chapter will also discuss the
differing political tendencies among the Shiites towards various nationalist ideas which were
emerging in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in order to establish their political
affiliation. The effect of their political affiliation will be discussed in the next chapter.
In the course of the hundred years or so before World War I, Lebanon experienced
appreciable economic progress. "Its economic, social and political structure were entangled
within the complex dyirmics of Ottoman reform and European expansion." However, this
economic progress was neither constant nor even in its impact on the various sects, regions,
and classes. 2 The principal reforms took place in Mount Lebanon and Beirut while the
Shiite area of Jabal 'Amil became increasingly isolated as it was not within the zone of any
1 Choueiri, 'Ottoman Reform ..., p. 68.
2 Charles Issawi, 'The Historical Background of Lebanese Emigration, 1800-1914', in A.
Hourani & N. Shehadi, (ed.), The Lebanese in the World: A Century of Immigration, I.B. Tauris,
London, 1992, p.22.
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great power interests. As a result, the role of the Shfites became somewhat irrelevant in the
twentieth century particularly when Greater Lebanon was established in 1920. This economic
differentiation was to shape the future strengths of the various Lebanese communities.
1. The world economy and its effects on the social structure of the Shi'ites
The nineteenth century was a period of dramatic economic change as various parts of the
Middle East became integrated into the world system of commerce and transport. This
integration benefited the mercantile and financial sector while those who suffered from this
integration were generally agrarian workers, small landowners, urban workers and craftsman.'
The initial basis of economic reform was established under the Egyptian occupation in 1832.
The Egyptian gave greater protection to Christians and Jews engaged in industry and
commerce as well as to foreign merchants who settled in the towns in the interior. 2 In
addition, local peasants were given immunity from taxation for a number of years if they
returned to their abandoned fields. In general, cultivation increased. For instance, the export
of silk increased from 582 bales in 1833 to 1760 bales in 1836 due to increase of mulberry
trees.3
Gates, The Historical Role ..., p. 5-7.
2 Roger Owen, The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914, I.B. Tauris, London, 1981.
p. 70.
3 Ibid.
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The general prosperity that the peasants enjoyed was disrupted when the Ottomans regained
control of Syria,' although the lot of the Christians continued to improve due to their special
relations with European powers, particularly the French. 2 This French influence began to
grow after the Egyptians' withdrawal from Syria in 1840, and gradually became stronger
because of the continuous financial difficulties of the Ottoman government which favoured
the expansion of French investment. 3 Eventually French companies gained complete
monopoly over the Syrian railways as well as the leading harbours on the coast of the
Mediterranean. In addition, French contractors had concessions on practically all the
construction work on roads, ports and lighthouses in the area. 4 This increased French
influence and their special relations with the Christians of Mount Lebanon caused immense
economic and social change within the Maronite community far more than any other
community in Lebanon.
1.1 French dominance and changing social order
French influence certainly affected the social order particularly in Mount Lebanon and Beirut.
The Direct result of French influence can be noted in the increase in urbanisation,
improvement of education, formation of the middle class and finally immunity from
conscription facilitated the ascendancy of the Christians and to a lesser extent the Sunnis 5
'Ibid., p. 81.
2 Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples, Warner Books, New York, 1991, p. 236.
3 Michael Johnson, Class & Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the
Lebanese State 1840-1985, Ithaca Press, London, 1986, p. 27.
4 Juldca Nevaldvi, Britain, France and the Middle East 1914-1920, The Hamilton Press, 1969,
P. 6.
5 Issawi, The Fertile Crescent 1800-1914, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. p. 26.
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The concentration of trade and commerce in the cities proved a great attraction for the
impoverished peasants who neglected their fields in order to obtain a better life. Due to the
movement of peasants from rural areas, the population in urban centres increased
considerably in a relatively short time. The population of Tripoli increased from 15,000 to
30,000 between 1830-1914 Balbek grew to about 25,000 inhabitants and both Sidon and
Zahleh to about 15,000. In Beirut the population grew from 60,000 in 1860 to 150,000 in
1914.1
Improvement of education was another character of French influence in Lebanon. Before
1860, there were about 4 girls' schools and 15 boys' schools in Beirut; by 1869 there were
23 girls' schools and 29 boys schools. The total number of students was 5,150. By 1913
Mount Lebanon had 330 schools, with over 20,000 pupils. 2 The total pre-war number of
Syrian students attending French schools was to increase further to 50,000, while the total
number of students attending the schools of all other nationalities was 23,000. The majority of
these establishments had been founded by French religious orders, 3 and Christian
missionaries.
The major factor which set the motion of change in Mount Lebanon and Beirut was the
development of a modem middle classes. This was due to the specialisation of Mount
Lebanon in silk production which had shaped its economy since 1820, and due to Beirut's
l Issawi, 'The Historical ..., p. 28.
2 Ibid., p. 27.
3 Nevakivi, op.cit., p. 5.
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increased importance as a port and trade centre. Aside from a few Europeans who came to
invest in the new markets, the chief beneficiaries of the prosperity were the Beiruti Sunni
and Christian merchants, but more clearly with the latter.' Beirut's importance also continued
to increase as a result of growing French and English trade. 2 France had been trading with
the Syrian coast since at least the eighteenth century, a relationship was strengthened further in
the nineteenth century. England, on the other hand, had concentrated on the route to India,
and Syria's importance to England had traditionally hinged on the caravan routes crossing the
Syrian interiors. These different concerns accounted for the different roles the two countries
played in Syria. France had the largest share of the export trade ranging from 25 per cent in
1833 to 32 per cent in 1910. Its share in the imports of Syria was more modest: 15.9 per
cent in 1833 going down to 9.3 per cent in 1910. 3 As for Britain, it maintained the largest
share of the import trade throughout the period, ranging from 31.9 per cent in 1833 to 35.3
per cent in 1910.4
The cultivation of silkwomis also tied the city more closely to the nearby countryside and to
Mount Lebanon. Peasants came to the suburbs of Beirut to harvest the crop, and mountain
merchants came to Beirut to conduct business. The value of silk shipped from Beirut
increased by over 400 per cent between 1850 and 1856. 5 The control of the silk industry
from production to export remained firmly subservient to French capital and French
1 Hourani, A History ..., p. 268. Fawaz, op.cit., p. 61.
2 Ibid., p. 39.
3 Fawaz, op.cit., p. 62.
4 ibid.
5 Owen, The Middle East ..., p. 155.
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commercial interests. More importantly, French firms provided the bulk of the working
capital, whether directly or via Beirut subsidiaries. Local entrepreneurs played an essential
role in conducting French business which gave them opportunities to develop their own
interests particularly because they were very often French protégés.' From 1850-1870 the
industry had a set back briefly as profit from silk declined and interest in the mountain waned.
This was due to Japanese production, an epidemic of silkworm disease, and the civil war in
1860.2
But the international aspect of the city's financial activity was reinforced by investment on
the part of Beiruti businesses in Europe, West Africa and North and South America and
major Mediterranean ports like Alexandria. 3 In addition, the increase in world demand, the
introduction of new technology to the silk industry, and the new international administration
to Mount Lebanon in 1861, the silk trade began to develop again4 . The number of mulberry
trees varied from one area to another. This variation represented, among other things, the
strength and significance of these areas to France as the following table shows:
1 Hourani, A History ..., p. 276.
2 Fawaz, op.cit., p. 63-4.
3 Ibid., p. 154.
4 Ibid., p. 65.
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Table 1: Plantation of Mulberry trees in Lebanon in 1860.
Area	 I Number of frees
Mount Lebanon 28,000,000
Tripoli 6,800,000
Biqa' 2,000,000
Ba' lbek 600,000
Beirut 550,000
Marj' ayun - Hasbaiyya 500,000
Rashaiyya 15,000
Jabal 'Amil
W. Kawtharani, Bilad al-Sham, Ma'had al-huna' al-'Arabi,
Beirut, 1980, p. 107-8.
The merchants of Beirut played an essential role in reviving the economy of Mount Lebanon.
Even though the town was outside the official boundary of the mutasarrifiyya,
its modem banking and transport facilities and the fact that the Commercial
Tribunal located in Beirut had been given such wide powers of jurisdiction
made it, de facto, the economic capital of the mountain. It provided the
channel for funds coming from Europe for the purchase, processing and
export of silk; it generated local funds for investment in the Mountain and for
loans to Mountain merchants and entrepreneurs. A further link between the
coast and the interior was provided by the opening, in 1863, of the Beirut /
Damascus private carriage road constructed by a French company.' All this
encouraged the further growth of the town of Beirut itself From a population
of some 40,000 in 1857 it grew to perhaps 65,000 in 1875 and 80,000 in
1880.2
On an administrative level, the special status of Mount Lebanon was established in 1861, and
the establishment of the wilaya of Beirut in 1888 brought the interests of the two areas even
closer together. 3 By 1861, the economic order of Mount Lebanon was reorganised under
what is known as the Reglement!' This provided the framework for the future economic
1 Owen, The Middle East ..., p. 165.
2 Ibid., p. 166.
3 Fawaz, op.cit., p. 21.
4 Owen, The Middle East ..., pp. 163-164.
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development of the Mountain. The establishment of better security, the institution of a
regular system of tax collection and the improvements in the administrative structure all
helped to create conditions in which money wealth could be accumulated without official
harassment. In addition, Mount Lebanon's special status meant that its inhabitants were not
conscripted into the Ottoman army nor liable to pay the special taxes which were levied in
time of war. This was of particular advantage during the Russian-Turkish	  war of 1877-78
when agricultural life in the rest of Syria was considerably disrupted by the call-up of
peasants for military duty. This represented a considerable victory for the local forces which
were seeking an end to the rule of the muqata ijis in the interests of opening up Mount
Lebanon further to foreign commercial interests. In addition, the Reglement was welcomed
by the European bankers and the merchants of Beirut.
In addition, the Reglement provided local entrepreneurs with the opportunity to play an
essential role in advancing foreign interests in Syria. They have been described as "agents of
change": Their role increased due to the consular protection which was extended to many
locals who provided Europeans with services. The service of the local people became
indispensable to the conduct of business and in return it gave them privileges and exemption
from the personal and other taxes the Ottoman government levied upon its subjects. "They
were eligible for the same judicial, financial, economic and other privileges granted to
Europeans in the empire which were of great advantage in business."2
1 Fawaz, op.cit., p. 85.
2 Ibid., pp. 85-86.
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The locals' major role was to act as intermediaries between the European wholesaler and the
local retailer, and also between the European merchants and cultivators of various crops.'
This gave the locals immense power which later on, they managed to impose their own
conditions over the sellers and buyers and to earn substantial profits in the process. For
instance, they lent money to silk cultivators at a high rate, and then sold the crops at high
prices imposed by them on the buyers. Soon they moved from being middlemen to becoming
manufacturers. 2 Although there were a number of Muslims who benefited from the
European presence in Beirut, the imbalance in economic opportunities between wealthy
Christian and wealthy Muslim merchants was even more pronounced in the rest of the
p opulation.3
1.2 Economy of Jabal 'limit and its relevance to European powers
While Mount Lebanon and Beirut were flourishing economically, the Shiite area of Jabal
'Amil was gradually falling behind. It is not only that it did not benefit from the international
economic expansion in the area but that its own economic infrastructure, which was mainly
agrarian, was damaged. Consequently, the class structure remained unchanged and iqta'i-
peasant dependencies remained unchanged.
Lack of statistics makes it difficult to give a precise quantitative description of the class
structure of Jabal 'AmiL However, the economic stagnation of the area shows that not much
'Ibid., p. 87.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., p. 98.
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development occurred in comparison with Mount Lebanon and Beirut. One could conclude
that there were three major classes. At the apex of the social pyramid in Jabal 'Amil was the
iqta'i. He exercised exclusive control as well as a limited judicial function over the 'uhda, the
domain over which his governing powers extended. The iqta'i became the main link between
the central authorities and the populace. His function and relation to the Ottoman government
revolved around the specific amount of tax to be paid to the central treasury. Somewhat
independent of the iqta'i were the `ulama families who belonged to all strata of society as far
as social prestige and marriage ties were concerned. And lastly were the 'amma, the peasants.
All of these classes were also highly stratified internally with marked social distinctions on the
basis of status and kinship affiliation.'
Unlike the economy in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, the economy in Jabal 'Amll did not have a
steady growth. Jabal 'Amil was always affected by political and economic circumstances
around it. For instance, in the eighteenth century Jabal 'Mill experienced successes in
cultivating high quality coloured cotton at a time when there was rising demand for cotton
textiles in Europe and North Africa. The cultivation began to decline only after Ahmad al-
Ja77ar established a monopoly and very high duties on cotton, leading to its being replaced by
tobacco.2 In addition, the discovery of the dyeing method by the French resulted in a marked
decrease in their import of 'Amifi coloured cotton fabric. 3 Again, however briefly, the Shi'ite
1 Tarif Khalidi, 'Shaykh Ahmad 'Arif al-Zain and al-'Irfan.' In M. Buheiry, (ed.), Intellectual
Life in the Arab East, 1890-1939, Beirut, American University of Beirut, 1981, P. 110-24. Khalaf,
Lebanon's ..., p. 22-29. Halawi, op.cit., p. 32.
2 Issawi, The Fertile ..., p. 298.
3 Halawi, op.cit., p. 32.
47
Chapter 2 	
 Economic Progress
economy revived but this time it was due to Napoleon's siege of Acre when he bought all
agricultural products and paid 10 times more than the usual asking price.'
Throughout the nineteenth century Jabal `Amil did not have a significant economy. Moreover,
certain political developments eventually caused dramatic economic decline in Jabal `Amil in
comparison to the economy in Mount Lebanon and Beirut. The reason for this decline can be
attributed to both internal and external factors.
Internally, the Shi'ites of Jabal `Amil did not have a proper political stability. As mentioned
before, they fell under the rule of al-Ja7gar, who followed a heavy-handed policy in Jabal
`Amil until his death in the early nineteenth century. Thereafter, although the autonomy of
the Shi'ites was restored by Sulaiman and `Abdullah pashas, it did not last long because Syria
as a whole fell under the Egyptian occupation in 1832. By then, the main agricultural product
in Jabal `Amil was tobacco which was exported to Egypt. Liberation of Syria from the
Egyptians in 1840 had serious consequences on Jabal 'Am', in that the Shi'ites lost their
tobacco market in Egypt to the Greeks2
Although Jabal `Amil was not stable politically, it was stable socially. That is to say that Jabal
`Amil was predominantly a Shi'ite populated area, and therefore their was no room for inter-
communal conflict. The competition was limited to the zu'ama class only, even though, al-
As' ad's leadership was generally accepted.
1 Rida, 'al-Shi'a fi Jabal 'Amil', al- 'Irfan, Vol. 2, 1910, p. 335.
2 Ibid.
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Externally, In 1840 with the liberation of Syria from the Egyptians, international interest in
Mount Lebanon and Beirut was gaining strength and Jabal 'Amil was irrelevant to the
concerns of the powers. The area, mainly Mount Lebanon, was experiencing dramatic
political, social and economic changes between the Maronites and the Druzes which
eventually led to partitioning of Mount Lebanon into two qa'immaqamates. This dynamism in
Mount Lebanon facilitated the intervention of the European powers mainly the French and
the British. Since 1840 the Maronite community found its hopes and fortunes with the French
who claimed protection of the Catholics. On the other hand, the British supported the Druzes.
French interests in Mount Lebanon was not only to protect their co-religionists, the
Maronites, but also their was economic value. Mount Lebanon was economically important to
the French because of production of silk which was vital to the French economy. French-
Maronites relations grew stronger and by 1861 Mount Lebanon was recognised as
mutasarrifiyya with a special political status.
In retrospect, Jabal `Amil did not attract any European powers' attention because its
specialisation in tobacco plantation was not of great importance to the economy of either
France or Britain. In 1883, further decline in Jabal `Amil was caused due to a monopolistic
control of the tobacco which was granted to a French company, the Tobacco Regie. The low
prices the Regie offered the Shi'ite peasants contributed to decline of the product. Being
tobacco planters, the Shi'ites were tide to the Regie for long time continuing into the French
Mandate and independence period.
49
Chapter 2 	  Economic Progress
This situation continued until the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920. In fact the years
preceding 1920 further aggravated the life of the Shi'ites in Jabal `Amil. The major cause of
decline was the World War I in 1914 where the Shi'ites were conscripted in large numbers
and as a result their fields were abandoned. One year later famine struck as Locusts did not
leave any green leaf in their journey from Jabal 'Amil up to Beirut and Mount Lebanon.
People left their villages and travelled to Beirut in search of a better life.' The
deterioration in Jabal `Amil triggered the emmigration of many Shi'ites to America and
Africa.
As has been discussed European interests and the socio-economic variation between Mount
Lebanon, Beirut, and Jabal `Amil practically set the political importance of the major
communities residing in these areas. By September 1920 the French announced the creation of
Greater Lebanon after the inclusion of Beirut, the Biqa', Tripoli and Jabal Anni Under such
new reality the Slailes were left to their own initiatives to improve their position vis-à-vis the
other major communities in Lebanon.
Creating Greater Lebanon had three consequences2 . First, it augmented the pre-dominantly
Maronite Christian and Druze population of the Mountain with an almost equally large
Muslim population which had long-standing links with the towns of the Syrian interior.
Second, having established a state composed of different religions it was important that the
Hakim, op. cit., p. 249-251.
2 &n 'The Political Economy ..., pp. 23-24.
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French established a system that incorporated the various members of those religions. Third,
by creating Greater Lebanon the French confirmed the fuiancial and commercial hegemony of
Beirut over the Mountain, and also strengthened a pattern of economic activity in which
agriculture and industry was becoming more and more subordinate to banking and trade.
Although agriculture in the Mountain and the silk industry were actually beginning to decline,
the service sector was prospering and was "assisted by a policy of low tariffs and the
creation of an infrastructure of harbours and roads ideally suited to the further expansion of
trade, building, and the new business of tourism."'
Industry in Jabal 'Amil was of no interest to the French and was confined to crafts
needed for local consumption and shoe making, for export to Palestine, in the village of
Bint Jubail. Jabal 'Amil had traded with the cities of north Palestine for a long time so that
Palestinian currency was used more than Lebanese in Jabal 'Amil.2
Although economy was the major reason which caused the inferior position of the Shi'ites, it
was their political affiliation and stands which increased their inferiority vis-a-vis the other
major communities. From 1920 onward two forms of political trends were dominant, that is,
the pro-French policy which was represented by the Maronites and the pro-Syrian policy
which was represented by the majority of Muslim zu'ama. The following section will examine
Ibid., p. 26.
2 Salim Taqi al-Din, 'al-Janub al-Lubnani fi Ri'ayat 	 Safahal min Tarikh Jabal
al-Majlis al-Thaqafi li-Lubnan al-Janubi, Farabi, Beirut, 1979, p. 139.
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the position of the Shi'ites towards the various national ideas prior and alter the creation of
Greater Lebanon.
2. Shi'ite attitudes towards rising national ideas
These tendencies dominated the political scene in the Arab provinces of the empire but their
strength varied according to the crisis the empire was facing. The political activities of the
Shiites also began to develop. Along these lines, however, the Shiites as such never
advocated a distinctive political line because politics was the domain of their leaders who
affiliated themselves with one tendency or another. The Shiites were in no position to adopt a
tendency that was different from that of the Sunni majority. However, by 1918 some Shiite
zu'ama were explicit in their support for Lebanese nationalism (this will be explained in the
next chapter). Adopting one tendency or another by the Shiite zu lama was used as a means
in the power struggle between them which will also be explained later.
Most Muslims felt no allegiance to Greater Lebanon, and although the Sunni and Shiite
leaders were incorporated into the system of government, the identification of the lower
social classes with this new Lebanese entity remained ambiguous.
The initial Muslim ambiguity towards Lebanon was a reflection of their rejection of European
intervention in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. This rejection began to surface in the
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nineteenth century when calls for modernisation were sounded by both Muslim and Christians
despite the variation in tone.
The modernist Ottomanist elements such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and
Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) 1 attempted a synthesis between Islamic and Western values.
Afghani said that 'primitive Islam required its followers to exercise reason and examine the
bases of their faith: a In addition, "the modernist also stated that a modified Islamic teaching
was also essential so as to accommodate those European forms and dm	 Ines which appeared
to be the catalysts of economic and social progress."3
Parallel to this, a few Syrian Christians who shared the general idea of modernism advanced
a quasi-secular Arab nationalism.4 The missionary schools in Lebanon brought many Syrians,
mostly Christians, into close contact with the West. One of the most important spokesman
for the group was Ibrahim al-Yaziji who in 1868 called for an Arab national revival
"However, the Christian version of Arabism was not to the liking of the Syrian Muslim
Arabs. Yangs secular Arabism found few followers, and Ottomanism, whether conservative
or modernist, remained the dominant ideology within the Ottoman lands until 1914." 5 A more
limited call for Lebanese nationalism was also developing, 6
 as discussed below.
'Jacob Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp. 25, 34, 125.
Hourani, A History ..., pp. 308-9.
2 Ernest Dawn, 'From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an Ideology', in A. Hourani, P.
Khoury & M. Wilson, (ed.), The Modern Middle East, I.B. Tauris, 1993, pp. 380-381.
3 Johnson, op.cit., p. 14.
4 Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, Essay on the Origin of Arab Nationalism, University
of Illinois Press, 1973, p. 132.
5 Owen, The Middle East ..., p. 133
6 Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon, Croom Helm, London, 1985, p. 7-8.
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In 1876 a combination of rapid political and economic development in the world, and
mounting pressure from both inside and outside the empire forced Sultan Abd al-Hamid
(1876-1909) to establish the Ottoman constitution which incorporated a parliamentary
system in which all the provinces were represented, however the constitution was suspended
one year later.
The deterioration of the Empire due to the Balkan Crisis in 1877 encouraged the emergence
of national ideas. Among the first national ideas which emerged was that of decentralisation.
The governorship of Midhat Pasha in Syria (1878-1880) has always been referred to as a
major contributor to the idea of decentralisation. Longrigg stated:
The period of Egyptian rule ..., reoriented some perceptive minds; the
governorship of Midhat Pasha, with his advocacy of decentralisation and the
full equality of the non-Turkish races, was again suggestive.'
Midhat's close association with Arab notables convinced him to make Arabic the language of
instruction in the new state schools. It remained the language of instruction under the rule of
his successor, Ahmad Hamdi Pasha (1880-1885). 2 Al-Safa also referred to communication
between Midhat Pasha and some Shfite leaders such as Khalil and Najib al-As'ad to the effect
that they should advocate decentralisation in Jabal 'Amil. In addition, Al-Safa had the
impression that Midhat Pasha gave his tacit support to the intellectuals who used to express
1 Longrigg, op.cit., p. 26.
2 Mahmud Haddad, 'The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered', LIMES, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1994,
p. 202.
54
Chapter 2 	
 Economic Progress
their idea through poems which were wide spread throughout Syria. Most of these poems
were possibly written by Ibrahim al-Yaziji. 1 Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid was aware of Midhat
Pasha's intentions and nominated him wali of 'Emir as a first step to removing him from office
and subsequently having him murdered in prison.2
Al-Safa and 'Adil al-Sulh' claimed that the idea of Arab independence began to appear in
1877 during the Russian-Turkish war. A clandestine political movement was organised by
some Arab nationalists who advocated the separation of Syria from the Ottomans. This
appeared in 1877 in the Damascus Conference and among the participants were
representatives from Jabal 'Anil including Sayyid Muhammad al-Amin, Shaikh 'Ali al-Jabal,
'Ali `Usayran and Shabib al-Assad. Ahmad Pasha al-Sulh conveyed the conferees' decision to
Amir Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza siri4
 who was also chosen by them to lead Syria. However, al-
Jazashi was hesitant to accept until he had clearer idea of the nature of the independence his
colleagues sought. 5
 When the Ottoman authorities discovered this movement they dispersed it
and one of the Shiite participants, Sayyid Muhammad al-Amin, was exiled to Tripoli6
1 Al-Safa, op.cit., p. 209.
2 Johnson, op.cit, p. 15.
3 Al-Safa, op.cit., p. 209. Mahmud Bazzi, Jabal 'Amil fi Muhitihi al-'Arabi 1864-1948, al-
Majlis al-Islami al-Shi'i al-A'ala, Beirut, 1993, pp. 31-33. The Shi'ite historians disagree on whether the
Damascus Conference took place. Contrary to Al-Safa, Shaikh 'Ali al-Zain denies that it took place
altogether, on the ground that the contemporary historians such as Muhammad Kurd Ali, Mildia'il Mishaqa,
and Shaikh Muhammad Mughniyya would have documented the idea of independence let alone the conference
itself. He also asserts that the idea of Arab nationalism began to develop in the first decade of twentieth
century. All al-Zain, Lil Bahth 'an Tarikhuna fi Lubnan, Beirut, 1973, p. 23.
4 'Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iii the leader of the Algerian resistance in the 1840s who had been exiled
to Damascus by the French in 1856.
5 Bazzi, op.cit., p. 32.
6 Al-Safa, op.cit., p.209.
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Although the idea of decentralisation was not strong enough to assert itself in society as a
whole, decentralisation began to assert itself in the first decade of the twentieth century.
However, a number of politicised Arabs in Ottoman service gave their support to the Young
Turk Revolution of 1908 which ended in the replacement of Sultan `Abd al-Hamid by Sultan
Muhammad Rashad. The latter was merely a figure-head as the Committee of Union and
Progress, CUP, was in full control of the affairs of the empire. They aimed at replacing the
absolute rule of the Sultan with a constitutional monarchy guaranteeing religious and civil
liberties to Ottoman subjects.
The proclamation of the Constitution on 23/4 July 1908 was a success beyond all expectations
of the CUP.' However, in 1911 Arab feeling towards the Turks began to alter. The capture
of Libya by the Italians subsequently weakened the Turks in Arab eyes and destroyed much
of the hopes they had in a revived empire. As a result, an Arab Decentralisation Party was
founded "to create concord among the potentates of the Arabian Peninsula, in order to bring
strong pressure on the Turks on behalf of the Arabs and to provide for the defence .af tIve Arab
against foreign ambition, should the Ottoman Empire -Cantoces."2 stemed.to
be substantiated when the Arab nationalists in al-Fatat society convened in Paris in the
summer of 1913. In order to retain Arab loyalty, the Unionists made some concession to the
nationalists, and they also supported the local resistance movement in Libya.
The optimism of the nationalists was also thwarted when:
1 Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1969, p. 16.
2 Ibid., p. 153.
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the CUP implemented a Turkification policy which sought to centralise the
empire and bring the various confessional and ethnic groups more closely
together under the control of Istanbul As soon as it became clear that the
CUP was not going to grant autonomy rule to the Arab regions of the empire,
the more extreme varieties of Arab and Lebanese nationalism developed.
Where did the Shi'ites fit in all these developments? In Jabal 'Amil the political involvement of
the Shiites was largely directed by the zu'ama and a new group of intellectuals who
competed to draw the support of the Sh?ite masses.
...this awakening [among the Shiites] was restricted to a few members of a
narrow class, and was the work of a small intellectual circle.2
The masses who were mostly peasants did not have the ability or the means to initiate any
political activities, but they were rather a means to an end in the hands of their zu'ama. Die
other Arabs, the Sh?ites of Jabal 'Amil were generally supportive of the CUP. A new group
of intellectuals was responsible for heightened political awareness among the Sh?ites and had
been heavily involved in various movements and societies. For instance, Shaikh Ahmad 'Arif
al-Zain began publication of a literary and political journal, al-hfan, which became a leading
forum of intellectual discourse in Jabal 'Amil. Mother leading figure was Rustum Haider
from the Biqa' who was a member of al-Fatal Society and later participated in the Sharifian
administration in Damascus. Mother example was 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil who was hanged
for treason by the Ottomans. In addition, the traditional-religious leadership and a new group
of intellectuals supported the Empire against foreign interference.
Johnson, op.cit., p. 16.
2 Joseph Olmert, 'The Shilis and the Lebanese State', (ed.), in M. Kramer, (ed.), Shi'ism Resistance
and Revolution, Boulder, Colorado, 1987, p. 191. Longrigg, op.cit, p. 144.
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This support was apparent both immediately before and during the first year of World War L
Shiite intellectuals feared occupation of Lebanon by the European powers and the prospect
of Christian rule. In addition, the anti-European attitude of the Shiites of Jabal 'Amil could
be attributed to a promise on the part of the Turks that the Shiites would be recognised as a
separate community from their Sunni counterparts if they disassociated themselves from the
Beirut Reform Society.'
The precarious position of the Shiites, a minority in the Arab provinces, hindered them from
initiating any political trend contradictory to the general Arab one. However, their attitude
towards the Ottomans changed when all attempts at reconciliation between Arabs and Turks
reached deadlock, and particularly when Arab resentment culminated in the Sharifian
revolution in June 1916.
The increased rift between the Turks and the Arabs had its own effect on the Shiites. There
were two principal political trends in Jabal Amil. One represented loyalty to the Ottomans
and the other was pro-Arab nationalism (the power struggle between the two will be
elaborated in the next chapter). What concerns us here is the attitude of the Turks towards
the nationalists rather than towards the traditional leadership which was pro-Turkish and was
1 Zamir, op.cit., p. 32. The society was formed in order to pressurise the Ottomans to undertake
essential reform particularly when the Christians of Mount Lebanon managed to achieve some
concession with the help of European powers in 1912.
58
Chapter 2 	
 Economic Progress
mainly represented by Kamil al-Mad who was an Ottomanist and had good relations with the
wali of Damascus Jamal Pasha.'
In 1908 a CUP branch in Nabatiyya was established by 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, Muhammad
Jabir Al-Safa, Shaikh Ahmad Rida and Shaikh Sulaiman Dahir. 2 However, the Shiites quickly
became disillusioned when they realised the real intentions of the new government and soon
closed the Nabatiyya branch. 3 Hostilities between the two groups increased when al-Khalil
founded the Arab Club in 1909. The Turks soon forced the club to change the adjective
"Arab" to "Literary".
The entry of the Ottomans into World War I on the side of the Central Powers was a great
chance for the Arabs to liberate themselves from Turkish control However, the actual process
of breaking ties with the CUP began only in 1915 Initially Shiite intellectuals and traditional
and religious leaders lent their support to the Empire in the war. The Shiite 'ularna 
throughout the Muslim world issued fatwas legalising and inciting jihad against foreign
forces as well as support for the Ottomans. 4 When it became clear that the CUP was not
willing to carry out reform, Arab support melted away. As the founder of the Literary Club
and a member of different political organisations such as the Committee of Arab Brotherhood,
the Qahtani Committee and as a close associate of Rida al-Sulh, 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil
Al-Safa, op.cit., p. 213.
21Ali. A. Shu'aib, Matalib Jabal 'Amil: al-Wihda, al-Musawat fi Lubnan al-Kabir 1900-1936,
al-Mu'assasa al-Jami'aiyya, Beirut, 1987, p. 54.
3 Al-Safa, op.cit., p. 183-4. Shu'aib, op.cit., p.55-6.
4 al-'lrfan, Vol. 6, 1915, p. 78.
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organised opposition to the Turks in Jabal 'Amil and subsequently established branches of
the Decentralisation Party in Sidon and Nabatiyya.1
The Party was betrayed since some of its members had connections with the president of the
municipality of Sidon Nazih al-Bizri, who informed the Turks about the Party's activities. On
lath March 1915, the Turkish authorities arrested a number of party activists in Sidon, Tyre,
Nabatiyya and Beirut and some were sentenced to death. Among them was 'Abd al-Karim al-
Khalil who was hanged in August 1915.2
Repressive Turkish measures generally had the effect of containing Arab nationalist activity in
Syria during the war. The continuation of arrests and death sentences by the Turks on the
one hand and the initiation of the Arab revolt in 1916 under the leadership of the Sharifians
with British encouragement and assistance put an end to Arab co-operation with the Turks
and hereafter the Arabs aspired to fa independence.3
After the Arabs forces took over Syria, it might have been expected that the Shiite Arab
nationalists would be among those first to benefit. In fact it was the traditionalists who were
favoured in these appointments. Muhammad al-Fadl, a ShPite notable from Nabatiyya was
among those who received telegrams from Said al-Jazairi the first Prime Minister of Syria in
1918 appointing him as a representative of the new Arab Government."
1 Bazzi, op.cit., p. 39. A1-Safa, op.cit., p. 211.
2 Dawn, op.cit., p. 155. Al-Safa, op.cit, 1981, p. 218. Shu'aib, op.cit., p. 62.
3 Ibid.
4 Nevaldvi, op.cit., p. 26. Al-Safa, op.cit., p. 221.
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Amir Faisal arrived in Syria as the head of the Arab government and on 5 October 1918 his
representative Ilia al-Khuri, accompanied by the Sh?ite leader Kamil al-As'ad, went to Jabal
'Amil vvhere they hoisted the Arab flag in recognition of the Arab government' and
consequently al-As'ad was put in charge of Jabal 'Amil.
The period from 1918 to 1920 was dominated by a complex of political and military activities
in which the Shiites played a major role. Their support of the Shariflan government and of
Amir Faisal put them in direct conflict with the French. The Shariflan government was short-
lived ending in July 1920 with the imposition of the French mandate. In September, Greater
Lebanon was established after Beirut, Tripoli, the Biqa' Valley, and Jabal 'Amil had been
added to Mount Lebanon. Consequently, the Maronites were no longer the vast majority that
dominated Mount Lebanon. According to the census of 1921 the population of Greater
Lebanon was as follows:
Table 2: Greater Lebanon's population in 1921.
Sect Number Per cent	 1
Maronites 199,LS1 32.7,3
Greek Orthodox 81,409 13.37
Greek Catholic 42,462 6.97
Other Christians 12,651 2.08
Sunnis 124,786 20.48
Mutwalis 104,947 17.23
Dnae 43,633 7.16
Zamir, The Emergence .. ., p. 98.
1 Kawtharani, al-litijahat ..., p. 271.
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As has been discussed, the economic decline of Jabal `Amil had serious consequences for the
Shi'ites' inferior position in Lebanon. Unlike the Maronites, the Shi'ites could not develop a
modem middle class and consequently, they remained under the control of their zu'ama well
into the second half of the twentieth century. Their political affiliation with Arab nationalism
was an added factor that deepened the Shi'ites' inferiority.
It has been clear that the Shiites did not have any sense of solidarity as a community. This
fact was particularly evident when Greater Lebanon was established. Lacking a sense of a
community kept the Shiites well behind the two leading communities, the Maronite and the
Sunni, and even other communities smaller in number than the Shiite such as the Druzes and
the Catholics.
The next chapter will discuss effects of the Shi'ites political affiliation, and how their status
began to develop analysing the intemal and external factors that contributed to this change.
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Map 4: Basis of guerrilla groups and major towns and villages in Jabal 'Anil mentioned in
Chapter Three and Four.
Chapter 3 	 Shi'ite Identity
The Roots of a Shi'ite Identity: Political
Dynamism 1900 - 1920
The first decade of the twentieth century was the beginning of a political change among
the Shi'ites. However, this change was not the making of ordinary Shi'ites but rather the
undertaking of the spiritual leader Sayyid `Abd al-Husain Sharaf al-Din, who played an
essential role in bringing it about. The occasion that triggered the motion of change was
the reopening of the Ottoman parliament in 1908.
In Lebanon, what is meant by the term 'Shiite identity' is the notion that the Shiites
recognise that they have a distinct set of interests vis-a-vis other Lebanese communities,
and that these interests can only be achieved, maintained and promoted by a Lebanese
Shilte leader. In Jabal 'Amil the main competition for Parliament in 1908 was,
geographically, between the coastal cities of Sidon and Tyre on the one hand, and the
interior on the other. The coastal areas were mainly dominated by Rida al-Sulh, a Sunni
notable of Sidon who was backed by some of the leading Shiite families in the cities,
including prominent names such as 'Usayran, al-Zain and al-Khalil. The interior was
dominated by Kamil al-As'ad, of the long established family of 'Ali al-Saghir, who was
supported by Sharaf al-Din.
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Sharaf al-Din's role was vital as he was the main force which strengthened the position of
al-As'ad against al-Sulh. The support of Sharaf al-Din was based on sectarian issues.
Since, as will be discussed below, no Shi'ite spiritual leader would hand over the
leadership of the Shi'ites to a non-Shfite, and since the main competition in Jabal `Amil
was between a Sunni and a Shi'ite, it was natural that Sharaf al-Din would opt to support
the latter candidate. This support was a matter of principle rather than a matter of
personal choice.
This support continued throughout the political upheavals in greater Syria from 1916
until 1920. Sharaf al-Din's political involvement became most obvious in 1920 when he
was a major organiser of opposition against the French. However, the subsequent failure
of the Syrian unionists to achieve their objective of a united Syria and the eventual
creation of Greater Lebanon were among the factors which forced him to divert his
energy and activity from political to social issues. As a Shi'ite Sharaf al-Din's
involvement in politics can be used to examine how viable are the term quietist and
activist which have been used to distinguish between the Shi'ite `ulama who involve
themselves in politics, and those who do not.
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss the roots of change, and the driving force
behind it among the Shi'ites to establish their own identity. The chapter will be divided
into four main sections: the `ulama's perception of political involvement, the political
involvement of Sharaf al-Din in the power struggle among the zu'ama in the early
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twentieth century, his relationships with the French and the Sharifians, and finally, his
role after the creation of Lebanon.
1. The `ulama's perception of political involvement
The issue of the involvement and non-involvement of Shiite `ulama has been attributed
to two different tendencies in Shi'ism, that is, the quietist and the activist. The quietist
tendency indicates that the pursuit of power is the concern of the infallible Imam, that is
to say that temporal rule is a privilege reserved for the hidden imam which can be
resumed only when he appears from his occultation. The activist tendency is vigorous in
condemning tyranny, and this passionate concern with the establishment and maintenance
of just rule leads to political activism.
In principle, it is agreed by all Shilte `ulama that Muslims must only live under Islamic
control.' However, it is the mujtahids who decide when and how a particular form of
political organisation lives up to such principles. During the lifetimes of the twelve
Imams the Shiites deferred to them on various matters because the imam has the sole
authority to decide when whether or not to rise against tyranny. Despite the fact that
eleven Imams were killed either by the Umayyad or the Abbasid caliphs, the martyrdom
of Imam Husain had the greatest effect on the Shiites. He used revolution to face tyranny
and his struggle against Yazid represented a form of activism. However, after Imam
Husain's death and the continuous persecution of the Shiites by the Umayyads and the
l Abd al-Hadi al-Fadli, al-Dawla al-Islamiyya, Beirut, 1979, p. 34.
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Abbasids, the other Imams used taqiyya, in order to protect their faith. That the 'ulama
resorted to taqiyya when Shilsm faced extreme danger was a major factor in preserving
Shilsm from extinction. However, it should be noted that the Shiites did not live their
lives in hiding. One might wonder why the Shiites did not convert to another faith to
avoid extinction by the authorities. The answer may be found in analysing the effects of
the yearly commemoration of Imam Husain and the role of the mujtahids within the
Shiite sect after the disappearance of the last Imam.
Despite the apparent contrast between them, these two notions, the quietist and the
activist, were of major importance reasons for the continued vitality of Shilsm. The form
the `ulama would adopt at any given historical moment was dictated by social
circumstances.
Nevertheless, making the distinction between the two notions in this way is rather
misleading. A more useful distinction than that between activists and quietists my be,
that between those mujtahids who seek an active political role even if they d.u. wat
to hold political authority themselves, and those who do seek political authority. Several
examples exist of 'ulama who were seeking an active political role. Kelidar suggests, for
instance, that in 1920's Iraq, the mujtahids who advocated armed resistance to the British
did not seek to take control themselves. They advocated a Muslim Arab kingdom ruled
by `Abdullah, the son of Sharif Husain.' Half a century later Sayyid Musa al-Sadr in
Abbas Kelidar, 'The Shil Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East', Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol. 19, January, 1983, pp. 7,9
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Lebanon did not seek power and his general attitudes towards the Lebanese were
peaceful. Yet he was politically active and sought justice and equality on the basis of
equal citizenship. These attitudes of the Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon were based on a
rational evaluation of their social circumstances. That is to say, neither Lebanon nor Iraq
were majority Shi'ite states. The only case which differed was that of Imam Khumaini 
who attempted to establish an Islamic state. In all these examples it was the mujtahids
who decided when to legitimise a revolt, when to become involved in politics, or when to
neglect them altogether.
Here it should be showed that, contrary to Kelidar and Lewis, political activism does not
necessarily imply violence.' The eighth Imam 'Ali al-Rida was the successor to the
throne during the reign of the Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun, although it was unlikely that 'Ali
al-Rida would ever actually succeed him, in principle he provided a classic example of
non-violent activism which certainly contradicts the views of both Kelidar and Lewis.
The early activities of Sharaf al-Din represented a form of non-violent political activism
which lasted until 1920. However, the subsequent years, he became more involved in
social welfare activities. This change of activities was motivated by changing of
circumstances in Jabal `Amil and the region.
l Ibid. Bernard Lewis, 'The Quietist and Activist Tradition in Islamic Writing', Bulletin of
School of Oriental and African Studies, 1986, pp. 141-147.
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2. Sayyid Sharaf al-Din's involvement in local politics
Sayyid Sharaf al-Din was born in 1873 in Kadhmiyya in Iraq; his father had left his village,
Shuhur, in Jabal 'Anil to pursue his religious studies in Iraq. When Sharaf al-Din returned he
followed his father's path as a cleric,' and pursued his own religious studies in Iraq in turn in
1891. He reached a high religious position and received six academic llaZat, licences, from
senior 'ulama in Iraq.2 His religious studies were not confined to Shiism but also included
Zaidism and Smmism 
His religious activities took him beyond Jabal 'AmiL In 1910 he went to Egypt and engaged
in a dialogue with Shaikh al-Azhar Salim al-Bishri over the differences between Sunni and
Shiite concepts of the succession to the Prophet and other Shiite beliefs. This dialogue was
later published as al-Muraja'at (dialogue),3 and continued after Sharaf al-Din had returned to
Lebanon in 1921. Sharaf al-Din died in 1957, only one year before the new head of al-Azhar
Shaikh Mahmud Shaltut issued a fatwa confirming that the Ithna 'Ashari Shiite sect does not
differ in the basic Islamic principles from the four major Sunni sects.4 During his stay in
Egypt Sharaf al-Din received three more ijazat from Sunni 'ulama: Salim al-Bishri,
Muhammad Bakhit, and Muhammad al-Samluti.5
i 'Abd al-Husain Sharaf al-Din, Bughiat al-Raghibin, Vol. 2, al-Dar al-Islamiyya, Beirut, 1991, pp.
65-68.
2 Ibid., pp. 87-91. A. Kubaisi, Hayat al-Imam Sharaf al-Din, Dar al-Tav.jih al-Islami, Beirut,
Lebanon, 1980, pp. 41-43.
3 Sharaf al-Din, Bughiat p. 98. Kubaisi, op.cit., pp. 54, 104.
4 Sharaf al-Din, al-Muraja'at, al-Dar al-Islamiyya, Beirut, Lebanon, 1986, p. 301.
5 Ibid., pp. 199-201.
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Amid the complex political developments at the beginning of the twentieth century, the
main objective of Sharaf al-Din was to preserve the identity of the Shiites through
establishing a political leadership for them. As mentioned previously, the power struggle
in Jabal 'Amil was between the interior, mainly in Nabatiyya, and the coastal cities, Sidon
and Tyre. Nabatiyya was the stronghold of al-As'ad and his supporters, such as al-Fadl,
while Sidon and parts of Tyre were controlled by al-Sulh and his supporters, the
'Usayrans, al-Khalils and 'Arif al-Zain and some prominent intellectuals from Nabatiyya
such as Sulaiman Dahir, Al-Safa and Ahmad Rida. 1 Those who were allied to al-Sulh will
be named Sulhi or Sulhis while those allied to al-As'ad will be named As'adi or As'adis. It
may seem confusing to associate the Sunni notable Rida al-Sulh with the power struggle
among the Shiites, but this confusion ends when it is known that al-Sulh originally come
from Sidon.
The elections to the Ottoman Parliament in 1908 triggered the political activities of
Sharaf al-Din. Among the various notables in Jabal `Amil, Sharaf al-Din lent his backing
to al-As'ad. This backing was a matter of principle rather than a matter of personal
choice because al-As'ad was the only prominent leader in Jabal 'Amil who possessed the
ability to mobilise the majority of Shi'ites behind him, largely because he belonged to the
long established Shi'ite family of 'Ali al-Sag)iir. Also, the other Shiite notables were
either second in rank or lacked the abilities necessary to preserve Shilte interests. More
importantly, as some notables were allied to al-Sulh notables, a non-Shfite elements,
"Aril al-Zain belongs to a branch who fled Tyre during the rule of al-Jazzar and settled in
Sidon in the eighteenth century.
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Sharaf al-Din did not approve of their candidacy. Sharaf al-Din's support for al-As'ad
increased between 1918 and 1920 when the French were seen as being committed to
promoting Maronite interests as well as sectarianism in Lebanon.
Early indications of local tension between the As'adis and the Sulhis took place during
the preparations for the 1908 elections. In Tyre, Sharaf al-Din faced a direct
confrontation with the Sulhis of the al-Khalil family. While he was preaching after Friday
prayers, 'Abdullah al-Khalil, the head of the al-Khalil family, interrupted and accused
Sharaf al-Din of dividing the community. He said; "This town was united until you
divided it by calling for the election of al-As'ad." Sharaf al-Din replied;
Everybody is free to elect whoever they wish. I did not call people to elect
al-As'ad as you call for the election of Rida al-Sulh. This town has been
suffering from oppression because of the backing you receive from him'
Hence, Tyre was torn between the families of Sharaf al-Din and al-Khalil Tension
between the two develop into a contest for control of the city, a contest which lasted until
the late 1950s.
2.1 Kamil al-As' ad
The leadership of the al-As'ad family, which was based in Taiyba, has not been
satisfactorily documented, despite acknowledgement of the importance of their leadership
by various Shi'ite historians, even those who opposed the al-As'ads, such as Al-Safa.2
'Interview, Ja'far Sharaf al-Din, son of Sayyid 'Abd al-Husain, Tyre, winter, 1992.
2 al-Faqih, op.cit., p. 370. Al-Safa, op.cit., p. 44. al-Amin. A'ian al-Shi'a, Vol. 15, p. 103.
Although an opponent of al-As'ad, Al-Safa recognised al-As'ad's leadership in Jabal `Amil throughout
his book
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Their leadership began in 1649 (1059 AH) and continued uninterrupted well into the
twentieth century. What is certain is that their power base was not based on land
ownership which was not as big as the land ownership of; for instance, al-Sulh, al-Zain,
al-Khalil and al-Amin. Rather, as shown in chapter one, their leadership was based on
their reputation as "protectors" of the Shi'ite interests vis-a-vis the M'ans, the Shihabs
and the Ottoman authorities in the seventeenth century. al-As'ad's leadership was further
strengthened when they formed an affiance with al-'Umar of Galilee in the eighteenth
century, and again when they helped the Ottomans to end the Egyptian occupation in
Jabal 'Mail in 1840.
In 1908, Kamil al-As'ad (1868-1924) had maintained his supremacy in Jabal 'Amil by
winning the elections to the Ottoman parliament. Beirut and its districts, Sidon, Tyre,
and Marlayun, were represented by three deputies Kamil al-As'ad, Rida al-Sulh, and
Sulaiman al-Bustani. 1 In 1912 al-As'ad's position was further strengthened when the
French backed him by persuading the Christian electorates in Jabal 'Amil to vote for him,2
against his Sulhi opponent 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil.
While discussing Kamil al-As'ad, some writers 3 are dependent upon Al-Safa's analyses,
particularly for the period 1912 to 1916, where he is portrayed as a notable interested
1 Halcim, op.cit., p. 36.
2 Kawtharani, 'Wathiqatan Faransiyyatan: Kaifa Hawalat Faransa Ikhtiraq al-Bunya al-
Ijtimaiyya ii Shi'at Jabal 'Amil' Al-Muntalaq, Vol. 15. pp. 21-36.
3 The majority of sources which discussed al-As'ad depended on the work of Al-Safa. His work
can not be taken without questioning because he was a Sulhi, and also an opponent of al-As'ads. Some of
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only in preserving his leadership in Jabal 'Amil. Thus whenever critics mention Kamil al-
As'ad they refer to his denunciation of the early Arab nationalists, or his good
relationship with the brutal statesman Jamal Pasha the wali of Syria. Critics always
portrayed Kamil al-As'ad as a notable who thought that representing the Shi'ites of Jabal
`Amil was a privilege precluded to anybody else whatever his personality and his
capacities might have been.'
Critics often refer to 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil's challenge to al-As'ad in the elections of the
parliament in 1912. It has been believed that although al-As'ad won, he regarded al-
Khalil as a threat that should be eliminated. This happened in 1915 when al-Khalil was
among those who were executed by Jamal Pasha at the instigation of Kamil al-As'ad. My
criticism to the critics who interpreted the competition between al-As'ad and al-Khalil is
two fold. Firstly, they overlook the fact that al-As'ad was an Ottomanist. Sayyid Muhsin
al-Amin, the Shiite marja' in Syria, himself a Sulhi, reported that when al-As'ad was
elected to the Ottoman Parliament he invited the Arab members of the parliament to have
dinner in Tuqatilian restaurant where he advocated harmony and unity between the
peoples of the Empire and warned of enmities and division. 2
 Given these beliefs, al-As'ad
naturally would oppose any moves towards separatism and, in addition, it was also
normal that candidates would undermine each other. Secondly, the claim that 'Abd al-
Karim al-Khalil presented a challenge to al-As lad's leadership is quite illogical. As
these sources are Kawtharani, op.cit., p. 266. Bazzi, Jabal 'Amil p. 49. Hottinger, 'Zu'aina in
historical ..., p. 92-93. Johnson, op.cit., p. 65.
1 Hottinger, op.cit, p. 92.
2 Muhsin al-Amin, A'aian al-Shi'a, Vol. 9 pp. 22-23
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mentioned in chapter two, al-Khalil was heard of only when the CUP made their coup in
1908. In addition, he did not possess an independent leadership but instead was acting in
the orbit of Rida al-Sulh. The competition between and al-As'ad was simply a
reflection of the real struggle between al-Sulh and al-As'ad.
Although 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil was an active and energetic intellectual, he was the
instrument which al-Sulh utilised in order to undermine the authority of al-As'ad. His
Sulhi associate, Al-Safa, described al-Khalil as being inexperienced, outgoing and not
sufficiently familiar with the power struggle in Jabal 'Ana l Certainly such a personality
would not be able to cause real damage to al-As'ad but would merely act as an irritant.
Despite being a friend of Jamal Pasha, the authority of al-As'ad in Jabal `Amil continued
even when the Ottomans were defeated in 1918 and Jamal Pasha fell from power.
One would assume that the supporters of the Turks such as al-As'ad would have suffered
as a result of the Ottoman defeat. On the contrary, al-As'ad retained his supremacy and
his status was actually enhanced under the regime of Amir Faisal After Faisal arrived in
Syria as the head of the Arab Government his representative ilia al-Klnui, accompanied by
Kamil al-Mad, went to Jabal 'Amil early in October and they hoisted the Arab flag in
recognition of the Arab Govemment. 2 al-Mad was put in charge of Jabal 'Amil by al-Khuri,
but was displeased when the area was attached to Sidon under the new administrative system,
and above all when his rival Riyad al-Sulh (1892-1951) was appointed head of the provincial
1 A1-Safa, op.cit., p. 212.
2 Kawtharani, al-litijahat p. 271.
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government in Sidon. This angered al-As'ad who called for a meeting in Nabatiyya in order to
have al-Sulh dismissed.' This meeting was ineffective due to French intervention, which
ordered the suspension of all political activities in Jabal 'Amil.
2.2 Rida al-Sulh
On the other hand Rida al-Sulh (1860-1935)2 was a long established zalm who came
originally from Sidon. The power base of the family remained in that city until Ahmad
and 'Abd al-Rahim al-Sulh decided to settle in Beirut around 1860. Although they moved
to Beirut they maintained strong links with Jabal 'Amil, mainly through Sidon, because of
the administrative attachment of Jabal 'Amil to Beirut in 1888, the centre of the wilayat.
The result was continued rivalry between al-Sulh and al-As'ad, seen most obviously in
the 1908 elections.
A number of factors had determined the prominence of the al-Sulh family in Jabal 'Amil.
Firstly, they belonged to the Sunni sect and as a result the Ottoman authorities gave them
leverage over Shiite notables. In 1883 Hamdi Pasha, the wali of Sidon, visited Nabatiyya
and was very impressed with its market where people came from all over Jabal 'Amil to
sell their produce. 3 He then appointed Rida al-Sulh mudir of Nabatiyya choosing to
ignore the leadership claims of the al-As'ad family. Secondly, the al-Sulh owned large
amounts of land in Jabal 'Amil, mainly in Tul, al-Sharqiyya, al-Khardali and Sidon.
1 Hottinger, op.cit, pp. 92-93. A1-Safa, op.cit., p. 224.
2 Hassan Hallaq, 'Rida al-Sulh: Rajul al-'Uruba w l al-Wanda al-Wataniyya 1860-1935', al-
Manabir, issue 68, Beirut, Lebanon, 1993, pp. 91-106.
3 A1-Safa, op.cit., p. 174.
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Thirdly, in the second decade of the twentieth century their well known reputation as
Arab nationalists attracted many Shiite intellectuals to their side. In addition, although
they had moved to Beirut, some members of the family such as Rida took up residence in
the Shiite dominated area of al-Bashura and often used to celebrate 'Ashura in his home
there.'
It was not only the 'national factor' which favoured co-operation between al-Sulh and
his Shiite supporters. The Shi'ite historian Al-Safa was the director of the al-Sulh
businesses. 2 `Arif al-Zain and `Usayran supported al-Sulh for different reasons. They had
their own sources of power, as both were landowners mainly in al-Qasmiyya near Sidon,
where they held authority over large numbers of peasants. In addition, `Usayran's
prominence in Sidon increased after l8523 when they became Iranian consuls in the city.
This position increased their authority and rendered those who worked for them exempt
from military service!' The close relationship between 'Usayran and the Shahs continued
until the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty. 5 Moreover, `Usayran's status was also strengthened
locally through marriage with the prominent Beiruti family of Baydun. Rashid Baydun
established al-'Amiliyya, the first modem Shiite school in Beirut, and subsequently
extended his activities to Jabal 'Amil, where he established a number of schools.
'Interview, Munah al-Sulh, Beirut, winter, 1992.
2 Hasan al-Amin, son of Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin, the Shi'ite marja' of Damascus, interview,
summer, 1992.
3 
al-Safir, 26, July,1990.
4 Yusuf Tabaja, al-Za'ama al-Siyasiyya fi Lubnan al-Janubi, MA dissertation, Social Science
Dept., Lebanese University, 1987, p.96.
5 al-Qawmi alJArabi, No. 91, 24 June 1991, p. 43.
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Yet, the combined strengths of Al-Safa, 'Arif al-Zain and the 'Usayrans were no match
against al-As'ad. The only way they could challenge this family's long established
leadership was to form an alliance with another well established family, that of al-Sulh.
However, because al-Sulh was a Sunni, such an alliance was not of much benefit to them.
One major factor contributing to their failure was the sectarian nature of the local
communities emerging since the qaimmaqamate, the mutasarrifiyya and the French
Mandate. Because the political structure of Greater Lebanon had been established on
sectarian foundations, advocating non-sectarian political approaches would have less
chance to succeed. Such rivalry between al-As'ad and al-Sulh continued during the
Sharifian revolt against the Turks and during the French mandate. The support of Sharaf
al-Din also continued in favour of al-As'ad.
3. Establishment of an independent Shi'ite leadership
In 1918 the majority of the Shiites in Jabal 'Amil were committed to the Sharifians. This
commitment was based on three main factors. Firstly Sharif Husain's family were
Hashimites, which was in itself sufficient reason to support them. Secondly, the Shiltes
were suspicious of a French supported independent Lebanon which might sentence them
to oblivion. Thirdly, the general support Faisal received in 1918 placed the Shiite
minority in a critical position where they had to show commitment to the general Sunni
attitudes towards the Sharifians.
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The upheaval the Arab territories were going through, especially after 1918, forced the
Shiite `ulama throughout the region to act quickly and support Arab claims for
independence. There were two major political visions of the future in Lebanon. The first
was Muslim dominated and generally supportive of the Sharifians, and saw Lebanon as an
integral part of an independent Syria. The second was Maronite-dominated and aimed at
creating an independent state (taking the mutasarrifiyya as a precedent) with French
assistance. As Jabal 'Amil was a Shiite-dominated area with the Maronites composing
only the second largest community, the Shiites rejected the idea of a separate Lebanon and
thus, implicitly, the prospect of French domination. These divergent views produced a deep
rift between the local Shi'ite and Maronite communities
Table 3: Population of Jabal 'Arnil in 1917.
Communities population
Shi'ites 63,000
Maronites 17,500
Sunnis 13,397
G. Orthodox 5,673
Dnize 3,500
Protestant 1,434
G. Catholic 1,124
Jews 629
Total 106,257
al-Wfan, Vol. VIII Sidon, 1954, pp. 1-5. The
figures are not official but based on a survey
conducted by al-'Irfan in 1917.
Shi'ite support for the Sharilians was best demonstrated in 1919. Upon his return to Beirut
from the Paris peace conference, King Faisal was warmly welcomed by the Shiite leaders,
although the events which took place also reflected the deep division between the Sulhis and
the As'adis. Before the meeting with Faisal, Riyad al-Sulh approached Sharaf al-Din in an
attempt to convince him to be part of the group headed by 'Abdullah al-Khalil which would
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be the first to shake hands with the king. Sharaf al-Din was informed that if he declined and
chose to be with the group headed by Kamil al-As'ad, then they would be the last to shake
hands with Faisal Sharaf al-Din rejected al-Sulh's offer and told him that he preferred to be in
the group which would meet Faisal last, so that they could enjoy the longest time 'talking to
hid'
On 2 July, 1919, representatives from Jabal 'Amil participated in the National Syrian
Congress to support Faisal's efforts to achieve the independence of Syria. It was at this point
that they demonstrated the hostile attitudes of the Shiites towards the Fiala presence, as we))
as their support of the Arab govemment. 2 The Shiites' rejection of the notion of a French
Mandate was also manifested in 1919 during the visit of the King-Crane Commission.3
The Commission came to the region on 10 June 1919, and remained there until 21 July in
order to find the real political aspiration of the Arabs, and their views towards the various
mandates in general. When the Commission had concluded its work in Palestine it arrived in
Tyre where it met a group of Shiites from Jabal	 Sharaf al-Din and Shaikh	 Husain Sadiq
were chosen to represent the Shiltes. 4 Their requests to the Americans coincided precisely
with more general Arab aspirations for a united Syria with Faisal as king. Sharaf al-Din also
demanded American assistance to achieve this objective. 5
 This angered the French who
'Interview, Ja'far Sharaf al-Din, Tyre, winter, 1992.
2 Kawthar4ni, al-Inijahat p. 289.
3 Dahir, Tarikh Lubnan p. 33.
4 Sharaf al-Din, Bughiat p. 148.
5 Ibid.
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apparently encouraged an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Sharaf al-Din.' The general
conclusion reached by the Commission was that the local population was against both French
and British control, but that if they had to accept a mandatory authority, they would
choose an American one. 2
 Farling that, the Syrians would prefer the British to the French. It
should be remembered that at this stage most of 'Greater Syria' was under British military
control.
3.1 The aspirations of the Maronites
In contrast to the Shiites the Maronites were hoping for a separate entity under French
protection. In this respect their aspirations had been supported by the French long before
1919. French support for the Maronites in the nineteenth century was part of wider
European involvement in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire mostly through the minority
communities. France had long acted as the protector of the Catholics of the Levant.3
The Maronites were viewed with great suspicion and hogaity both z.side and. oktUde
Lebanon, as they were the only community to demand separation from the rest of Syria and to
seek protection from the colonial powers. Nevertheless, their hopes were realised in
September 1920 when France established Greater Lebanon. France was determined from
the start to assume direct political control in Lebanon because it chose to believe that the
Maronites looked to it 'Tor protection from domination of the surrounding Arab Muslim 
1 Jubran known as ibn al-Hallaq a Christian from Tyre, attempted to assassinate Sharaf al-Din.
Sharaf al-Din, Bughint ..., p. 149.
2 Ibid., p. 37. Longrigg, op.cit, p. 91.
3 Spagnolo, France & ..., p. 67.
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•	 •	 ,,imajority. Very early indications of this determination were shown in 1918 when the French
ordered a suspension of all political activities in Jabal 'Amil2 and in October 1918, Colonel De
Piepapa was appointed the commander-in-chief as well as governor of Beirut and Tyre.3
The creation of Greater Lebanon on 1 September 1920 was a date to celebrate for the
Maronite community. And yet the enlargement of Lebanon stirred mixed feelings among the
French officers themselves. Robert de Caix was opposed to the creation of Greater Lebanon,
and aware of the danger Maronites could face if it was established. He sent a detailed
recommendation to Millerand stating that only the Biqa' valley and Jabal 'Akkar should be
annexed, while annexation of Beirut and the sanjak of Sidon should be deferred until it
became clear how the first two regions turned out. 4 De Caix was even cautious about the
inclusion of Beirut, arguing that Beirut would probably soon have half as many inhabitants as
the whole of Lebanon, which would greatly alter the character of the Lebanese state. He also
recommended that Tripoli should not be included in greater Lebanon.
Gouraud rejected de Caix's reservations and "pressed Millerand to allow him to set up a
Greater Lebanon. He regarded the fulfilment of Lebanese Christian aspirations as a repayment
of France's moral debt to them for their loyalty and historic attachment."5 The creation of
Greater Lebanon brought a dramatic change to the position of the Christians. The table
1 F.W. Brecher, 'French Policy towards the Levant 1914-18', MES, Vol. 29 No. 4, 1993, p. 645.
2 Al-Safa, op.cit., p. 223-4.
3 Longrigg, op.cit, pp.66-67.
4 Zamir, op.cit, p.92.
5 Ibid., p. 93.
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below shows that the majority which the Christians enjoyed in the mutasarrifiyya had
more or less disappeared in Greater Lebanon.
Table 4: A comparison of the population distribution between the Mutasarrifiyya and
Greater Lebanon.
Sect The
Mutasarrifiyya
Greater
Lebanon 1921
Greater
Lebanon 1932
Maronites 58.40% 32.70% 29.11%
Greek Orthodox 12.62% 13.37% 9.88%
Greek Catholic 7.70% 6.97% 5.97%
Other Christians 0.73% 2.08% 5.77%
Total Christians 79.45% 55.12% 50.73%
Sunnis 3.50% 20.48% 22.63%
Shi'ites 5.64% 17.23% 19.81%
Druze 11.40% 7.16% 6.82%
Total Muslims 20.54% 44.87% 49.26%
Zamir, The Formation of..., p.98.
As far as the Shiites were concerned, it was French planes and heavy bombardments that
ended their rebellion in April 1920, as will be shown below, and consequently led to their
incorporation into Greater Lebanon a few months later.' This violent method of incorporating
the Shiites into the new state was greatly resented and caused long term discontent within the
state.
1 Zamir, op.cit., p. 86.
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3.2 Shi'ite opposition to the French
The contradictory views of the Shiites and Maronites regarding Greater Lebanon and a
united Syria were irreconcilable. During the armed clashes of late 1919 and early 1920,
political rivalry between the Shiite rivals halted briefly, and so al-As'ad's leadership was
assured. However, this leadership eventually suffered what may only be described as a
hammer blow under French auspices.
3.2.1 French relations with Kamil al-As'ad
French relations with al-As'ad can only be described as unstable. In 1912, early indication
gave the impression that the French were supportive of al-As'ad, but as years went by the
French were the major factor which undermined the supremacy of al-As'ad family for a
number of years.
In 1912, the French intervened in al-As'ad's favour during parliamentary elections. This
could be interpreted as their recognition of his leadership of Jabal 'Amil so as to win
him to their side. Until 1920 al-As'ad did not meet face to face with the French to reach
an understanding,' and all arrangements were transacted through members of his family,
or other second-rank notables acting on his intermediaries. He promoted the interests of
the al-Fadl family, who were the link between himself and General Gouraud in February
1920.2
1 Kawtharani, 'Wathiqatan..., p. 21-36.
2 Muhammad Sheraim, Jabal 'Amil 1920-1926: Taqallub al-Masir, Social Science Dept., MA
dissertation, Lebanese University, 1983, p. 151.
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In February and March 1920 General Gouraud visited Nabatiyya l and al-Khardali2 and met
al-As'ad, in an attempt to persuade the Shiites not to support King Faisal and to accept the
idea of Greater Lebanon. The general could not convince his audience, and al-As'ad told him
unequivocally that he could not encourage his people to accept the French plan since it
contradicted his religious principles. In addition, his close association with Sharaf al-Din
would rule out such co-operation. Both al-As'ad and Sharaf al-Din played a crucial role in
maintaining order in Jabal 'Anil, particularly when tension between the Maronites and the
Shi'ites began to increase.
In the late 1919, such tension increased due to contradictory attitudes towards the
French, and developed into armed clashes between the two communities, particularly
who each had its own guerrilla groups. On the Shiite side some groups were well known
for their effectiveness, such as those headed by Sadiq al-Hamza, Adham al-Khanjar, 'Ali
Bazzi and Mahmud al-Fa'aur. On the Maronite side two major groups were effective,
those headed by Ibrahim Fransis and 'Aid al-Hawrani.3
al-As'ad sought to calm the situation by setting up direct communication with the
French. On 15 April 1920, he and some other notables, al-Fadl, al-Zain and al-Abdullah
1 Hasan M Sa'd, Jabal 'Amil, Dar al-Kitab, Beirut, 1980, p. 92.
2 Rida, al- slrfan, Vol. 7, p. 736.
3 Nadine Meouchy, Les Formes de Conscience Politique et Communautaire au Liban et en
Syrie a L'Epoque du Mandate Francais 1920-1939, these de Doctorat, Universite de Paris - Sorbonne,
1989, p. 148. Taqi al-Din, 'al-Janub al Lubnani p. 135. Dahir, Tarikh ..., 1974, p. 39. 3 'Ali al-Amin,
Sadiq Hamza al-Fa'aur, Asia Publishing Company, Beirut, 1985, p. 73.
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met at Dayr Mimas to discuss the deteriorating security situation in Jabal 'AmiL They
suggested the use of local guards who would be paid monthly by the French. The French
rejected this because of the high salaries suggested' and, more importantly, because the
control of these guards would be in the hands of the notables rather than themselves.2
They were disappointed with the outcome of the meeting in Dayr Mimas and this had
fiuther effects on the Shiites as a whole. In March 1920 the French authorities had
established administrative offices in Sidon with employees from various communities. But
as a sign of dissatisfaction, the French sacked all Shiite employees and replaced them
with Christians. 3 Thereupon, al-As'ad called a general meeting to discuss the issue of
security in Jabal `Amil and to consider the position towards the French and the Sharifians.
3.2.2 The Shi'ite conference of al-Hujair
The deterioration of the situation between the Shiites and the Maronites required a quick
solution in order to ease the tension. For this reason, al-As'ad sent invitations to notables,
intellectuals, guerrilla leaders and `tilama to attend a conference to take place on 24 April
1920, at al-Hujair.
It seems from Sharaf al-Din's memoirs4 that al-As'ad was pressed by some officers from
Damascus to prepare for rebellion. The officers gave al-As'ad two choices: he would either
The salary requested for each officer was 15 pounds. Shulaib, Matalib Jabal 'Amil: al-Wanda,
al-Musawat fi Lubnan al-Kabir 1900-1936, al-Muassasa al-Jam'aiyya, Beirut, 1987, p. 75.
2 Khalil M. Ismail, Tarikh Jabal 'Amil al-ljtima'i 1860-1920, MA dissertation, History
Department, Lebanese University, 1986, pp.55-60.
3 Rida, al-lrfan, Vol. 35 No 8, 1948, P. 691.
4 Sharaf al-Din, Bughiat...,pp.151-152.
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comply with their demands, or he would be considered an opponent. In order to avoid any
commitment al-As'ad requested consultation with the notables and `ulaina in an attempt to
establish security through peaceful means in Jabal 'Amil, contrary to what the delegates
from Damascus wanted.
Delegates to the al-Hujair conference had to consider three matters in order to establish
security. First, many opportunists had joined the guerrilla groups and partly subverted their
original aims. Secondly, many of the guerrilla groups were supported and trained by the
Arab government in Syria, which made the position of the conference delegates very sensitive
as they were aware of their delicate position vis-a-vis Damascus if they were to deal drastically
with the guerrillas. Thirdly, the participants were well aware of French intentions towards
Syria and Lebanon, and realised that effective measures needed to be taken.' The outcome of
the conference was a definite rejection of Allied policy regarding the dismantling of Syria, and
the enthusiastic recognition of Faisal as king of Syria.2
As far as the Christians in Jabal 'Amil were concerned, Sharaf al-Din was aware that the
continuing tensions between the Shiites and the Maronites would be made use of by the
French to consolidate their occupation. Therefore, during the conference he called strongly
for understanding with the Maronites:
The Christians (Nasara) are your brethren in the country and in destiny. Show
to them the love you show to yourselves. Protect their lives and possessions
'Sa'd, op.cit, p. 84.
2 Al-Sda, op.cit, p. 223.
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as you do to your own. Only by this can you face the conspiracy and put an
end to the civil strife ....1
The conference chose him and Sayyid Husain Nur al-Din, accompanied by Kamil al-Mad,
to convey the resolutions of support to the Arab government in Damascus.2
On their way to Damascus, the Shiite delegates met with Mahmud al-Fa'aur the Amir of
Qunaytra in the eastern side of Jabal 'Amil. The amir was in favour of continuing military
activities against the French, but Sharaf al-Din expressed the opinion that a peaceful
approach should be pursued with the French to solve the deteriorating situation in Jabal
'Amil.3 He was aware that adopting a violent approach towards the French would have
devastating effects. However, he added that if this peaceful approach failed, the Shiites
would be more than willing to take military action. 4 al-Fa'aur promised that he would
halt all action until he knew the outcome of Sharaf al-Din's meeting with King Faisa1.5
However, while in Damascus, a group of Shi'ite guerrillas attacked 'Ain Ibil, a Christian
village, and atrocities were committed.6
1 Sharaf al-Din, Bughiat p. 440.
2 Ibid., p. 156. Sa'd, op.cit, 1980, p. 76.
3 Sharaf al-Din, Bughiat ..., p.156.
4 Ibid.
5 This pacific approach of al-As'ad and Sharaf al-Din was long resented by the al-Sulh party,
and still rankles today. In a recent interview, Munah al-Sulh accused Sharaf al-Din of being a French
agent, reactionary and an opportunist. Munah divided the participants at the al-Hujair conference into
two groups. The first group included the Sulhis such as Sulaiman Dahir, Al-Safa, Alunad Rida and
Alunad 'Arif al-Zain. The second included the As'adis. Not surprisingly Munah considered the first
group to be the progressive one. Interview, Munah al-Sulh, a prominent figure of al-Sulh family, Beirut,
winter, 1992.
6 Meouchy, op.cit., p. 146.
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Despite Sharaf al-Din's clear massage for peace, the Maronites of Jabal 'Amil regarded the
al-Huj air conference as highly dangerous. The pro-French paper, al-Bashir, went so far as to
claim that Sharaf al-Din had issued a fatwa calling on the Muslims to eliminate all
Maronites. 1
 Certainly this report had the effect of increasing tensions between the two
communities.
The Shiite conference at al-Hujair was the first instance of a religious community in Syria
openly taking a political stand in favour of the Arab government. In addition, the conference
can be considered as one of the first public rejections of the French mandatory power and of
the notion of Greater Lebanon.
3.2.3 Shi'ite armed resistance
Hank suggests2 that the Sunnis were more active in their opposition to the French than the
Shiites, but certainly as far as Jabal 'Amil was concerned, the Shiite population gave very
early indications of their hostility to the French presence. However, the rebellion of 19 19-
1920 was crushed, and as a consequence, the community was left paralysed both
economically and socially.
The exact circumstances surrounding the Shi'ite rebellion are still somewhat obscure.
According to Kurd 'Ali's memoirs, Dahir recalls that when King Faisal was in Paris in 1919,
he promised the Allies that he would put an end to the activities of guerrilla groups, especially
1 al-Bashir, 20 May 1920.
2 Harik, op.cit., 1972, pp. 303-323.
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those who were attacking the French.' On the other hand, Sharaf al-Din explained that in
1920 al-As'ad did not accept any backing from King Faisal during the rebellion because of his
preference for a peaceful solution. Similarly, al-Mad ordered the villages of Jabal 'Amil not to
resist the French, especially after the French used aeroplanes to crush the rebellion.2
Although these statements of Sharaf al-Din and Dahir seem contradictory, they reflected
Faisars changing attitudes between 1919 and 1920. While Clemenceau was prime minister,
there was some understanding between him and Faisal but this vanished when he lost the
election to the more right wing Millerand in January 1920. The new government adopted a
firm stand on the Syrian question, and this may have encouraged Faisal to assist the Shiites.
However, regardless of Faisal's position and deals with the French, armed groups were
formed in Syria around the end of 1918 to direct attacks against the pro-French elements.
Some Shi'ite groups in Jabal 'Amil were supported by Damascus while the Maronite groups
were supported by the French. 3 lhsan al-Hindi, a Syrian officer, reported in his memoirs that
around 300 soldiers from the Sharifian Army fought alongside Shiite armed groups. Among
these soldiers were Zaki al-HaLabi, Said al-'As, and Fawzi al-Qawuqji 4 It has been reported
that there were about seven thousand Shi'ite guerrillas.' Although the guerrillas were large in
number only a few groups were effective. Four of these groups had wide reputation, that is,
the group headed by Sadiq al-Hamza, Adham al-Khanjar, 'Ali Bath and Mahmud al-Fa'aur.
1 Dahir, Tarikh	 p. 39. Z,arnir, op.cit, p. 415.
2 Sa'd, op.cit, 1980, p. 89.
3 Meouchy, op.cit., p. 142. Taqi al-Din, op.cit., p. 135. Dahir, Tarikh 	 p. 39. Zamir, op.cit, p. 415.
4 Taqi al-Din, op.cit., p. 148.
5 Ibid., p. 135.
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What distinguished these groups were that their military activities were effective, and that their
leaders came from prominent families.
Firstly, the largest group was led by Sadiq al-Hamza of the 'Ali al-Sagjiir family,' and his
sphere of activities was limited to Tyre and its surroundings. 2 Al-Hamza's political and
military activities were at their height between 1918-1920. His importance can be attributed to
various factors. He had important links with amir Mahmud al-Fa'aur of Qunaytra who took
up residence at al-Hula, and who in turn had links with Syrian officers. Al-Hamza also
developed good relations with amir Faisal and amir `Abdullah.
Despite being warned by the French when they entered Nabatiyya in 1918 not to carry out any
political activities, al-Hamza hoisted the Arab flag in a few villages in Jabal 'Mill as a sign of
rejection of French occupation. 3 As Tyre was his major sphere of activities, he co-ordinated
his movements with Sharaf al-Din and was also invited to participate in the al-Hujair
conference where he was in charge of security. When the French occupied Damascus in July
1920, al-Hamza left for Jordan to serve amir `Abdullah, and remained there until his death.4
A second guerrilla group was headed by Amir Mahmud al-Fa'aur. His group was effective
because he was amir of Qunaytra, and particularly because he enjoyed the support of the
Syrian officers, mainly lthsan al-Hindi His base was al-Hula and he directed his activities
al-Amin, Sadiq p. 73.
2 Meouchy, op.cit., p. 146.
3 Ahrnad Rida, 'Muthakkarat ii al-Tarikh' al-'Irfan , Vol. 7, p. 733.
4 a1-Amin, Sadiq ..., pp. 82-83.
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towards Hasbaiyya, Rashaiyya and Marlayun. 1 al-Fa'aur was known for being in favour of a
military solution rather than dialogue with the French.
A third group was headed by Adham Bek al-Khanjar. He was a prominent figure of the
famous family of al-Sa'bi which was prominent in Nabatiyya district. His father was a large
land owner in al-Marwaniyya which also contributed to his influence and fame. al-Khanjar co-
operated closely with al-Hamza and at times they inflected heavy losses on the French. He
concentrated his activities around Nabatiyya and took al-Shaqif castle as his base. He was
best known for his attempt to assassinate Gouraud in 1922.
Finally, a fourth group was under the command of Mahmud Bazzi who originated from Bint-
Jubail. The Bath family was prominent in land-ownership al-Bazzi concentrated his activities
around his area,2
 and he led the attack on 'Ain Ibfl which subsequently led to direct French
intervention to suppress the rebellion in Jabal 'Arai
The aim of these guerrilla groups was to resist the French, but their activities were neither
organised nor co-ordinated. This was evident because they possessed no central leadership
and so relied upon individual leaders to decide when and where to take military action.
However, this did not stop them from inflicting heavy casualties on French troops. al-Bashir,
described how al-Hamza group used to challenge French tax collectors. On one occasion they
arrested a tax collector along with his two gendarmes, and returned all the money to the
'Ibid.
2 Sa'd, op.cit, p. 63.
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people from whom it had been collected. In addition, they would threaten those who did pay
taxes.' al-Bashir also reported a battle between the French and al-Hamza in which the
former lost fifty men (dead and wounded) as well as some weapons.2
On the other hand, the Maronites had their own armed groups which were supported by the
French, such as that led by Ibrahim Fransis from Q1afaa, 3 and that led by 'Aid al-Hawrani
from al-Kufiir near the town of Nabatiyya. 4 The Maronites increased their military activities
against the Shrites following the Syrian congress of 2 July 1919 where the Shrites restated
their commitment to a united Syria.
Maronite newspapers depicted the Shiite guerrillas as gangs interested only in robbing and
killing, while the Shiites considered the Maronites as French agents. These divergent views
indicates that there was no one common view of external intervention in Lebanon's internal
affairs. The difference of perceptions between the Maronites in particular and the Muslims in
general continued well into the 1980s. 5 This antagonistic view of the .Nlaronites was
shared by Longrigg who adopted a negative view of the resistance i%emu& against *t.
French. His view of the resistance was the following:
In the Jabal al-Druze, predominantly isolationist in feeling (as well as an
asylum for the criminals of all neighbouring areas), the governorship of Salim
1 Zamir, op.cit, p. 416.
2 1(awtharani, Ittijahat p. 308.
3 Salam al-Rasi, al-Muallafat al-Kamila, Nawfal Press, Beirut, 1977, p. 160
4 Rida, memoir, al-lrfan, Vol. 33, No. 8, Sidon, pp. 991-992.
5 Even after forty years of Lebanese independence especially during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in
1982, the Lebanese appeared not to have a common national allegiance or perception. On the contr-ary, for
instance the Maronites called the Shfites who resisted the Israelis with "terrorists", a widely used word.
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al-Atrash was made uneasy by the indiscipline of the other Atrash leaders,
notably the Amir Sultan. The latter, offended by the arrest of a criminal [a
Lebanese Sh?ite] who sought (in his absence) asylum at his village of Quraya,
raised a force of his followers in July 1922, and tried to rally the countryside;
but he attracted no major support, ... a small French column was sent to
remove the arrested prisoner [Adham al-Khanjar]. 1
As so often in such tensions a minor incident was all that was needed to touch off an outbreak
of violence. In May 1920, while the delegates from the al-Huj air conference were in
Damascus, Baths armed group attacked the Maronite inhabitants of 'Ain Ibil and many lives
were lost. Various important reasons were reported as to why this attack took place, but the
major reason was the difference between the Maronites and the Shi'ites regarding the French
presence and the Syrian union.
This sectarian clash gave the French a golden opportunity to increase their protection of the
Maronites, who had immediately asked for French intervention. An expedition was launched
under Colonel Niger with some 4000 men assisted by Maronite volunteers which crushed
the Shiite rebeffion. 2 On 5 June 1920, Colonel Niger gathered the Shiite notables and ' ulama
and forced them to sign a document holding them responsible for the events at 'Ain IbiL The
Shiites had to pay 200,000 Turkish gold pounds in reparation to the Maronites, which
severely affected the economy of the whole area.3
1 Longrigg, op.cit, p. 131.
2 1(awtharani, al-Ittijahat ..., p. 315. Petran, op.cit., p. 59.
3 Sharaf al-Din, Bughiat ..., p. 163.
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Practically, the Shiite resistance against the French was ended, but an attempt on General
Gouraud's life by Adham al-Khanjar was made in 1922. 1 Adham al-Khanjar was in Sultan
al-Atrash's house when he was arrested by the French and later killed. It is even said that
this was the principal reason which sparked the revolution of 1925. 2 As an act of honour
al-Atrash burned his house, stating that "the house which is unable to protect its guests is
not worthy of keeping." 3 However, most resistance activities after 1920 were undertaken
by individuals and did not represent the cohesive acts of a community as such.
The downfall of the Shiites in April 1920 made it easier for the French to include Jabal 'Amil
in the newly created Greater Lebanon which was proclaimed by General Gouraud on 1
September 1920. This proclamation took place in the presence of al-Huwaiyyek the
Maronite Patriarch and Mustafa Naja the Sunni Mufli, 4 while most of the Shiite leaders,
both notables and `ulama, were in hiding in neighbouring countries. This new reality
caused change of attitudes among the Shi'ites in order to take part in the new state.
4. French influence and the rise of new zu'ama
The events of 1920 were crucial in the sense that all major opposition was crushed by the
French both in Lebanon and Syria, and many local zu'ama realised that it was time to
come to terms with reality. However these events left the Shiites in Jabal 'Amil deeply
resentful towards the French authorities. The community was shattered, since its main
1 Sherairn, op.cit., p. 135. Tabajah, op.cit., p. 122.
2 Najib Bi'aini, Rijal min Biladi, al-Raihani Press, Beirut, 1984, pp. 221-2.
3 Interview, Munah al-Sulh, Beirut, winter, 1992.
4 Jubran K. Touq, Ha'ula Hum Hukkam Lubnan, Beirut,n.d, p. 20.
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leaders had fled from their villages and taken refuge in Syria, Palestine and Egypt, and
thousands of peasants had also fled, because they had participated in the revolt and
feared reprisals.
In 1922, after al-As'ad had come back from exile, and in a desperate attempt he led a
rising against the French but was easily suppressed.' Subsequently, his health
deteriorated, and he died in 1924. His attitude towards the French adversely affected the
standing of his family, and paved the way for second-rank families to establish their own
leadership.
After 1920 the position of the second-ranking Shiite notables was strengthened for two
main reasons. Firstly, because of the absence of al-As'ad, the French had to seek an
alternative leaders in order to facilitate the incorporation of the Shiites into Greater
Lebanon. Secondly, some Shiite notables believed that they should take the opportunity
to consolidate their position in the new state. The new realities on the ground and the
incapability of the Shi'ites to alter the new arrangement forced the Shi'ites to review their
position regarding the French and Greater Lebanon.
4.1 Incorporation of the Shi'ites into Greater Lebanon
The sectarian structure which had been the guiding principle behind the qa'immaqamate
and the mutasarrifiyya was utilised again in Greater Lebanon. In order to complete the
1 Longrigg, op.cit., p. 123.
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Lebanese sectarian structure the French dealt mainly with the Shiite notables rather than
the `ulama. This was because the new state was of a secular nature which necessitated
the exclusion of all hostile elements. On the other hand, some Shiite notables were
anxious to come to terms with the French authorities particularly when General Gouraud's
proclamation was issued in the presence of the Maronite Patriarch and the Sunni Muffi as well
as Sunni notables.'
In 1922 some signs of agreement began to appear between the Maronites and the
Shiltes. al-Bashir2 highlighted the misery existing in Jabal 'Amil, and attributed it to the
high fines imposed there after the rebellion of 1920. The newspaper even asked the
French authorities to cancel the debts in order to encourage the Shiltes to participate in
building of Greater Lebanon.
In 1925 although some Shiites took part in the Syrian revolution 3
 their participation was
disorganised and ineffective. The main Shiite notables at the time, Yusuf al-Zain, and al-
Fadl from Nabatiyya and Muhammad Sa'id Bazzi from Bint Jubail played crucial roles in
accommodating the Christians who fled their villages in Jabal 'Amil during the revolution.
al-Bashir published a letter by Father Ighnatus al-Iladthuni expressing his gratitude to
the Shiltes for their caring and responsible actions. He wrote:
... what the Shiltes did for the Christians in the south will be cherished in
our hearts for as long as Lebanon and the Christians remain What
1 Zamir, op.cit, p. 130. Dahir, Tarikh	 p. 51.
2 al-Bashir, No 2945, 1922.
3 Stuart Colie, 'A Prospective on the Shfites and the Lebanese Tragedy, in M Curtis (ed), The
Middle East Reader, Oxford, 1986, p. 116.
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happened should be written in gold. Long live Lebanon, Long live
Lebanese unity and long live the Shiites.'
Later that year a group of Shiite notables met at al-Nabatiyya and demanded to be
recognised as a separate religious and independent community. 2 On 27 January 1926 de
Jouvenel recognised the Shiite community as an independent one with its own judges and
Ja'fari Shar'ai courts. 3 Sharaf al-Din subsequently visited the High Commissioner to
express gratitude for the grant of separate personal status.4
The French continued their policy of attracting the Shi'ites through including some of
their zu'ama in the first Administrative Committee in Greater Lebanon. 5 The
administrative places were divided and allocated along sectarian lines. Two seats were
given to the Shiites as shown in the following table:
Table 5: Sectarian distribution of the Administrative Committee from 22 September 1920
to March 1922.
Sunni Shi'ite Druze Maronite Orthodox Catholic Total
4 2 1 6 3 1 17
Ahmad M. Haidar, al-Dawla al-Lubnaniyya 1920-1953, al-Najmah, Beirut, 1954, P. 9.
The two Shi'ites were Husain al-Zain from Nabatiyya and Ibrahim Haidar from Balbek.
Because of their pro-Mandate stance the al-Zain family was a target of Shiite rebels in
1 Shu'aib, op.cit., pp. 97-8.
2 Ibid., p. 98.
3 Longrigg, op.cit., 162
4 al-Bashir, No 3437, 1926. Sharaf al-Din returned to Lebanon after 13 months in exile in Syria,
Palestine and Egypt.
5 From 22 September 1921 to 8 March 1922.
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1919 and 1920. The pro-French attitudes of Yusuf and Husain, the heads of the al-Zain
family, were clear when they did not participate in the Shiite conference of al-Hujair. The
absence of al-As'ad from Jabal 'Amil after the French incursions was the crucial factor in
enabling the al-Zains to consolidate their position in the community. Yusuf used his good
relations with the French to obtain an amnesty so that some villages should be exempted
from paying the high taxes imposed in 1920.' More importantly, the al-Zain family
managed to bring fresh water to Nabatiyya. Previously water was fetched by women
from a rain-filled well in the centre of the town. In order to undertake such an important
project, the al-Zains sold many of their villages to meet the costs, an act for which they
have always been remembered.2
In the Representative Council3 more Shiites were selected, such as Najib 'Usayran,4 and
Fadl al-Fadl. It seems that the French continued to follow a policy of bringing second-
ranking notables into these councils in order to broaden their control over the various
communities on the one hand and to challenge the well established authority of the As'ad
family on the other. The change of attitudes not only touched the traditional Shi'ite
zu 'ama but also reached those who vigorously resented the French mandate such as the
Sulhis.
1 Tabajah, op.cit., p. 122.
2 Zecher, op.cit., p. 35.
3 From 24 May 1922 to 26 may 1926.
4 Unlike his family, Najib Usayran was well known for his pro-French sympathies.
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4.2 The turning of the Sulhis to Greater Lebanon
Following 1920, the life of the Shi'ite intellectuals was in great disorder. They did not
have a common view regarding political development, and therefore, they were
ineffective and could not form a united bloc to speak of their interests. Rather they were
fragmented and continued to work in the sphere of the Sunnis.
Change also affected the Sulhi Shi'ites, who were known for their strong support for the
unity of Syria. In a sudden unexpected move, Ahmad Rida, signed a petition in 1921
recognising Greater Lebanon,' and many other Syrian unionists followed suit, 2 including
Al-Safa who called for an independent Jabal undm the supervision of the Trench
Mandate.' From 1925 the Shiites gradually accepted the status quo and did not try to
alter it. In February 1933, the two main factions among the Shiites, the Sulhis and the
pro-French, met in the house of Yusuf al-Zain in Kafr %unman and demanded that the
French authorities revise their policies towards the Shiltes.4
Some sectarian and non-sectarian factors also contributed to the change in Shi'ite
attitudes. The Shiites of Lebanon were disappointed with their fellow Arabs when the
International Archaeological Conference was organised in April 1926 entitled 'The
Persian in Lebanon and the Origin of the Matawila 'Shiltes15 This conference raised three
1 Sheraim, op.cit., p. 183.
2 Shu'aib, op.cit., p. 99.
31bid.
4 Ibid., p. 113.
5 Shu'aib, op.cit., p. 100.
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controversial issues. The first stated that the Shiites were originally of Persian origin and
that Mu'awiya, the first Umayyad Caliph, had brought them to defend the coast against
the Byzantines. Another opinion stated that the Shilites were of Kurdish origin, whilst the
third asserted that the Shiites were Arabs from the 'Amila tribe' who had migrated from
Yemen. The Shiite intellectuals were shocked by this conference as it was not the time or
place for their fellow Arabs to be dealing with such divisive issues, especially when the
whole of Syria needed unity rather than division. Knowing whether the Shiites were of
Arab origin or not would not alter the present situation.
On a wider level, the Franco-Syrian treaty in 1936 was received with mixed feelings in
Lebanon. The Maronites welcomed such a treaty, and demanded that a similar one should
be negotiated with Lebanon. The French were responsive and negotiations between the
two sides began in early 1936. In an attempt to adjust to these developments the
Muslims in Beirut organised the Conference of the Coast on 10 January. Views in the
conference towards union with Syria varied. Karami of Tripoli demanded full unity with
Syria, whilst Salam of Beirut was closer to the Maronites and suggested that it was up to
Mount Lebanon to decide whether it wanted to join the Syrian entity.'
Despite the fact that some Sulhi Shiites took part in the conference of the coast, their
role was irrelevant. In addition, they did not reflect a Shi site vision for the future of
Lebanon but rather their views fluctuated between the different opinions which were
1 Raghid al-Sulh, Lebanon and Arab Nationalism 1936-1945, D.Phil. thesis, St. Antony's
College, Oxford, 1986. p. 158
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represented by Tripoli and Beirut. Karami's view was to prevail but when it came to
sending a memorandum to the French government, only a few members signed it. Many
were reluctant to sign, and some such as Kazim al-Sulh and his Shiite ally 'Adil 'Usayran
refused to add their names to it! Other Shfite participants, including 'Arif al-Zain,
Sulaiman Dahir and Ahmad Rida, supported Karami. 2 Further differences of opinion
among the Sunnis emerged. On 23 October 1936 the delegates in the Islamic National
Conference convened in Beirut in the house of 'Umar Bayhum to raise a memorandum to
the High Commissioner recognising Greater Lebanon.3
In concluding, co-operation between al-As'ad and Sharaf al-Din played essential role in
maintaining a distinctive Shi'ite position in the political upheaval from 1918 until 1920.
However, after 1920, new perceptions began to develop among the Shi'ites for various
reasons, including the belief of some Shi'ite zu'ama that their fortune would be best
achieved in Greater Lebanon, the difference of opinion among the Sunnis towards
Greater Lebanon, and finally because of the French-Syrian treaty.
'Interview Munah al-Sulh, Beirut, winter, 1992.
2 Hallaq, Mutamar al-Sahil wal Aqdiya al-Arba'a, Beirut, 1983, p. 33.
3 Tbid., p.35.
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Political Awareness and the Role
of Sayyid Sharaf al-Din
This chapter will focus primarily on two issues. First is the manner in which Sharaf al-Din
managed to create political awareness in Jabal 'Amil through the establishment of social
organizations, with special reference to a modem school, al-Ja'fariyya, in Tyre. Secondly,
the social, educational and political role that al-Ja'fariyya played in Jabal 'Amil, in addition to
its role in the continuing power struggle among the zu'ama, will be discussed. Despite the
political awareness stimulated by al-Ja'fariyya in Jabal `Amil, which reached its highest level
in 1950s, this was not utilized to advance Shi'ite interests but rather to advance wider Arab
causes.
1. Sayyid Sharaf al-Din's social reform
The main aspect of social reform achieved by Sharaf al-Din was the improvement of
education. Therefore, some light must first be shed on the conditions and standards of
education under the Ottomans and the French Mandate. In addition, other Shi'ite activities in
establishing schools will be discussed in order to assess their failure and success.
1.1 Education under the Ottomans
In the Ottoman Empire the style and standard of education varied greatly between villages
and towns. In villages education took place in kuttab schools, held in the houses of shaikhs
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who only taught the Quran. Basic literacy was the highest level most students could achieve.
In the towns education took place in the mosques, but it was still largely limited to reading
and memorizing the Quran. Prior to the tan zimat period, the government did not have any
control over education in cities except where finance was concerned.' Although the kuttab
school was the main form of education, the Shiites were famous for having a number of well
known and respected schools of their own, which had been established by prominent 'ulama.
However, most Shi'ite schools remained active only during the life of their founders, and lost
importance after their death.2
In 1840, after the Egyptian withdrawal from Syria, the Ottomans introduced new methods of
education as part of the tanzimat reforms. Initially the stages of education during the tanzimat
period were five, Primary, Rushdiya, Elementary, Sultani, and higher education with the
second and the third stages being merged together later on under the elementary stage.
However, these attempts to improve education were largely ineffective due to government
financial difficulties. For example, in 1869 the government made four years of primary
education compulsory in villages, 3 yet financial difficulties meant that it was impossible to
open schools in the towns, let alone in the villages.
i 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Awad, al-Idara al-'Uthmaniyya fi PVilayat Suria 1864-1914, Dar al-Ma'a
1969, p. 252.
2 For more information see Al-Safa, op.cit, pp. 231-252. al-Amin, Khitat ..., pp. 182-196.
Momen, An Introduction ..., pp. 264-272.
3 'Awad, op.cit., pp. 254-256
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The elementary schools were established only in the centres of the qada, while the Sultani
schools were established in the centres of the wilaya, and higher education was found only in
Istanbul' This division and distillation of schools clearly shows that the rural areas hardly
benefited at all from the tanzimat reforms, with areas such as Jabal 'Arnil neither benefiting
nor being capable of keeping up with the modernization which was taking place at the
centre. Additionally, many Shfites did not send their children to the urban centres as they did
not have faith in state institutions. Hence because of the lack of schools in Jabal 'Amil and
the general lack of trust in state institutions, it was not uncommon for illiterate peasants
from Jabal 'Amil to sell their land or cattle in order to send their sons to Najaf for their
education.2
Table 6: Ottoman schools in Beirut province in 1886.
Modern Primary
No.	 Students
Elementary
No.	 students
Secondary
No.	 Students
Beirut 8 1140 = = 1 90
Sidon 4 412 = = =
Tyre 1 43 = = = =
Marj'ayun 2 70 = = = =
This table has been formed from figures shown in A. 'Awad, al-Idara ... pp. 362-369.
'Ibid.
2 Khalidi, 'Shaikh Ahmad ...,p. 119. Mai Shirawi, Education in Bahrain, Ithaca Press, London,
1989. p. 7.
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Table 7: Non-Muslim schools in Beirut province in 1886.
Primary & Secondary
No.	 Students
Higher Education
No.	 Students
Beirut 38 2500 70 5250
Sidon 3 110 = =
Tyre 7 340 = =
Marj'ayun 11 674 = =
This table has been formed from figures shown in 'Awacl. cacit.. oo. 363-369.
In the nineteenth century and regardless of the Ottoman policy of establishing schools in the
centre, Lebanon saw dramatic changes in education especially in Mount Lebanon and
along the coastal ship as a result of missionary activities. Yet, of all the Lebanese
communities the Shiites were practically the only ones who did not benefit from such
activities, since the remote areas where they lived were not exposed either to the
educational influences of other communities or of foreign missionaries.' The situation in
Jabal `Amil continued unchanged even when the French took control of entire Syria.
1.2 Education under the French
What fueled Shiite grievances further was that during the French mandate and alter the
independence period, most of the officials who filled state posts had to be French-speaking.
Knowledge of the French language was a prerequisite for the holding of any official post,
regardless of its importance. Furthermore, candidates for the higher civil service were
1 Salibi, Modern Histoiy ..., P. 140. Issawi, The Fertile ..., p. 69.
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required to have a university degree, and this put the Shi'ites well behind all other
communities.
The following table shows the gross under representation of the Shiites in the offices of
director general, director, provincial governor, ambassador, minister and service chief
Table 8: Distribution of higher administrative positions among religious communities in 1946 and
1955.
Year Maronite Sunni Shi' ite Greek
Orthodox
Greek
Catholic
Druze Total
Cases
1946 38.7% 29% 3.2% 19.3% 3.2% 6.4% 31
1955 40% 27% 3.6% 11.7% 9% 7.2% 111
Population
in 1950
30% 20% 18% 10% 6% 6% 1,420,908
H. Faiyyad, The effects of secularism in Lebanese administration, MA thesis, American University of
Beirut, 1956, quoted in RE. Crow, 'Confessionalism, Public Administration and Efficiency,' in L.
Binder, (ed.) Politics in Lebanon, John Wiley, London,1966, p. 172.
The unequal distribution of education between the communities was one of reasons which
prolonged the domination of a handful of educated Shiite zu 'ama. In addition to being large
land-owners, this group was the only one who possessed the skills necessary for
participation in political decision-making. The gap between the masses and the veama gave
the latter the flexibility of maneuvering that was needed to seize and consolidate their power,
and subsequently to delay any possible social change among the Shi'ites. The zu 'ama were
able to maintain themselves as a stable political entity long after independence.
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During the mandate period, the French had a policy of spreading French culture, and
allocated 1.5 million French Gold Francs to build French schools. The Arabic language
became secondary to the French and colloquial Arabic was used instead of the classical' In
1924 public schools were neglected as the budget decreased to L.S.138,801, 2
 while one
million French Francs was spent annually in support of the French schools in Lebanon.3
However, this French policy changed according to the attitudes of each high commissioner.
In 1925 General Sarrail was a supporter of secular education encouraged the increase in
public schools to 113 schools. Yet, such policy did not last long, as under Henri Ponsot in
1929, 111 schools were closed under the pretext of tightening public spending. Forty five of
these were in Jabal `Amil 4 French discrimination against Muslims continued particularly in
1934, when their schools received only 7.5 per cent of the government's aid budget, whereas
the Christians' received 92.5 per cent. 5 The following table shows the neglect of public
schools under the French, confronting them with private and foreign schools, whose main
beneficiaries were Christians.
1 Dahir, Tarikh Lubnan ..., p. 162. Petran, op.cit., p. 63.
2 Dahir, Tarikh Lubnan ..., pp. 179-186.
3 Zarnir, op.cit., p. 38.
4 Dahir, Tarikh Lubnan ..., pp. 179-186.
5 Halawi, op.cit., p. 42.
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Table 9: Total number of schools under French Mandate in 1939
Type
Number
of
schools
Students
Total
students
Christians Muslims Jews others
Public 182 5982 13869 8 20 19879
Private 1002 60063 21259 278 59 81659
Foreign 325 37509 4374 1642 133 43758
Total 1509 103554 39502 1928 212 145296
This table is based on Boutros Labalci. Education et Mobiliti Sociale Bans la Sociitê
Multicommunautaire du Liban, Deutsches Institut fur Internationale Padagogische Forschung, 1988,
p. 192.
This fluctuating policy of the French had a negative effect on the Shiites, vvho already had
the highest illiteracy rates among the Lebanese communities.
• •	 'I al/IC IV. 	 Glillay HILO amyl% WC laCVAIICJC VULIIIIIUIIILIWJ HI I7...1.
Community Shi'ite Sunni Roman
Catholic
Druze Maronite
Illiteracy Rate 83% 66% 53% 48% 39%
B. Labalci, Mawazin al-Quwa Bayn al-Tawa'if, Al-Waqi`a, No. 5&6, 1983, p. 227.
Labald used figures published in L'Orient Le Jour 24.1.1932.
Such variations in the literacy rates between the communities continued well into the mid
1950s, and had a direct effect on the proportional distribution of community members in
the government and the civil services. As jobs required qualified people, this favoured
the Maronites vis-a-vis the other communities which, subsequently, resulted in their over-
representation in government posts.' The government was the only hope for the Shfites
to improve levels of education in Jabal `Amil, but they were disappointed because the
'Michael Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon, Cornell University Press, New York, 1967, p.
33.
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primary concern of the government was promoting private schools. As a result, the
Shi'ites had to depend on their own initiatives in order to improve education in Jabal
`Amil.
1.3 Shi'ite attempts to improve education
The Shi'ites were well aware of the need for educational reform. In 1912, Shaikh Sulaiman 
Dahir deplored the education situation, commenting as follows:
Can the 'Amili people supervise their own education by themselves? The old
style of education is no good. Has the new one been rejected already? It is a
pity that we are losing our best people who are emigrating because of the bad
situation ... why are there no famous people now? the government has
neglected the people. The citizens should also be blamed for relying on others
... it is good to go to Najaf but one needs more background in science ...
can't the	 people finance their own school?'
In Jabal `Amil most of the reform Attempts were initiated mainly by 'ulama, but most of
their attempts were unsuccessful. This was due to different factors, mainly that of the ' ulama
being tied to a political za'im which made their activities short lived and doomed to failure. In
addition, Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin attributed their failure to lack of means, as they did not
have awqaf, charitable funds, and were thus restrained from undertaking any independent
activities. Another obstacle to reform was the attitudes of people towards their zu'ama.
This was the privileged group in society who had access to secular education, and were highly
regarded in consequence. They, not the ' ulama, were the ones expected to solve problems.
1 al-Irfan, IV, January, 1912, pp. 21-49.
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Attempts at reform in Jabal `Amil began in the early twentieth century but all failed except
those initiated by Sharaf al-Din. A major attempt was launched in the late 1920s. The
Jam'iyyat al-'Amiliyyin, the 'Amin Tlama Society, was jointly established by
'ulama and zu'ama. It had some thirty members whose objective was to establish schools in
Jabal 'Amil. 1 The committee was headed by two main members, Shaikh Husain Mughniyya
and Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin, whose patrons were the al-Khalil and al-Zain families
consecutively. In addition, the committee also had other prominent `ulama such as Shaikh 
Muhammad Ibrahim, Shaikh Yusuf Facial and Shaikh Munir `Usayran. A real chance to
establish a school arose in 1932 when the government offered a piece of land, 30 thousand
square meters, in al-Bass near Tyre. Sharaf al-Din joined the talks and suggested that the land
should be surrounded by a fence and that a hall should be built in the middle for community
activities. He thought that only by taking this measure would the Shiites be able to control
the land as if it were their own. His suggestion was not taken up, and the participants differed
on which part of the land the school should be built. The main division manifested itself
between the allies of Ismail al-Khalil from Tyre and those allied to Shaikh Najib `Usayran and
his nephew 'Adil from Sidon. Sharaf al-Din, observing the committee's ineffectiveness,
withdrew from it. The committee remained unable to achieve its objectives and, as a result, in
1939, the government repossessed the land to house, first, the Armenians who had fled from
Turkey and subsequently, the Palestinians after 1948. 2 The failure of the committee can be
1 Maldci, al-Hayat al-Fikriyya	 p. 211. Evelyn A. Early, The Amiliyya Society of Beirut, a
case study of an emerging urban za iim, MA thesis, American University of Beirut, 1971, p. 41.
2 Interview, Ja'far Sharaf al-Din, Tyre, winter, 1992. Hourani, A History ..., p. 333.
110
Chapter 4 	  Political Awareness
attributed not only to the struggle between the zu'ama such as Khalil and `Usayran but also to
the lack of 'ulama with sufficient initiative to undertake such a project.
In 1934, the death of Shaikh Mughniyya, and the decision of Sayyid al-Amin to concentrate
his activities in Damascus, brought an end to the 'Ulama Society. The collaps of the society
was a blow to the hopes of the Shiites. After the 'Ulama Society's dissolution, it chose to
donate all its remaining funds to the 'Amiliyya school in Beirut.' At this stage, Jabal 'Mill had
only four government primary schools located in Hang 'Aramta, 'Udaysa and 'Abbasiyya.2
The lack of unity among the Shate leaders on one hand, and government negligence on the
other, pointed to the need for serious reform. As a result, Sharaf al-Din believed that the only
way to establish schools in Jabal 'Anal was by working independently. His major objective
at this stage was to educate the Shi'ites through a modem school which he founded in 1938,
and named al-Ja'fariyya. He believed that improving social status of the Shi'ites in a rapidly
developing world would not come about without a modern school system and modem
syllabuses. The school became the corner stone that changed the life of the Shi'ites in Jabal
`Amil in general and Tyre in particular.
'Interview, Hasan al-Amin, Beirut, spring, 1992. He boasted that his father Sayyid Muhsin al-
Amin donated the money to al- t Amiliyya Society in Beirut but without referring to the reason for this
donation that is the failure of the 'Ulama Society which his father was a main member.
2 al-7rfan, Vol. 11, 1925-26, p. 783.
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2. al-Jalariyya school and its implications for Jabal 'Amil
Although Tyre was Sharaf al-Din's place of residence and had more schools than the interior
of Jabal 'Anil, he was deeply dissatisfied because non of the available schools were Shiite
despite the Shi'ites being the majority in the city. By 1909 Tyre had a population of 2800
Sh?ites, 2700 Christians and 500 Sunnis, while the total number of Shiites in the district of
Tyre as a whole was 40,000 and the Christians, 8000. The city had one Rushdiyya school,
for boys and one for girls, and three primary schools, all of which were poorly maintained and
cared for. On the other hand, the Christians enjoyed the care of European missionaries who
established a Russian, an English and two French schools in the city.'
The efforts Sharaf al-Din made will be traced in order to show what kind of obstacles he
faced and subsequently overcame. The twenty years of his life after the establishment of al-
Ja'fariyya witnessed great changes both regionally and nationally, and the school had a crucial
role to play in these. Two more members of Sharaf al-Din's family played essential roles in
developing al-Ja'fariyya, and in the political events in Tyre that dominated 1950s. These two
personalities are Sad Sharaf al-Din's son, Ja'far, and grandson, Husain.2
2.1 The start of al-Jalariyya school
Before the start of World War I, Sharaf al-Din managed to acquire a piece of land from the
Ottoman authorities during the rule of Sultan Muhammad Rashad. He began building a
Ibid., Vol. 1, 1909, p. 366.
2 It should be noted that Husain is the nephew ofJa'far
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mosque, but construction stopped because of the outbreak of war. Due to fast political
development and lack of funds, Sharaf al-Din could not resume the construction of the
mosque until 1928. In addition, the power struggle in the city between the Whig and the
As'adis was an added obstacle that Sharaf al-Din had to contend with. This power struggle
manifested itself in the opposition of the al-Khalil family to any project undertaken by
Sharaf al-Din family. al-Khalil certainly benefited from his links with al-Sulh as this family had
dominant figures in the government. The links between al-Khalil and al-Sulh hindered the
activities of Sharaf al-Din at various stages.
The first steps towards reform taken by Sharaf al-Din were to establish a mosque and
Husainiyya. He also believed that the only way to ward off the religious and political influence
of foreign missionaries was by establishing a modem school while maintaining Islamic
teaching. Sharaf al-Din did not confine himself to criticizing parents who sent their children to
missionary schools, but provided a school which played a major role in bringing social and
political awareness to the Shiites of JabarAmil. In 1938 he had to pledge his house in order
to build the school,' and from the start he worked to maintain his independence and not rely
on any za'im. In order to maintain his independence financially, Sharaf al-Din's first step was
to build stores to help finance his project. However, the French authorities stopped the
construction when al-Khalil urged them to do so, demanding 50 gold lira for permission to
continue. This he paid.
' Al-Jafariyya fi Sur, September, 1961. Private unpublished documents obtained from Ja'far
Sharaf al-Din.
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Above the stores, Sharaf al-Din built a girls' school and boys' school, plus a club, and seven
rooms.' The girls' school was called al-Zahra, after the daughter of the prophet Muhammad,
while the school, the club and the mosque were named after the sixth imam Jafar al-Sadiq.
However, due to financial difficulties the girls' school did not last long. Moreover, the
attitude of parents towards educating girls was not particularly favourable and they preferred
their daughters to stay at home. 2 Thirdly, the close links of the al-Khalil family with Sarni al-
Sul, prime minister in 1942, and Riyad al-Sulh prime minister in 1943, sped up the closure
of the girls' school, as they refused to treat it like any other private school and denied it
support. Sharaf al-Din had then to transfer the remaining girls to his home to continue their
education. The boys' school continued despite financial difficulties and was opened officially
on 12th October 1938.
The first annual report of al-Ja'fariyya shows that the independent line that Sharaf al-Din
followed did not stop him from co-operating with some wealthy people who did not belong
to the zu'ama. The money used to built al-Sadiq Club was donated by Hasan a1-Ruz, while
the mosque was built with a donation from Mad Mustafa Mad. Hudruj and Mustafa Mad
built one room each.3
1 Sharaf al-Din, Bughiat ..., Vol. 2, pp. 123-124.
2 Ibid., p.131.
3 al-Ja'fariyya annual report 1938-39, Private unpublished documents obtained from Ja'far
Sharaf al-Din.
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2.2 The Objectives
Sharaf al-Din declared,
... our religious duty urges us to educate our children in harmony with modem
education. However, this education should not be separate from our Arabic
and Islamic values. With both, the door will open for our rebirth.1
The al-Ja'fariyya school felt that its students should be aware of their identities as Shi'ites and
what this meant in the modem world, yet at the same time discouraged feeling of divisiveness
or isolation. The philosophy of the school was based on several points: the acceptance of
Lebanon as a country, support for Arab co-operation, work for comprehensive understanding
between the communities, and the employment of teachers from all the communities.
To enhance Shiite identity in particular and Islamic identity in general, it was natural that a
cleric like Sharaf al-Din should stress the principal Shiite occasions and make them official
holidays in al-JaTariyya school, particularly 'Ashura, the birthday of the twelfth imam and
'Id al-Ghadir. 2 Celebrating these Shi'ites occasions would certainly improve the awareness of
the Shi'ite students of their identity on one hand, and to present Shi'ism to non-Shile
students in a modem and civilized way. In addition to these Shiite occasions, Sharaf al-Din
stressed common Muslim occasions such as the birthday of the prophet, 'Id al-Fitr and 'Id
al-Adha and Fridays.'
'Ibid.
2 al-Ghadir is a place where Prophet Muhammad, according the the Shi'ites, appointed his
cousin Ali his successor.
3 Ibid.
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Simultaneously, although education was Sharaf al-Din's primary concern, he did not neglect
other activities to ensure the student's progress. He arranged for medical examinations three
times a year, and made sure that the students were taught about the importance of health
care. He was concerned to establish contact with the parents of students, which was achieved
through parties organized by the school. He aimed first to show them the progress of their
children, secondly to make them aware of the importance of education and thirdly to secure
their continued support.' A scout group was also established and named 'the scouts of Imam
al-Sadiq'. It was important for the students to get to know their country, so in accordance
with these objectives camping trips and visits were organized, 2 not only in Lebanon but also
to Damascus, Horns and Hama. 3
 The special care that the students received in al-Ja'fariyya
paid og with above average results in the first Primary National Exam (Brevette).
Teaching at al-Ja'fariyya reflected one of the original objective of Sharaf al-Din, that is to say,
the teaching committee was composed of members of various communities. The Lebanese
members of the teaching committee were not only Shiite but also Christians who counted for
nearly half of the stag some in key positions such as the headmaster, Michael Shaban. 4 In
the mid 1950s, due to good relations with Egypt, the cultural councillor at the Egyptian
Embassy provided al-Ja lfariyya with fifteen teachers paid by the Egyptian govemment.5
1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 al-Ja'fariyya annual report 1950-1953, 1953. Private unpublished documents obtained from
Ja'far Sharaf al-Din.
4 al-Thanawiyya al-Ja'fariyya, 'Arin al-Ashbal wa Masna' al-Ajial, 1962-63. Private
unpublished documents obtained from Ja'far Sharaf al-Din.
5 Interview, Ja'far Sharaf al-Din, Beirut, winter, 1992.
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The success of al-Ja'fariyya and the increase in student numbers led to serious financial
problems for Sharaf al-Din. By 1941, 400 students were receiving free education at al-
Ja'fariyya. 1 It was at this stage that the role of Sharaf al-Din's son, Ja'far, began to develop.
2.3 Financial structure
Sharaf al-Din did not try to possess full control of the school Although he was president of
the administrative committee, he made every effort to include other important local families.
Thus the committee consisted of some wealthy and competent members such as:2
Muhammad Halawi	 Vice president
Hasan al-Ruz	 Manager
Ali 'Ardi
	 Treasurer
Muhammad A. Abu Khalil
	 Secretary
This policy of full community participation continued through out the life of al-Ja'fariyya.3
Sharaf al-Din aimed to get other people involved in running the school to guarantee its
continuity.
The first hurdle this committee faced was securing funds. A major policy adopted to secure
fluids was by special appeals on the main Islamic religious festivals, 'Ashura, Hail
Ramadan, 'Id al-Fitr and 'Id al-Adha. By June 1939 al-Ja'fariyya had managed to
accumulate 304472 Lebanese Piasters and when contacts were made with Shiite emigrants in
West Africa the school collected 24200 Francs and 133 English Pounds. 4 Sharaf al-Din was
1 
al-Irfan, Vol. 30, Saida, 1940, pp. 383-387.
2 al-Jaffariyya annual report 1938-1939.
3 Early, op.cit., p. 81.
4 al-Jaffariyya annual report, 1938-1939.
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particularly interested in securing awqaf dedicated to al-Ja'fariyya school only. The first
indication of this was his registering the stores as awqaf Such stores continued to increase in
number over the years.
On 25 November 1949 contact with Shile emigrants increased when Sharaf al-Din called on
them to play their part in promoting education in Jabal 'Amil by forwarding donation.' This
call occurred as a result of the continuing neglect of the Lebanese govemment.2
2.4 Expansion of al-Ja'fariyya
Despite financial difficulties, al-Ja'fariyya expanded rapidly to fulfill the need of the Shiites
not only in Tyre but also in Jabal 'Amil in general Despite al-Ja'fariyya's plea to the
government for financial support, the government instead demanded a list of its teachers in
order to collect tax from them. 3
 While the Lebanese government denied any assistance to
Sharaf al-Din, it was generous to other 'ulama. In 1938, the same year al-Ja'fariyya was
established, Shaikh 'Ali Mughniyya, another 'alim in Tyre closely associated with the al-
Khalil, family, received L.L.34,000 from the government to assist him with his social
projects.4
1 al-Jaffariyya annual report, 1950-1951. Private unpublished documents obtained from JaTar
Sharaf al-Din.
2Ibid.
3 al-Ma'had magazine, No. 4, 15 April, 1947, p. 2. This magazine was the voice of al-Ja'fariyya
mainly to the emigrants who substantially supported it.
4 al-Hayat, issue no. 2973, 1956.
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In an attempt to solve the financial problem, fees were introduced in al-Ja'fariyya in 1948,
although poor students were exempted. The fees for primary and elementary education
varied between L.L.60 and L.L.70 per year, and for secondary education between L.L.150
and L.L.200. 1 In order to encourage students from far off villages a discount of up to
L.L.200 was made if more than one brother was enrolled.
In 1949, the deficit in the budget of al-Ja'fariyya was L.L.16,423. This deficit was later
covered by subscriptions from the emigrants in West Africa to al-Ma'had which was
published by al-Ja'fariyya, a contribution by the wife of al-Ja'fariyya's manager and a
mortgage on Sharaf al-Din's house. 2 By 1953, after it had been in existence for fifteen years,
al-Ja'fariyya was still financially dependent on private contributions and its own awqaf. The
Lebanese government's response to the needs of al-Ja'fariyya was a gift of L.L.750.003
Sharaf al-Din also believed in the importance of preparing children mentally and
psychologically before school. Therefore, in 1950 he established a kindergarten, which initially
was not successful due to the negative perception of the parents. Sharaf al-Din explained that
a kindergarten is neither a zariba, a barn, nor a place to waste time and play in, but his initial
efforts were in vain.4 However, he remained adamant and the kindergarten continued until it
became an essential part of the establishment, where children spent three years before moving
al-faffariyya annual report, 1950-1953. Private unpublished documents obtained from Ja'far
Sharaf al-Din.
2 Ibid.
'Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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to the primary school They were looked after from 7 o'clock in the morning until sunset and
three meals were provided. Both the kindergarten and the primary school were merged and
named Bayt al-Anadil, house of the nightingales.
al-Ja'fariyya provided the full range of education: primary, elementary and secondary. In 1951
the number of students was 640. This expansion was a constant burden on the schools
finance, which prompted Sharaf al-Din to send his son Ja'far on three fund-raising visits to
Africa in 1951, 1954 and 1956. It would not have been possible to cater for so many students
without the contribution of the emigrants. As a sign of appreciation, the main building of the
school was named Binayat al-Muhajir, building of the emigrants.'
Students at al-Ja'fariyya came from all over Jabal 'Amil, and a boarding section was required
to accommodate students living far away. 2 Sharaf al-Din was aware of the psychological
impact of students leaving their families, and therefore appointed a matron to administer the
boarding section. This facility was very successful as the annual results showed that the
highest grades were achieved by students from the boarding section. They were also noted for
their good manners.3
1 al-Ja'fariyya fi Sur wa Jabal 'Amil, September, 1961. Private unpublished document obtained
from Ja'far Sharaf al-Din.
2 al-Ja'fariyya annual report 1950-1951.
3 al-Thanawiyya al-Ja'fariyya, 'Arin al-Ashbal wa Masna' al-Ajial, 1962-63.
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Table 11: Expansion of al-Ja!fariyva in Tyre from 1938 to 1951
Level Year
Founded
Foreign
Language
Tuition
until 1948	 after 1948
Total
Number of
Students in
1951
Kindergarten 1950-1951 = fees
640
Primary 1938-1939 French Free fees
Primary 1947-1948 English Free fees
Elementary 1944-1945 French Free fees
Elementary 1951-1952 English fees
Secondary 1948-1949 French
English
fees
The figures in this table were obtained from the annual reports of al-Ja'fariyya supplied by Jafar Sharaf al-Din.
al-Than awiyya al-Jaffariyya, 1965-66.
While education for the Shi'ites in Tyre was improving, the interior of Jabal `Amil remained
neglected. Early signs to improve education in the interior began in the late 1930s. Baydun
and his school, al-'Amiliyya in Beirut established a number of primary schools in various
villages in Jabal `AmiL However, these schools were closed down in the mid 1940s, 1 partly
because of financial difficulties: the Baydun family was more interested in developing the main
branch of al-Amiliyya in Beirut itself Secondly, the government was gradually beginning to
take the initiative and to establish some schools. Thirdly, although al-Amiliyya schools were
established to educate the Shiites of Jabal 'Mail, they were utilized to strengthen the position
of Baydun and his relatives from the `Usayran families vis-a-vis Ahmad al-As'ad as the
power struggle between zu'ama never ceased.
'Early, op.cit., p. 50.
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There were some other modest attempts to expand education, but the most effective were the
activities of al-Ja'fariyya. By the mid 1940s al-Jasfariyya had opened summer schools as well
as permanent schools in many parts of the south. The aim was to get education to remote
villages as well as preparing students for the next academic year.' By 1963 al-Ja'fariyya had
established 22 primary schools in Jabal 'Ami1, 2 most of which remained in existence until
1970.
Table 12: The importance of al-Ja'fariyya School in the city of Tyre and its
environs in 1950 in comparison to other schools.
School No. Teachers
Male	 Female
Students
Male	 Female
al-Ja'fariyya 3 25 17 524 352
al-r Amiliyya 7 7 - 340 -
Maqasid 4 4 - 145 -
al-Saiyda al-
Wataniyya
1 - 3 25 30
R. Catholic 1 - 4 80 60
Anglican 1 - 4 25 35
Jawad A. Rida, Tatawwur	 fi Qada' Sur 19001950, MA dissertation,
History Department, Lebanese University, 1980, p. 57.
Apart from al-Ja'fariyya's role in improving education, it also had a role in raising political
awareness, which was spreading in 1950s. The next section will discuss the major political
upheavals that dominated Lebanon in general and Tyre in particular, and how this political
development affected the power struggle in the city between the Sulhi group represented by
al-Khalil and the As'adi group represented by Sharaf al-Din. This time Sharaf al-Din did not
become directly involved in politics, as did his son Ja'far and Ja'far's nephew Husain.
al-/afariyya annual report 1950-1951.
2Min Daftar al-Thikrayat al-Janubiyya, Vol. 2, Dar al-Kitab al-Lubnany, 1984.
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3. The political role of al-Ja'fariyya
The period in which the al-Ja'fariyya was founded and flourished was the time of the spread of
"revolutionary ideologies" such as Communism, Basthism and later on Nasserign. As
mentioned before, Sharaf al-Din was seeking to bring political awareness to the Skates
through establishing schools inspired by the -Islamic faith. However, during the first half of the
twentieth century there was a tendency in Lebanon and the Arab countries to drill away
from religion towards the adoption of leftist ideologies. This situation was also evident in
Jabal 'Amil and prominent especially among the students of the al-Ja'fariyya.
The Shi'ites of Jabal 'Ami were responsive to the national and regional political
developments which took place in 1940s and 1950s. The Shile response manifested itself in
al-Ja'fariyya which became a venue for expression of political opinions and action. Three
major political events had enormous effects on the Shiles. The first is the Arab-Israeli war in
1948 which made Jabal 'Amil a refuge for the Palestinians, and as a result Shiles sympathy
and support for their cause was growing. The second is Chamoun's internal and external
policies from 1952 until 1958 which had direct effects on various Lebanese communities.
Internally, the electoral reform which Chamoun introduced was widely opposed by well-
established zu'ama because he aimed at undermining their authorities. On the external level,
Chamoun pro-Western policies angered the Muslims who opposed Chamoun's supportive
policies for Baghdad Pact in February 1955, his neutrality during the Suez Crisis in 1956 and
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his commitment to the Eisenhower Doanne in March 1957. The third is the Egyptian-Syrian
unity which increased Muslim's antagonism against Chamoun's pro-Western policies.
Eventually, these events led to the civil war in 1958 which started in March in Tyre prior to
the major uprise in Beirut which began in May.
3.1 The attitude of al-Ja'fariyya towards the Palestinians
The Shae-Palestinian relationship has been dwelt upon in a recent study by Abu Khalil:
Contrary to propaganda claims, Lebanese Shiites as well as other Lebanese
communities, did not express solidarity and brotherhood with Palestinian
refugees in the aftermath of 1948. In fact, many of them have actively
participated in helping European Jews to infiltrate through the Lebanese
border into what was then Palestine'
Abu Khalil's statement was based on an interview he conducted with a Shiite who helped to
smuggle Jews into Palestine. What was said could be true, but Abu Khalil generalized the
act of a few individuals into those of the whole Shilte community. This statement was not
only surprising but also contradictory to all facts as will be mentioned below. He fails to
distinguish between individual acts and the attitudes of the Shiite leaders towards the
Palestinians.
In fact, ShPite support for the Palestinians was unmatched, as was shown particularly by
Sharaf al-Din and his school In 1936 Sharaf al-Din supported the Palestinian strike and
Palestinian demands for independence. Hajj Amin al-Husaini was ordered out of Palestine,
1 Asad Abu Khalil, 'The Palestinian-Shi l ite war in Lebanon: an examination of its origins',
Third World Affairs, 1988, p. 77.
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and aimed to go to Tyre to meet with Sharaf al-Din and arrange his stay, but was prevented
by French patrol boats. Instead al-Husaini's boat was diverted to 'Ajaltun. 1 Support
materialized in 1948 after the first Arab-Israeli war, as the Palestinians sought to reach Tyre
which was a major point of refuge. Sharaf al-Din let them shelter in al-Ja'fariyya until the
authorities arranged their housing in al-Bass. In order not to let the Palestinian students lose
an academic year, he introduced to al-Ja'fariyya a Palestinian curriculum called
"Matriculation" to allow them to finish what they had started in Palestine.2
Sharaf al-Din's support was part of a wider Shiite support for Palestine throughout the
1930s as `ulama in Najaf and Karbala, in particular Husain Kashif al-Ghita, were supporters
of the efforts of Hall Amin al-Husaini. 3
 Kashif al-Ghita not only participated in al-
Illu'tamarat al-Islamiyya but also demanded that conferees issue a fatwa asking Muslims
to temporarily divert their yearly hajj from Mecca to al-Aqsa Mosque in Palestine in order to
make Muslims all over the world participate in acknowledgment of the Palestinian problem.4
Not surprisingly his demand was not accepted.
In 1956, al-Ja'fariyya organized a guerrilla group consisting of 25 Lebanese and Palestinian
students to launch strikes in Israel Guerrilla activities were not unknown to the Deuxieme
Bureau, military intelligence apparatus, which was then divided between the Shillabists and
'Interview, Husain Sharaf al-Din, Tyre, summer, 1994.
2 Eventually, the new students followed the Lebanese curriculum and the Matriculation was later
closed.
3 ai-MaWSit?; 'al-Marj'aiyya al-Shi'aiyya wa Qadaya al- 1 Alam al-Islami', issue 18, 1994, pp.
187-193.
4 Interview, Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum, London, winter, 1994.
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Chamounists. Their activities were supported by Colonel Janadri, an army officer and close
associate of Shitab, who himself knew about their activities. SWlab and Janadri did not
mind the guerrilla activities so long as they did not take place on Lebanese territory. In
December 1956, as the Chamounists were against any guerrilla activity, the army was
ordered to confiscate all weapons from al-Ja'fariyya and to arrest the Palestinian head master
Ibrahim al-Ranilawi, who subsequently was jailed for two months and then released at the
instigation of Colonel Janadri
3.2 Chamoun's policy and its effects on Jabal `Amil
In 1950s and in particular since the beginning of Chamoun's presidency in 1952, Lebanon was
heading towards a civil war. Chamoun's internal and external policies were the major cause
that antagonised both the Lebanese zu'ama and the masses alike. Chamoun had build himself
a system to consolidate his presidency, and was seeking a second term in office. This
manifested itself in changing the electoral system, and undermining the traditional zu'ama.
In order to achieve his objective of a second term in defiance of the constitution, Chamoun
introduced an electoral reform bill in 1953 aiming at breaking up the "big list system". The
measure replaced the existing nine large constituencies with 22 single seat and 11 double seat
districts, thereby reducing the number of deputies elected from 77 to 44. In the 1957
elections Chamotm introduced another new electoral system, this time increasing the number
of deputies from 44 to 66 with the aim of bringing more of his supporters to parliament. As
'Interview, Ja'far Sharaf al-Din, Beirut, winter, 1992.
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a result, some prominent Lebanese, among them the main Shi'ite za'im Ahmad al-Mad, lost
the election for the first time. Subsequently, on the Mile level Ahmad al-As'ad, became
major instigator of events against Chamoun and his allies in the south in general and
particularly against al-Khalil in Tyre.
3.2.1 Continuation of power struggle in Tyre
Chamoun's policy had serious consequences not only in Lebanon in general but also in
Jabal `Amil and Tyre in particular. During his term in office from 1952 to 1958, Tyre
experienced the fiercest power struggle the city has ever known. His policies had direct
effects on local rivalries. The old competition between the SuThis, that is al-Khalil family, and
the As'adi, that is Sharaf al-Din's family, for the control of Tyre was inherited by Kazim al-
Khalil
	 Ja'far Sharaf al-Din.
This rivalry took two forms: locally in Tyre, and nationally regarding Lebanon's policy
towards the Arab cause. In time this rivalry took on an ideological dimension as Ja'far and
Husain adopted Bairhism while Kazim was supportive of the Lebanese president Chamoun.
Being both Sharaf al-Din and Balhist allowed Ja lfar and Husain not only to control al-
Ja'fariyya but also Tyre itself following the first civil war in 1958. Ja'far was elected to
parliament in 1960, 1964 and 1968.'
1 Although Ja'far and Husain were supportive of Arab cause, their relations with Egypt deteriorated
in the 1960s because of disenchantment between Nasser and the Bdthists increased and subsequently affected
the position of the Egyptian teachers in al-Ja'fariyya, who were expelled by Husain when he became the director
of the school in 1960. Husain explained that the reason for expelling the teachers was not political but
because of their breach of rules and regulations. He claims that teachers were involved in trade at the
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Kazim's initial attempts to extend his influence began in 1937 with the establishment of a
school in Tyre. This project failed due to his high fees and the successful establishment of al-
Ja'fariyya in 1938. 1 Kazim's failure to maintain his school made him anxious to utilize every
opportunity to put an end to the successful al-Ja'fariyya school As mentioned above, the
government not only declined to support al-Ja lfariyya but also took part in the power
struggle in Tyre. This was manifested when Kam managed, with prime minister Sami al-
Sulh's assistance, to force the closure of al-Ja'fariyya girls' school on 12 October 1942,
despite continuous remonstrations by Sharaf al-Din. In 1943 prime minister Riyad al-Sulh
used the building as a public school2
Kazim's range of alliances with al-Sulh was extended more effectively when he became a
supporter of Chamoun, and later joined his National Liberal Party where he became
Chamoun's vice president during certain periods.' Throughout the crisis of 1958 Kazim
was the only Shiite minister in the Sami al-Sulh Cabinet.4 As for the presidency of the
Parliament, Chamoun made sure that his ally 'Adil 'Usayran was elected president of the
Parliament, for the first time, which lasted from 1953 until 1959.5
expense of their duties affected the good standard of the school. Husain was director of al-Ja'fariyya
from 1960 until 1976. Interview, Husain Sharaf al-Din, Lebanon, autumn, 1994.
1 Rida, Tatawwur al-Talim ..., p. 57.
2 Sharaf al-Din , Bughiat ..., p. 131.
3 Goria, op.cit., p. 131.
4 Ali Z. Balhas, Nazra fi al-Waqi'a al-Siyasi al-Dini fi Madinai Sur: 1943-1972, MA
dissertation, Social Science Dept., Lebanese University, 1985, p. 20.
3 Tauq, op.cit., pp. 34-36.
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Kazirds followers had a free hand in Tyre; they could carry guns on the streets while others
were unable to do so. He used his connections to undermine the position of his opponents and
as a deputy in parliament managed to prevent Ja'far from registering the piece of land where
al-Ja'fariyya was built until 1958. The judge advised JaTar that the case would remain in
abeyance unless a powerful za 'im intervened; Ja'far then sought the assistance of Ahmad al-
As'ad who gladly offered his assistance. The case was settled and the Sharaf al-Din family
became the legal owner of the land.'
3.2.2 al-Ja'fariyya's support for Arab-cause
Political ideologies were developing fast in al-Ja'fariryya, but in a different direction from
those of the Lebanese system. In early 1947 student union's elections was permitted. In that
year the Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party, SSNP, won the elections against the Balthists.
Ja'far's nephew Husain, then a student, complained about the result to Ja'far, believing such
a result should not have occurred because the SSNP did not have a wide Arab commitment,
but was only limited to historical Syria. However, Ja'far rejected Husain's complaint because
the SSNP members won fairly and secondly, regardless of their political affiliation, they were
students of Ja'fariyya and were entitled to their own opinion. But by 1954 the Ba ithis won
the student union's elections because the SSNP expressed support for Chamoun.2
Chamoun's external polices brought the country into turmoil because, in some cases, he
abandoned the country's traditional neutrality. His support for the Baghdad Pact in
I Interview, Ja'far Sharaf al-Din, Beirut, winter, 1992.
2 Interview, Husain Sharaf al-Din, London, autumn, 1994.
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February 1955, his neutrality during the Suez Crisis in 1956, and his acceptance of the
Eisenhower Doc,	 hie in March 1957 angered the Muslims, who rejected Chamoun's external
approach. In addition, Chamoun's opposition to Nasser was another major factor that
brought the country to civil war.
Staff and students of al-Ja'fariyya were well aware of the various trends in international
and regional politics. Their dissatisfaction with the Lebanese government's policies began to
grow from 1954 until the start of the civil war in 1958 as a result of Chamoun's pro-
western policies. Due to the government's support for the Baghdad Pact, the students took
to the streets to show their solidarity with the Arab cause. The main organizer of the
demonstration was Husain who chose 15 May, the date the Arab armies had entered
Palestine in 1948, to begin the demonstration. During the demonstration the Lebanese
security forces opened fire for the first time on a peaceful demonstration, causing the death of
one student and paralyzing another, and Husain himself was wounded.'
In 1956 during the Suez Crisis, Chamoun's rejection of calls to suspend diplomatic relations
with France was not acceptable to most Muslims and demonstrations were launched in many
parts of the country. In 1957 Chamoun also affirmed Lebanon's commitment to the
Eisenhower Doctiiiie which was opposed by the majority of Muslim leaders.
'Interview, Husain Sharaf al-Din, Beirut, spring, 1992.
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The rising in Tyre began on 8 February 1958 following the declaration of the United Arab
Republic. al-Ja'fariyya was the base of the opposition to Chamoun. During a demonstration
organized by students and stag four students tore up the Lebanese flag and cleaned their
shoes with it. The security forces arrested them and they were sentenced to four months
imprisonment. Straight after the announcement of the sentence people took to the streets
denouncing the decision.
On 28 March the security forces, army units, and Kazin:is followers opened fire on the
demonstrators and three people were killed including a student of al-Ja'fariyya named
Muhammad Qasim. Four teachers and seventy students were arrested, and some girls were
beaten up and others imprisoned.' Husain was arrested and jailed but only for 15 days as
Sa'ib Salam, Ahmad al-As'ad and Nicola Salim intervened. 2 After his release the leftist
groups agreed to appoint him general secretary of the resistance movement against the
regime. During these disturbances Kazim demanded the closure of al-Ja'fariyya on the
ground that it was a force ofum-est. To this Raymond Edde commented "if you want to close
the school you should open a school yourself of better quality and al-Ja'fariyya will close
down automatically". 3 al-Ja'fariyya was practically under siege for two months. These
demonstration continued and spread until the situation was inflamed by the assassination of
the journalist Nasib al-Matni in Beirut on 8 May 1958.
'Interview, Ja'far Sharaf al-Din, Beirut, winter, 1992.
2 Interview, Husain Sharaf al-Din, Beirut, spring, 1992.
3 al-Jafariyya ji Sur, September, 1961. Private unpublished documents obtained from Ja'far
Sharaf al-Din.
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In the Beirut events the anti-government group in Jabal 'Anil was represented by Ahmad al-
As'ad a traditionalist leader, 'Atif al-Jammal, a Communist, Muhammad al-Zayyat of the
Arab Nationalist Movement, and Ja'far and Husain Sharaf al-Din, Ba'thists. During the civil
war Ahmad al-As'ad played a major role in supplying all opposition factions in the south with
weapons and support. His headquarters during the civil war were in Banias in south west
Syria. In July 1958, he was accused of conspiracy against the Lebanese system and was
sentenced to death in absentia.' As the civil war began to favour the opposition side, Kazim
was expelled and the Sharaf al-Din family took over control of Tyre. 2 The role of al-
Ja'fariyya in Tyre was widely appreciated. During the general elections of 1960, the list which
included Ja'far Sharaf al-Din was preferred and he gained 11,000 votes out of 17,000.
3.3 al-Ja'fariyya and Iran
As Iran is a Shiite state it might be thought that the Shiites of Lebanon would have enjoyed
a privileged measure of support from the Iranian government. However, Iranian involvement
with the Lebanese Shiites was minimal Its relationship was confmed to supporting some
Shi'ite zu 'ama who had good relations with Lebanese presidents. The Shi'ites of Lebanon
did not experience substantial support from Iran on a social level. Rather Iran's support took
the form of offering scholarships to the 'Amiliyya school in Beirut. However, in the 1950s
al-Nahar, 25 July, 1958.
2 The al-Khalil family was expelled three times from Tyre. First, due to Kazim's support for
Chamoun as the opposition forces took control. They returned in 1958 when life went back to normal, yet he
was attacked several times by gunmen. Secondly, in the 1970s the al-Kbalils were known for being anti-
Palestinians, which was enough reason for them to leave Tyre as the city was under Palestinian control. And
thirdly, due to their cooperation with the Israeli invasion in 1982 they were expelled in 1985 when the
Lebanese resistance managed to liberate the city.
132
Chapter 4 	  Political Awareness
the scholarships were terminated and the assistance took a new form of supplying teachers
of Farsil
As far as al-Ja'fariyya was concerned, the relationship with Iran can only be described as
antagonistic. Sharaf al-Din and his grandson Husain showed their commitment to the Arab
cause against Iran's imperial interests. During the time of the Baghdad Pact, Sharaf al-Din
sent a message to the Shah urging him not to get involved in such an alliance because it was
against Arab wishes. In 1957, the Shah visited Lebanon after an invitation from Chamoun.
As was customary, nearly all prominent Shiske zu'ama visited the Shah and offered their
support, particularly 'Adil 'Usayran whose family had functioned as Iranian consuls in
Ottoman times. Only Alumad al-As sad, Sabri Hamadeh and Sayyid Sharaf al-Din refused to
visit the Shah. Sharaf al-Din's refusal showed two points: support for Arab causes, and the
independence of the Shiite 'ulama from it's political leaders.2
In December 1957, Sharaf al-Din died leaving Ja'far and Husain to supervise the school al-
Jasfariyya's continued its commitment to the Arab cause but this time against Iran. In 1960,
Under the directorship of Husain, al-Ja'fariyya refused to accept an offer from the Iranian
government to supply al-Ja'fariyya with teachers. At the time this represented solidarity with
Bahrain to which the Iranian government was making claims?
Early, op.cit., p. 81.
2 Interview, Bahman Kashi, head of North Africa and Middle East Department in the Foreign
Ministry of Imperial Iran, London, summer, 1995. He asserted that antagonism between the Shah and
Sharaf al-Din was because of the latter's opposition to the Shah's political affiliation with Western
politics vis-à-vis the Arab cause.
3 Interview, Husain Sharaf al-Din, Beirut, spring, 1992.
133
Chapter 4 	  Political Awareness
As has been discussed, the social activities of Sharaf al-Din brought an immense change to
the Shiites. His success in establishing a modem school at a time when leftist ideologies were
popular made the school a nucleus for political activity in Tyre in particular. Subsequently,
his social reform, coupled with Ja'far and Husain's adoption to Ba ithism	 and their support
for Arab cause, led them eventually to control Tyre and led Ja'far to become a parliamentary
deputy.
The existing analyses of the events of the 1958 civil have overlooked the leading role of the
Shi'ites in the south. Ajami, for instance, relates the revolution to acts of the Sunnis and the
Druzes without significant Shiite involvement. Consequently, the first two communities
emerged the main beneficiaries of Slulab's reform.' However, contrary to 'Ajami's analysis,
the Shiites did not only participate in the civil war but they also arose against the system a
few months before the rising in Beirut. 2 That the Shiite were not given administrative
rewards under Shilab could be explained by the fact that they did not have a clear communal 
identity hie the Sunnis or the Druzes. As shown above, the Shiites spoke of Arabism rather
than Shilsm, which was clear, for instance, from the adoption of Ba'thism by Ja'far and
Husain. al-Ja'fariyya's commitment to the Arab cause was also apparent when it opposed
Iran's claim in the Gulf This Shi'ite attitude was the reason that the Shi'ites did not benefit
from Shitab's reform. Unlike the Sunnis and the Druzes, they did not have a clear communal
identity to preserve in a religiously divided country such as Lebanon.
1 Ajami, The Vanished ..., p. 87.
2 Salibi, 'Lebanon Under Fuad ..., p. 219.
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Sharaf al-Din's death on 30 December 1957, was a great loss for the Shiites in Lebanon.
It took two years to appoint a new 'alim to replace Sharaf al-Din, his successor was not
local but was invited from Iran. The next chapter will examine the various reasons for
inviting an Iranian to succeed Sharaf al-Din and the consequences of such succession for
the Shiites in particular and Lebanon in general.
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Map 5: Major cities, towns and villages mentioned in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.
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Opportunities for Change and
the Role of Musa al-Sadr
The issue of Sharaf al-Din's succession is important in the history of the Shi'ites of
Lebanon. Although Sharaf al-Din was recognised as the spiritual leader of the Shi'ites in
Lebanon, the specific position he held was that of 'dim of Tyre. Consequently, any
Wins who would be chosen to succeed Sharaf al-Din would become only `alim of Tyre
and not spiritual leader of the Shi'ites. However, succeeding Sharaf al-Din would give the
new 'dim a psychological advantage over other Shi'ite `ulama in the question of
spiritual leadership. A number of local Shi'ite `ulama had hoped to succeed Sharaf al-Din
but in the event, he was succeeded by an Iranian cleric, Musa al-Sadr. As a result, the
first few years of al-Sadr's residence was extremely critical because he faced fierce
opposition from local Lebanese `ulama, and because al-Sadr needed to prove himself
worthy to succeed Sharaf al-Din as 'dim of Tyre. Realising how important this
succession was, al-Sack utilized all means possible to achieve the status of becoming
spiritual leader of the Shi'ites in Lebanon.
It is important to understand how a Shi'ite 'dim acquires that high status among his
followers that would make him a "spiritual leader". Such factors are totally different
among Sunnis and Shi'ites. Among the Shi'ites, leadership is not acquired by official
137
Chapter 5 	
 Musa al-Sadr
appointment but is rather a combination of two factors, requiring both the high scholarly
reputation of the 'alim and his public popularity. This is in contrast to the position of
mufti in Sunni Islam, which is acquired by official appointment.'
This chapter will discuss first, the reasons for al-Sad?s arrival. Second, it will analyse the
factors for his success in becoming spiritual leader of the Shi'ites in Lebanon. It will focus on
three issues: the role of Najat the social changes and modernization that Lebanon was
undergoing, and al-Sad?s own initiatives to bring change to the Shiites. Third, this chapter
will consider al-Sack's attitudes towards Lebanese society, and how these attitudes affected
his status in Lebanon in general Since al-Sadr's activities were not confined to one particular
area, the focus from this chapter onwards will be upon both Jabal 'Anil and upon Lebanon as
a whole.
1. Controversies over al-Sadr's arrival
al-Sack was born in Qum in 1929. Here he studied fiqh as a young man, and then went on to
the University of Teheran where he studied Law. After the completion of his degree he
returned to Qum where he taught fiqh and logic, and established a magazine called Maktab
Islam (the Islamic school). During his presence in Qum he became a close associate of Imam
Klymaini with whom he was to adopt closer ties in the course of the Iranian revolution. In
Some authors such as Norton and Sicking and Khairallah have erroneously described al-Sacir
as a mufti. For the Shi'ites it is improper to refer to imams as muftis. The position of mufti for the
Shi'ites of Lebanon was introduced only in 1967 when the Shi'ite Council was established. Norton, Amal
and ..., p. 39. Tom Sicking & Shereen Khairallah, 'The Shi'a Awakening in Lebanon: a Search for
Radical Change in Traditional Way', CEMAN Reports, St. Joseph's University, Beirut, 1974, p. 108.
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1954 he moved to Najaf and remained there for four years in order to continue his religious
education.
At the age of thirty-one he moved to Lebanon as 'alim of Tyre and aroused a great deal of
antagonism from Lebanese Shi'ite ' ulama who considered themselves more worthy of
succeeding Sharaf al-Din. However, al-Sack's move to Lebanon was not something new for
the Shi'ites. Movement of the `ulama is common and there are three reasons why an 'alim
might go to a certain place to become its imam. For instance, a prominent 'alim could request
another to go to a certain place to perform his religious duties. Usually such a demand would
be respected and complied with. The great marja' al-taqlid Sayyid Abu'l Hasan al-Asfahanil
had summoned Sayyid 'Abd al-Hadi al-Milani and Sayyid Abu'l Qasim al-Kiwi to go to
Karbala to fidfill their duties. 2 A second reason is that a particular 'alim could be invited into
an area to become its imam. Finally, an 'alim might ask the wujaha, local notables, for
appointment as imam of their area. In al-Sack's case he was invited to become imam of
Tyre, as will be explained below, contrary to common stories that tell he was chosen by
Sharaf al-Din to succeed him.
Inviting al-Sack to succeed Sharaf al-Din proved fruitful for the Shi'ites in Lebanon. He
was able, at least, to create a Shiite identity where others had failed. al-Sack's arrival
triggered a series of accusations that the force behind Shiite revivalism depended on
external forces rather than indigenous ones. Most of these accusations were posed in the
1 Died in 1945.
2 Interview, Fadil Milani, the director of Imam Khui Foundation in London, summer, 1994.
139
Chapter 5 	  Musa al-Sadr
press rather than in academic circles, but press comment reflects aspects of general attitudes
on the part of academics and press alike to the Shile revival in Lebanon.'
I shall begin by tracing the origins of al-Sadr's family, in order to understand some of the
reasons that helped him to become prominent in Lebanon. It has been reiterated that al-Sadr's
family went to Iran to teach Shi'ism under the Safavids. Rather, it seems that al-Sadr's
ancestors left Lebanon first for Iraq because of persecution by Ahmad al-Jar7ar Pasha in the
late eighteenth century, at a time when many of the prominent `ulama of Jabal 'Amin& the
area to settle in Iraq or Iran. 2 The following diagram shows the descent of the al-Sadr family
from Ibrahim Sharaf al-Din, the family being established separately only in the nineteenth
century.
1 Some academic such as Deeb and 'Ajami refer Sheite revivalism in Lebanon to external factors.
See the introduction, p. 1-2.
2 Samahat al-Imam Musa al-Sadr, Siratahu, Afkaruhu, Mawaqifuhu wa Nidaluhu, pamphlet,
SISC, Beirut, n.d.
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The origin of the al-Sadr family and its emigration from Lebanon to Najaf, led by Sad Salih, in the
eighteenth century.
Ibrahim Sharaf al-Din
Muhammad
Muhammad
Salih
(Lebanon)
(Najaf 18th Century)
Jawad
Yusuf
•	 I
Abd al-Husain
Muhammad 'Ali	 Sadr al-Din (Asfahan)
Hadi	 Ismail al-Sadr (Najaf)
Hasan al-Sadr
Haidar	 Muhammad Jawad 	 Sadr al-Din (Quin) 	 Muhammad Hadi
Muhammad Baqir	 Musa
This diagram is based on Sharaf al-Din, Bughiat ..., and on Interview, Sayyid Husain al-Sadr, London,
winter, 1994.
Sayyid Sahli Sharaf al-Din left for Iraq in the late eighteenth century. Later on, his son
Muhammad Ali and grandson Ismail came to be known as al-Sadr. They acquired this name
because the Shiite marja' Mirza Hasan Shirazi l had two students named Ismail, his own
1 Hasan al-Shirazi was famous for his fatwa against smoking tobacco in 1899 which was
directed against British monopoly.
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cousin and the grandfather of Sayyid Musa. In order to distinguish between them al-Shirazi
gave the title Sadr (which means front) to Sayyid Musa's grandfather.' The al-Sack branch in
Iran came into existence only in the late nineteenth century when Sack al-Din, the son of
Ismail, emigrated to Iran.
The Iraqi branch of the al-Sack family had some members who played important roles in
Iraqi politics, such as Sayyid Muhammad al-Sack, who became Prime Minister in the 1940s,
and Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sack who was a leading opponent of the Iraqi regime in
1980, and who was later killed. The Iranian branch also had some prominent `ulama such
as Sad Sack al-Din al-Sack, father of Sayyid Musa. Musa al-Sack's Lebanese origin could
have been an early legitimizing factor for his presence in Lebanon, and of use in meeting
opposition from other `ulama.
al-Sack first visited Lebanon in 1955 in order to meet his relatives from the Sharaf al-Din
family. During this visit, he left a positive impression on `Abd al-Husain Sharaf al-Din, and
after the latter's death in December 1957, al-Sack returned to Lebanon in late 1959 for a short
period following an invitation from Ja'far to become his father's successor. In 1960 al-Sack
came back to settle permanently.2
'Interview, Sayyid Talib al-Rifa'i, London , winter, 1994. He was representative of Sayyid al-
Hakim in Cairo in 1960s and 1970s, and was famous for conducting the prayer on the Shah's funeral
which caused him inunense antagonism in revolutionary Iran.
2 Interview, Husain Sharaf al-Din, Beirut, august, 1994.
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It is important to consider the circumstances surrounding the issue of the succession to Sharaf
al-Din in order to show how al-Sadr managed to become a major figure in the history of the
Lebanese Shiites. In the first place, why did Sharaf al-Din not appoint a local 'alim to
succeed him? Secondly, why did Ja'far call upon al-Sadr only two years after his father's
death? As shown in the previous chapter, Sharaf al-Din was convinced that the local `ulama
were either not strong enough to carry out the mission he had started, or were dependent
upon the zu'ama. The `ulama were too bound to the wishes of their patrons, rather than 
being concerned with the needs of the Shiites. It has also been shown how, after a fierce
struggle between Sharaf al-Din and the other gulama, he eventually decided to work
independently, and subsequently established a benevolent society and a modem school where
the rest of the `ulama had failed.
On the second question, it was once incorrectly thought that Sharaf al-Din recommended al-
Sadr to succeed him. For example, close associates of al-Sadr himselt the Imam of the Tyre's
mosque, Sayyid al-Ghurawi,' and the general secretary of al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shi'i al-
'Ala, the Supreme Islamic Shi'a Council (SISC), Muhammad Shi'aitu2 both mentioned that it
was Sayyid Sharaf al-Din who nominated al-Sadr to succeed him. However, if we recall that
there was a gap of two years between the death of Sharaf al-Din and the arrival of al-Sadr, it
seems that this is not the case. I was told first by Husain and later by Ja'far that the invitation
'Interview, Sayyid Muhammad al-Ghurawi, Imam of Tyre, summer, 1987. This interview was
conducted for the purpose of MA dissertation.
2 Biography of Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, SISC, Beirut, n.d.
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to al-Sadr to come to Lebanon was issued by Ja'far himself; not his father.' Originally
Sharaf al-Din asked Sayyid Mandi ibn 'Ali ibn Hasan al-Sadr to take his place after his death
but Mandi declined the offer.2
Trying to understand the reason for this invitation one can find several interpretations. To
begin with, Ja'far was his father's right hand in carrying out social reform in Tyre and Jabal
'Amil, besides making many trips to Africa to raise funds. He was well aware of the other
`ulama's almost complete submission to the zu'ama, and their general conservatism which
made them unsuitable to replace his father. Secondly, he was aware of the conflict between
his father and the other `ulama which naturally made him reluctant to support any one of
them. He therefore decided to invite an 'alim from outside Lebanon. The delay in doing so
was caused by the first Lebanese civil war, which began in Tyre in March 1958 and which
meant that there was no time then to think of a replacement for Sharaf al-Din.
Did Ja'far have the authority to impose his will in Tyre? He and the al-Ja lfariyya school played
a major role in the uprising of 1958, which meant the family came to have almost fa control
over the city, and in 1960 Ja'far was elected to parliament. His popularity and his local
backing made him a force to be reckoned with, and any opposition to his wishes on the
`ulama's part would have been easily dealt with.
'Interview, Husain Sharaf al-Din, Tyre, Lebanon, summer, 1994. And a telephone
conversation with Ja'far Sharaf al-Din in May 1995.
2 Correspondence, Ja'far Sharaf al-Din, May, 1995.
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Ja'far invited Musa al-Sadr - rather than other non-Lebanese - because of the family
connection. Among other possible reasons was the support given by Sayyid Ismail, the
grandfather of Musa al-Sadr, to Sharaf al-Din's activities in Tyre. To this effect, Sayyid Ismail
sent a letter to the people of Tyre enjoining them to support Sharaf al-Din.
Ja'far thus invited al-Sadr, having previously made contact with Ayatollah Shaikh Murtada al-
Yasin, the Ra'is Varna in Najat to arrange the move to Lebanon. al-Sack visited Lebanon
in late 1959 for a brief period before he made up his mind, and then came to reside in
Lebanon permanently in 1960.'
Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, the great marja' al-taqlid in Najat blessed al-Sack, who had
been his student from 1954 to 1959. For Muhsin al-Hakim, Lebanon was a special place
particularly since his father Mandi was the 'alim of Bint Jubail in southern Lebanon.
Ayatollah al-Hakim continued his support for al-Sack for many years and assisted him to
consolidate his position in Lebanon.
2. The consolidation of al-Sadr's position in Lebanon
Upon his arrival in Lebanon al-Sack was received as no 'alim had been before. Many Shiite
notables came to welcome him at Beirut airport, particularly the speaker of the Parliament,
1 This is contrary to what 'Ajami belief that al-Sacir was chosen by Sharaf al-Din. He mentioned
that Sharaf al-Din was disappointed with the calibre of his own sons which is not the case as some of his
sons were highly qualified and well known scholars such as Muhammad Ali and Sadr al-Din. Ajami,
The Vanished p.43.
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Sabri Hamadeh. al-Sack was subsequently escorted to Tyre by a great procession of people
and cars.
This cordial reception and show of support for him from the Shiite notables did not last long,
and affection and support rapidly changed to hatred and conflict. Even Ja'far, who had been
largely responsible for bringing al-Sack to Lebanon, later came to oppose him. This was
because both the notables and al-Sack had different perceptions of each other's role in
society. It can be assumed that the notables thought that al-Sack would not be different from
pervious `ulama who had always been dependent upon them. In contrast, al-Sack had a clear
vision of his role: to serve the Shiites to the best of his ability rather than to defer to the
influence of the notables. In addition, the prominent `ulama were at odds with him right
from the very start. It is these attitudes that will be discussed throughout this chapter and the
following two chapters. My main concern in this chapter, however is to show first how al-
Sack managed to strengthen his position in Lebanese society. There were three major factors
behind al-Sadr's success: the support he received from Najaf the socio-economic changes in
Lebanon, and his own various initiatives.
2.1 The support of Najaf
There were three main reasons for al-Sack's unpopularity among the Lebanese Shi'ite
`ulama. First, they considered that he was too young and not qualified enough to succeed
Sharaf al-Din. Hence, he faced rigorous challenges from some of the more learned `ulama
such as Shaikh Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya and Shaikh Musa Izz al-Din. The former's
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fierce opposition to al-Sadr even prompted mediation from Najaf The second reason was
the attitude of al-Sack himself towards the `ulama. Thirdly, al-Sadr's political views on
Lebanese co-existence galvanized many young `ulama who held or supported rather different
views. The first two reasons will be discussed in this chapter while al-Sad?s political views
will be discussed more fully in the last chapter.
2.1.1 Shaikh Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya and his opposition to Musa al-Sadr
al-Sack's principal opponent, Shaikh Mughniyya, was born in the Tayr Dibba near Tyre in
1904, and spent his childhood in poverty after his father's death when he was 10 years old.
The harsh situation in the south forced the young Shaikh Mughniyya north to Beirut where
the only work he could find was to sell sweets which he made himself He spent four years
there and faced sharp criticism from some `ulama for doing such 'humiliating' work,
especially since he was descended from a family of renowned reputation. During the Syrian
revolution of 1925, he decided to go to Najaf in an attempt to improve his chances. The level
of poverty in Najaf was similar to that in Lebanon, but at least as a student Shaikh 
Mughniyya was offered a place to sleep and eat. After the death in 1936 of his brother who
had been imam of the village of Ma'raka, he retained to Lebanon and took over his
brother's position.' His stay in Ma iraka did not last long and he left in 1938 for al-Jibbin where
he collected some money to build a mosque, and where he remained until 1948.
1 Muharnmad J. Mughniyya, al-Islam Ma' al-Hayat, Dar al-Andalus, Beirut, 1959, pp. 239-268.
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In 1948 he was appointed as a judge in the Ja'fari court in Beirut,' and was subsequently
promoted to the post of President of the court in 1951. During his Presidency he disagreed
with the way vacant positions were filled in the court which was based on favours and
connections with those in authority. Therefore, Mughniyya introduced an examination which
candidates had to pass in order to be appointed to vacant positions. His position as President
of the Ja'fari court brought to him the enmity of the zu'ama as he generally opposed their
wishes. In 1956 for instance, 'Adil Usayran the then speaker of Parliament, nominated a
candidate to fill a vacancy, but his candidate failed the test. Although the examination
committee was composed of four members; two Slinnis and two Shiites, 'AR Usayran
directed his discontent towards Mughniyya. In the same year Mughniyya refused to yield to
the pressure put on him from Kazim al-Khalil to give a judgment in his favour when al-Khalis
opponent was in the right. With their combined strength both Ilsayran and al-Khalil managed
to convince the Prime Minister to remove Shaikh Mughniyya from his position in early 1956.2
Not suiprisingly, when Shaikh Mughniyya was denied the succession to Sharaf al-Din, a
great deal of bitterness arose between him and the new corner al-Sadr. However, the
difference in approaches of the two men were an added factor in this bitterness, as
Mughniyya remained a traditional 'alim while al-Sadr had managed to attract support from all
sides in Shiite society during his early residency in Tyre.
'The Ja'fari court was established in 1926 when the French recognised Shi'ism as an
independent madhab with its own courts.
2 Mughniyya did not mention who the prime minister was but until March 1956 it was Rashid
Karami and from March until late 1956 it was Sami al-Sulh.
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Mugbniyya's feelings of resentment towards the situation in which the Shiites lived in the
south is apparent from a small book he wrote in the early 1940s.' However, although he
called for change, Mughniyya did not have the means to break away from the traditional
circles and framework of the ' ulama and thus, could only confine himself to preaching. His
first task was to establish a mosque, an act typical of a traditional 'dim. In contrast, al-
Sadf s main priority was to improve the social situation of the Shiites. This was illustrated in
his attempt to end begging on the streets of Tyre. Indeed Mughniyya's desire for change
could well have led him to work closely with al-Sadr yet, in reality, things were the other
way round, with Mughniyya proving to be one of al-Sadr's fiercest opponents.
The success and reputation al-Sadr achieved in Lebanon served only to increase Mughniyya's
dissatisfaction with him. This was made worse by the fact that although Mughniyya had
reached the level of mujtahid, he still failed to play a significant role in society, largely
because of his approach to the social and political issues of the day. His main problem was
that his attitude towards people which did not win him any great popularity, especially
when he made attacks on the people themselves, accusing them of being "slaves to the
masters". 2 For his part al-Sack never attacked the people in general, but rather the Shiite
zu'ama, which won him great popularity.
i Mughniyya, Al-Wad'a al-Hadir Li Jabal 'Amil, Dar al-Jawad, 1983.
2 Chibli Mallat, Shi'i Thought From South Lebanon, Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford,
1988, p. 19.
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The dispute led Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim to try to reach a settlement between
Mughniyya and al-Sadr. His interest in Lebanese affairs was party due to the fact that al-Sadr
had been his student, and partly because he was particularly interested in promoting a
positive Shiite identity throughout the Shiite world and Lebanon was part of it.' He sent
Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum, Mandi and Hadi al-Hakim to Lebanon with messages for
Mughniyya, Shaikh 'Abd al-Hamid al-Hu1T 2 and others, to the effect that they should end
their opposition to al-Sadr. The three main delegations also met with Kamil al-Mad for the
same pcupose.3
Bahr al-'Ulum was dispatched more than once to Lebanon to try to solve the problem, and
he came to realize how popular al-Sadr was, unlike his rival Mughniyya. For example, in the
late 1960s Bahr al-Ulum was staying in a hotel in Balishmay in Mount Lebanon, and when al-
Sack came to visit him, the manager of the hotel, who was a Christian greeted him warmly
and ordered his staff to arrange a dinner party to welcome al-Sadr. Bahr al-Ulum was worried
about who would pay for the dinner but al-Sack said he should not be concerned. On his
departure the manager refused to charge for the dinner and replied that his payment was in
the honor of having al-Sadr in their hotel The same evening Mughniyya arrived in the hotel
after the departure of al-Sack, but his arrival went unnoticed. Bahr al-Ulum tried hard to
convince Shaikh Mughniyya to end the dispute, and to work closely with al-Sack instead of
fighting him, especially after he had seen how both men were received in the hotel
'Interview, Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum, Iraqi scholar in exile, London, autumn, 1990.
2 Shaikh 'Abd al- Hamid al-Huff became the Chief Judge of the Shi'ite Court in 1970s, and
joined Mughniyya in his opposition to Musa al-Sadr.
3 Interview, Muhammad Bahr al- Ulum, London, autumn, 1992.
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Husain Sharaf al-Din has also shown that attempts were made by other Lebanese figures to
end the dispute. A small booklet written by 'Ali Shur' shows how al-Sadr was accused of all
sorts of things unjustifiably by various people. He advised that this enmity against al-Sadr
should end for no other reason than because he had won the people's confidence.
According to Husain, 'Ali Shur was in fact Shaikh Mughniyya's brother, matting under a
pseudonym because the enmity towards al-Sadr was so immense that he preferred to
remain anonymous. Eventually, all attempts at reconciliation feed.
Mughniyya's antagonism remained unabated. His strong resentment of al-Sadr led him to
display a portrait of al-Sadr in his home which shows him preaching in a church under a cross
in order to show this "unlawful" act to his visitors. In addition, Mughniyya wrote a book
entitled al-Jasus al-Mu'ammam, a Spy with a Turban, but it was never published. Sayyid
Muhammad Husain Fadlallah strongly opposed publication of the book on the grounds that if
the (ulama were to start accusing each other, the public would lose all respect for them.2
2.2 al-Sadr's perception of the 'ulama's role and the effects of socio-economic
development in society
The way in which al-Sadr perceived the role of `ulama in the society was criticized not
only by his opponents from `ulama and zu'ama as one would expect, but also by some of
those who worked closely with him. The fact that al-Sack was an outsider meant that he was
1 Ali Shur, Qissatuna Ma' al-Sadr, Tyre, Lebanon, 1966.
2 Interview, Talib al-Rifai i, London, winter, 1995.
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not involved in local factionalism, or tied to the wishes of the zu'ama. He guarded this
independence jealously in order to establish his own strong and free position in society. al-
Sadr was not concerned with other `ulama's opinion about him because his main concern was
to get the support of the people. According to Shaikh Mahmud Farahat,' Director General
of SISC, mentioned that al-Sadr marginalized the role of other `ulama in their local areas
because of his increasing popularity.
2.2.1 Emerging friction between al-Sadr and fellow `ulama
The main reason for continued antagonism between al-Sadr and his `ulama and `zu'ama
opponents was his popularity among Shi'ites and non-Shi'ites alike. Also, he often failed to
respect the status of other culama. In one case, after al-Sadr finished giving a talk in the
Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq Club in Tyre, a few people from Nabatiyya invited him to visit their area
to give a talk. al-Sadr instantly welcomed the invitation, but Ja'far, who was present,
suggested that it would be more appropriate if the imam of Nabatiyya himself would
introduce al-Sack to Nabatiyya. al-Sack agreed but his dissatisfaction was obvious. 2 Ja'far
added that al-Sack was wrong to accept invitations from people from various part of the
country without cooperating with the local `ulama, partly because the `ulama usually
needed the extra income from ceremonies such as weddings where they were offered
money. When al-Sack took over, and when he was often offered more money than a local
imam could even dream this antagonized the local `ulama. Dissatisfaction with al-Sack
'Interview, Malunud Farahat, former General Director of SISC, London, winter, 1992.
2 Ja'far Sharaf al-Din, correspondence, winter, 1992.
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was even more the case when he became deeply involved in politics in the late 1960s and
1970s when the majority of ' ulama, unlike him, were backing the notables.
al-Sack's openness with Christians was an added factor in the antagonism he received from
fellow ' ulama. Dining a visit to a church in Tripoli in the early 1970s al-Sack was
accompanied by the vice president of the Shfite Council Shaikh Sulaiman al-Yahfufi and
Sayyid Tall al-Rifal. During his talk al-Sack three times used the word Abuna which means
Christ as God, and in consequence, al-Yahfufi declared to al-Rifal that he intended to resign
from the Shiite council.'
2.2.2 Independence of the `ulama and the role of al-Sadr
Criticism of al-Sadr's approach towards the notables was also mounting. It was clear that he
resented the subordination of the culama to the notables, which pushed him to establish his
independence, and promote it further so as to establish his leadership However, despite this
resentment he did not stop working with them, although he was particularly cautious with
regard to one particular zalm, that is, Kamil al-Mad. In this section, the early relationship
between al-Sack and al-As'ad will be highlighted in order to show how al-Sack began to
challenge al-As'ad's leadership
'Shaikh Mahmud Farahat mentioned another reason for al-YahfuE's resignation. The death of
Husain al-Balbald the first Shi'ite mufti, al-Yahfufi was hoping to become the new mufti, but al-Sadr instead
appointed Shaikh 'Abd al-Amir Qabalan. This angered al-Yahfitfi who wanted to keep the position of the
mufti in Balbaki hands, an attitude al-Sadr clearly rejected. Farahat explained that al-Yahfufi wanted the
position of the mufti because it was paid unlike the position of vice president which was purely honorary.
Interview, Malunud Farahat, London, winter, 1992.
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As the al-As'ad family was the strongest in Jabal 'AmiL it was important for al-Sadr that the
authority of Kamil al-As'ad should be undermined in order to establish his own. To begin
with, between 1960-64 relations between the two were harmonious, but tensions emerged in
1964 because of approaching parliamentary elections. al-As'ad approached al-Sadr in order
to gain his pledge of support, but al-Sadr saw the elections as giving him an opportunity to
defy al-As'ad's domination in Jabal 'AmiL From then on relations had worsened between
the two parties.
Muhammad Sally al-Din, a former deputy and minister, reported that during al-As'ad's
campaign for the 1964 parliamentary elections, he visited Tyre and met with al-Sadr as he
was hoping that al-Sack would support his candidates. al-Sack indicated that he was not
interested in al-As'ad's candidates and that he would not necessarily support them. Since then
al-Sack had pursued a policy of defiance towards al-Mad. He told him:
I cannot give you my opinion. I have my own feelings which I do not have to
reveal to you.'
In general al-Sadr's policy was to support other candidates, but al-As'ad's list won the seats
in Tyre.
Ja'far thought that it was important for the Shiites that al-Sack and al-Mad should work
together. To this effect he organized a meeting in the late 1960s between the two in Kaifim
where al-Sack would spend the summer, but al-Sack left Kaifun shortly before al-As'ad's
'Muhammad Safiy al-Din, Memoir, al-Shira'a', 12 October, 1987.
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arrival' The only interpretation of this is that al-Sadr was intent on avoiding cooperation
with al-As'ad, perhaps because he thought any cooperation would put him in a subordinate
position for which he had no desire. This put Ja sfar in a difficult position, since his fortunes had
long been tied to those of the al-As'ad family. To avoid embarrassment he called upon Favvzi
Said, a respected personality in the area, to announce that al-As'ad would be making a visit
to them, and a large number of people duly turned out to welcome al-Assad.
Jasfar warned al-Sadr that his policy of playing on differences between the zu'ama was not
acceptable but al-Sadr replied that it was important to undermine al-As'ad if he wanted to
enhance his own status locally, while the rest of the notables remained easy to deal with. For
example, al-Sadr had given his support to Mahmud 'Ammar in 1968 during the election of
the speaker of parliament. Relations between Ja'far and al-Sack then began to worsen,
primarily due to Ja'far's criticism of al-Sadr's attitudes towards the `ulama and the notables.
While al-Sadr had hoped to be in charge of al-Ja'fariyya school, Ja'far refused to hand it over
to him because it was his own chief power base. However, Ja'far did hand over the
Jama'iyyat al-Bir w'al -Ihsan, Society for Piety and Charity, which had been established by
his father.2
The consolidation of al-Sack's position in Lebanon was based not only on the support of
Najaf and his attitudes towards 'ulama and zu'ama, but also on the rapid social and
'Interview, Jalfar Sharaf al-Din, Tyre, winter, 1992.
2 The society was established by Sayyid Sharaf al-Din in Tyre in 1948.
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economic changes which were taking place in Lebanon. It was inevitable that the Shi'ites
should mix with other communities and be affected by social and economic change and
exposed to revolutionary ideologies, particularly when they migrated to urban centres. This
migration resulted in considerable reduction of the zu'ama's authority over the Shi'ites.
2.2.3 Socio-economic modernisation and its effects on social structure
The socio-economic modernization which Lebanon was going through offered al-Sadr a
golden opportunity to revitalize the community and create a sense of identity for it. The fact
that the process of modernization was so uneven between the various Lebanese areas, posed
serious problems for the state.' The two main Shi'ite dominated areas, the Biqa' and the
south, were agricultural However, the fact that the Lebanese economy was geared towards
the tertiary sector - mainly banking, foreign investment and commerce - meant that the share
of the commodity producing sector in the economy - mainly agriculture - gradually
declined, and with it the prosperity of these Shi'ite areas.
The big difference between the two sectors was shown in their share in the gross domestic
products, GDP. The tertiary sector's share increased from 62 percent in 1950 to 72 percent in
1970.2 On the other hand the commodity producing sector declined to only 30 percent of the
GDP. The main reason for this big difference between the two sectors was the growing
importance of Beirut which became a regional headquarters for an increasing number of
Michael Hudson, The Precarious Republic, Westview Press, Oxford, 1985, p.53
2 Nasr, 'The Crisis of Lebanese Capitalism', MERIP Reports, No. 73, 1978, p. 3.
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foreign financial institutions, particularly western ones. The importance of foreign investment
contributed greatly to the increase of banking deposits, which grew from 20 percent in 1950
to 122 percent in 1974. Contrary to this development, the commodity producing sector
(mainly agriculture) did not receive enough support from the government, as shown by the
small amount of money spent on this sector in comparison with the tertiary sector. In 1968,
banking credits for agriculture accounted for 4.3 percent, while for commerce it accounted for
53 percent.2
The decline of agriculture had serious effects on rural population, which decreased from
48.9 percent in 1959 to 34 percent in 1964, and to 18.9 percent in 1970. The Shi'ites in
the Biqa' and the south were hit hardest, because the main crops cultivated were sugar
beet and tobacco respectively. This specialization contributed to the decline of
agriculture mainly due to monopoly policy and minimal state investment. Prior to the
Civil War in 1975 two large firms monopolized the importation of all fertilizers and
insecticides, and nearly 25 merchants were responsible for the purchase of almost all
agricultural pro duce.3
'Ibid., p. 4.
2 M. Sluglett & P. Sluglett, 'Aspects of the Changing Nature of Lebanese Confessional Politics:
al-Murabitun, 1958-1979' Peuples Mediterraneens, Vol. 20, 1982, p. 65. Gates, The Role of Political
Economy in Lebanon, Center for Lebanese Studies, p. 22.R. Owen, ' The Political Economy of Grand
Liban, 1920-70', in R. Owen, (ed.), Essays on the Crisis of Lebanon, Ithaca Press, London, 1976, p. 28.
Suleiman, Political Parties..., p. 26.
3 Nasr, 'The Crisis ..., p. 8.
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In the south, production of tobacco was controlled by the Regie des Tabacs 1 which was
the exclusive buyer of the crop and was the only authority that granted licenses to plant
it. The Regie contributed to the decline of agriculture because it stopped granting
licenses from 1960 until 1974, which blocked the expansion of the planted areas, and
held down the prices at which it was buying the crop. The processing of local production
decreased from 2.2 million kilograms in 1967 to 1.5 million kilograms in 1972. The
Regie preferred to increase imported cigarettes rather than develop the local tobacco
production because of the rapid profits.2
In the Biqa', its specialization in sugar beet production also put the cultivator at the
mercy of a monopoly. There was one processing plant in the Biqa', which also had a
monopoly of the importation of sugar. 'Depending on world prices, they had an interest
in increasing or decreasing the share of the locally produced sugar.”3 At certain times,
when the cost of production increased tremendously, the price paid by the processing
plant to the producers was unchanged. Therefore, the producers were forced to abandon
the crop, and as a result the cultivated land decreased from 35,000 to 10,000 dunmns in
1974.4
1 Tobacco company founded by the French in 1935, which became a mixed public-private one
after independence in 1943.
2 Nasr, 'The Crisis ..., p. 9.
3 Ibid.
4 ibid.,
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As a result of government economic policy, the impoverishment of the Lebanese
peasantry increased, and rapid depopulation of the rural areas resulted. People left for
urban centres, mainly Beirut and the Arab Gulf countries.
Table 13: Rural migration to urban centre in 1970.
Province Total population
of rural origin
% of population
migrated to towns
in province
% of population
migrated to Beirut or
suburb
Mount
Lebanon
344,000 2.1% 17.4%
North
Lebanon
204,435 8.6% 7.4%
South
Lebanon
242,085 2.8% 29.3%
Biqa' 178,425 1.7% 16.9%
Total 968,945 3.5% 18.1%
Nasr, 'The Crisis ... , p. 10. See also Fuad Khuri, From Village to Suburb, University of Chicago Press,
1975, pp. 32, 62. Also See B, Roberts, Cities of Peasants, Edward Arnold, 1981, p. 9. P. Saba, 'The
Creation of the Lebanese Economy-Economic Growth in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,' in R.
Owen, (ed.), Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon, Ithaca Press, London, 1976, pp. 1-7.
Obera?s formulation of the reasons for migration from rural areas to cities in the Third
World can be applied to the ShAtes of Lebanon:
... rural poverty manifested in low agricultural incomes, low productivity, and
under-employment, is an important factor in pushing migrants out of rural
areas towards areas with greater employment opportunities.'
The following table shows the big difference in manufacturing distribution which
attracted migration from rural areas.
'A. S. Oberai, (ed.), State Politics and Internal Migration, Croom Helm, London, 1983, p.2.
Nasr, 'The Crisis ..., p. 10.
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Table 14: Distribution of manufacturing and mimpg establishments in 1955
Areas Number of establishments
Beirut 995
M. Lebanon 480
N. Lebanon 241
Biqa' 88
S. Lebanon 57
_
Sulaiman, Political Parties..., p. 26.
This migration had serious consequences for the social structure of the Shi'ites. The process
of moving from village to urban centre, which began modestly in the late 1920s and increased
dramatically in the 1960s, opened for the Shi'ites to a variety of opportunities, ranging from
decreasing the zu'ama's domination, susceptibility to new ideologies, potential conflict with
other communities and finally to challenging state structure itself Furthermore, the
difficulties of migrants did not end with arrival in the city but multiplied simply because
they did not find work. Roberts explains the migrants' situation as follows;
... urban economy affects social relationships, housing, local-level politics
and even religious practices, producing a situation in which the poor are
active but unincorporated members of the urban populations of
underdeveloped countries. These poor are, however, fragmented
ideologically and motivated by their short-term economic interests. Since
no class or class fraction has sufficient strength and appeal to form the
basis of stable government, there is a permanent crisis in government
which makes it difficult to obtain the consensus needed to resolve the
problems of an increasing technological and financial dependence, internal
inflation, lack of private investment in production and so on.'
1 Roberts, op.cit. p.3.
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Shiite migrants to urban centres usually worked in the lowest status jobs available, which
further aggravated their situation in comparison to other communities. This can be
attributed mainly to them being farm labourers and lacking the appropriate skills needed
in cities.
Modernization in Lebanon was not the only cause of migration of the Shi'ites. Another
factor was the intensive Israeli bombing in the south of Lebanon and Western Biqa' from
1970 to 1975. The rate of forced migration from the south was 65 percent of the rural
population, and 50 percent of the rural population in the Biqa'. 1 This migration was the
major force that affected and developed the Shi'ites' social structure. In addition, what
increased the Shi'ites misery in the centre was that the Shiites had the highest rate of
illiteracy which only served to aggravate their position in official government
employment. This is unlike the position of the Christians which was reinforced by a more
direct access to education: "throughout most of the period of the mandate (1920-1946)
education was still substantially in the hands of foreign missions, and thus more
specifically directed towards the Christian population". 2 Some estimates have shown
that the Maronites held nearly 50 percent of major public offices.
As the following two tables show, the number of governmental civil services the Shi'ites
held were not in accordance with their numerical status in comparison with other major
Lebanese communities.
I Nasr, 'The Crisis ..., p. 10.
2 Salibi, 'Lebanon Under Fuad Chehab 1958-1964', MES, Vol. 2, 1966, p. 213.
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Table 15: Distribution of civil service First Category posts among the various
communities 1946-1974
Community 1946 % 1962 % 1972 % 1974
_
%
G. Catholic 1 3 7 10 9 9 8 6
G. Orthodox 6 19 11 16 10 11 14 10
Maronite 12 39 18 25 28 30 39 28
Other
minorities
0 0 2 3 2 2 9 6
Subtotal 19 38 49 70
Percentage 61 54 52 50
Druze 2 7 6 9 7 7 10 7
Shi'a 1 3 2 3 15 16 29 21
Sunni 9 29 24 34 23 25 31 22
Subtotal 12 32 45 70
Percentage 39 46— 48 50
Total 31 70 I	 1 94	 1 140
D. Smock & A Smock, The Politics of Pluralism, Elsevier Publishing Company,
New York, 1975, p. 127.
Table 16: Major population groups in 1932, 1956 and 1977 by religion
Religious groups 1932 1956 1977
Sunni 175,925 285,698 600,000
Shi'a 154,208 250,605 850,000
Druze 53,047 88,131 250,000
Total Muslims 383,180 624,434 1,700000
Maronite 226,378 423,708 750,000
G. Orthodox 76.522 148,927 300,000
G. Catholic 45,999 87,788 200,000
Ar. Orthodox 31,156 63,679 160,000
Other Christians 22,308 = =
Total Christians 402363 724,102 1,410000
Total Population 785,543 1,348536 3,110000
The figures for 1932 are taken from D. McDowall, 'Lebanon: A Conflict of Minorities', Minority
Rights Groups Report, London, MRG, 1983, p.9. The figures for 1956 are taken from M. Halawi,
op.cit., p. 50. The figures for 1977 are taken from, H. Cobban, 'Lebanon's Chinese Puzzle',
Foreign Policy, Washington DC, issue 53, 1983, p. 35.
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Before the massive migration of the Shiites, primordial loyalties remained strong in the
villages.' However, the authority of the zu'ama and family ties gradually declined in
favour of a wider element, that is the sect. Khuri explains how this loyalty was greatly
affected by migration:
Among villagers in Lebanon, local politics, ... are determined by family
alliances; only in this case family and sect are neither held together nor
reinforce each other. The arrangement of political organization in villages
seems to be so designed that it limits the rise of sect as a potential source
of support. But when villagers migrate to the city and settle there, they
begin to use sect instead of family as a frame of reference in politics...2
Khuri explains this theory through his investigation of Shiite migrants into two villages
in Beirut southern suburbs, Shiyah and Ghobairi. 3 Ghobairi was the direction for more
Shi'ite migrants than that of Shiyah which was Maronite populated. 4 Khuri relates the
primary factor responsible for the rise of such identities and division between the two
areas to the change from family to sect loyalty among migrants. This change manifested
itself in the increasing support of the Maronites for the Kata'ib party, while the Shi'ites,
although they did not support a political party as such, directed their loyalty towards the
sect. This was demonstrated by the public celebration of `Ashura in Ghobairi.5
This new Shi'ite loyalty to the sect benefited the activities of al-Sadr as he used it to
increase his own independence in the face of the zu'ama. It is not a surprise that al-
1 Khalaf, Primordial Ties and Politics in Lebanon,' MES, October, 1967, No. 1, pp. 243-267.
2 Khuri, 'Sectarian Loyalty among Rural Migration in two Lebanese Suburbs: A stage between
family and national allegiance,' in R. Antoun & I. Hard( (ed.), Rural Politics and Social Change in the
Middle East, Indiana Press, 1974, P. 198.
3 Ibid., pp. 200,205.
4 1(huri, 'Sectarian Loyalty ..., p. 205.
'Ibid.
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Sack's activities in Beirut concentrated in Ghobairi and Shiyah in particular. Ashura was a
major occasion which he utilized to bring a new meaning to Shi'ism and to increase
loyalty to the sect rather than to individuals. The new meaning to Shi'ism which was
advocated by al-Sack will be discussed later in this chapter.
The political behaviour of the migrants thus differed from what it had been in their
villages of origin. Issues relating to property, inheritance, and irrigation which ordinarily
provoked family conflicts in the villages did not arise in the suburbs, where new settlers
lived mostly in rented houses and worked in salaried jobs. Similarly, the fraternal
associations, which "clustered around adult males because of patrilineal descent and
partilocal residence, and which may stimulate family feuds, were dispersed by the process
of migration."'
The new social change that the Shrites were going through, and their mingling with other
communities affected al-Sack's understanding of the importance of the Lebanese co-
existence on one side and of increasing self awareness on the other.
3. al-Sadr's attitudes toward Lebanese society
When al-Sack first arrived in Lebanon his intention was to complete his religious studies and in
particular to write a risala (thesis). 2 He may well have imagined himself to be in a quiet calm
'Ibid., p. 206.
2 The student of Shi'ite Islam has to pass through three stages to become mujtahid the Muqaddima,
Sutuh and Kharij. In the third stage the student has to write a risala, which if accepted earns him a certificate
and recognition as a mujtahid. He is then expected to continue study and dedicate himself to learning and
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backwater where there would be ample opportunity for him to do research and become a
mujtahid. However, the initial haze soon evaporated, as he quickly became engaged in
social and political activities. This led him to neglect his original plans and he never managed
to finish the risala. 1 Yet, al-Sadr's understanding of Islam and Shfism, and particularly his
approach to Lebanese society made him, in effect, a first class mujtahid as he gave various
fatwas regarding social and political issues, beginning with a fatwa forbidding begging in Tyre.
It was clear to him that the community that he had come to serve did not need another
Vaditionar 'dim; rather it needed someone whom it could rely upon to bring forward
change and prosperity. Sayyid al-Ghuravvi once accompanied al-Sadr to Falugha in Mount
Lebanon in 1960 to give a lecture. al-Ghurawi was astonished at the remarkable contrast
between this area and Tyre. Realizing this al-Sadr explained to al-Ghurawi that the traditional
approach which the ' ulama had always adopted in Lebanese society could no longer work
He asked al-Ghurawi to convey this message to the `ulama of Najaf2
With this in mind al-Sack developed a totally different approach from the rest of the ' ulama
so that he could bring about both change from within and for the benefit of the Shi'ites. In
such a multi-sectarian and heterogeneous society it was important to recognize that these
education in order to reach the position of Ayatollah. However, even if a student does not write a risala, he
still can become a mujtahid, that is, if he can arrive at judgments on points of religious law using reason and
the principles ofjurisprudence, usul al-fiqh. al-Sadr had actually come to Lebanon with boxes full of books
and notes so that he could write his risala. Momen, op.cit., p.186. Interview, Sayyid Muhammad al-
Ghurawi, imam of Tyre, summer, 1987. This interview was conducted for the purpose of MA
dissertation.
'Peter Theroux, Imam Moussa Sadr, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1987, p. 14.
2 Interview, Muhammad al-Ghurawi, Tyre, summer, 1987.
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various groups were often involved in the manipulation of their identity in order to advance
their more immediate goals.
Fortunately for al-Sadr, his presence in Lebanon coincided with the presidency of General
Fuad Shihab which in various ways helped him to carry out his activities relatively
unhindered. Unlike previous Lebanese presidents who attributed the crisis of late 1950,
largely to external reasons, Fuad Shihab had a wider perception of the reasons for the
crisis. It was clear to him when he was commander-in-chief of the army that there were
sharp contrasts between different regions in the country. This was apparent from the
number of recruits who came from the most deprived area such as the South, 'Akkar and
the Biqa'.'
Shihab realized that it was important to promote a sense of national unity in Lebanon
particularly as his rise to power followed the period of civil war in 1958. He was
evidently sincere in his efforts to bring about social justice. During Shihab's presidency
al-Sadr was granted Lebanese nationality in 1963. Although citizenship consolidated his
presence in Lebanon, it occasioned numerous accusations from his opponents that he
was a lackey of the regime 2 Although it was nearly impossible for non-Lebanese to get
Lebanese citizenship, al-Sadr managed to do so. His acquisition of this nationality can be
attributed to a number of reasons. When Shihab came to power he was dissatisfied with
the existing power bases in Lebanese society and wanted to strengthen the Lebanese
1 Salibi, 'Lebanon Under ...., p. 216.
2 Ajami, The Vanished ..., p.86.
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state. To this end he modernized the country and utilized the Deuxieme Bureau
undertaking social reform for the very first time, based on a state sponsored research
institution.' However, he could not challenge the authority of the notables by such
means alone; he also had to resort to creating rivals from within the zusama's own
religious groups with whom he could work, and by 1963 al-Sack proved that he could be
a rival to the well established authority of Kamil al-As'ad. Another reason al-Sack's
gaining nationality can be attributed to the good relations of Imperial Iran with Lebanese
Christians in general, which was apparent from Iran's support of Chamoun in the
1950s.2
Despite his efforts to achieve social justice, Shihab failed to bring the Shiite community
onto an equal footing with the other communities. In the aftermath of the 1958 civil
war, struggle took place between the two then dominant communities, the Sunnis and the
Maronites, to gain as many administrative posts as possible, regardless of social justice
or equality. It is true that, consequently, the Muslims' share increased yet, this was mainly
in favuor of Sunnis Safiy al-Din3 mentioned in his memoirs that President Sinlab
occasionally refused requests from Saib Salam, the Prime minister, to appoint a Sunni to
a high official post reserved for a Shiite. This incident clearly indicated the struggle
between the Sunnis and the Maronites at the expense of the Shiites. The Shi'ites were
Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation,
LB. Tauris, London, 1993, p. 100. Suleiman, Political Parties p. 26.
2 Interview, Bahman Kashi, head of North Africa and Middle East Department in the Iranian
imperial foreign ministry, London, summer, 1995.
3 Safiy al-Din, op.cit., p. 24.
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not only deprived from possessing an equal share in governmental offices but actually lost
more posts.' This may be attributed to the fact the Shiites lacked a sense of communal
identity, or rather, that their political involvement was concerned more with the Arab
cause in general than with the advancement of their own communal interest. This
continued to be a major factor that hindered the Shiites in becoming an equal partner in
the running of Lebanese affairs.
Still, al-Sadr believed that Lebanon represented a unique example for the world, and that
it could prove the unity of God despite its plurality of religions. He also believed that
each religion had its own different way of reaching God. He did not "deny that each
way to God has its own proper characteristics, but in their essence all these ways are alike
because they lead to the same end." Therefore, he rejected antagonism between believers
in the name of religion and he consistently preached the need for harmony among them.2
As will be shown, al-Sadr's understanding of Lebanese society prompted him to
establish a non-sectarian approach to social reform, at a time where almost everyone was
hoping to increase their own specific sectarian demands, thereby making al-Sadr's
approach difficult to understand. In order to improve the political status of his
community, it was important for him to build bridges with all parties in Lebanese society,
so long as he managed to preserve the interests of the Shiites.
1 Salibi, 'Lebanon Under ..., p. 219. Jean Aucagne, 'L'Imam Mousa Sadr et la Communeate
Chiite', Travaux et fours, Vol., 53, 1974, p. 35.
2 Norton, 'Changing Actors ..., p. 113.
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"Grasping the political potential of social services as a means of outflanking the traditional
elite and entering the political arena, al-Sack underwrote a string of religious and vocational
schools." From early on he had the idea of establishing a Sh?ite organintion to direct the
Shi'ites under a single leadership Sayyid al-Raisi, 2
 an Iranian cleric, met al-Sack in Balbek in
1962, and on that occasion al-Sadr revealed his desire to establish such an organintion in
order to put the community onto an equal footing with the other main communities in the
country. How then did he work to achieve this aim in such a communally divided society?
For al-Sack the Lebanese formula of the coexistence of a number of different religious
communities provided him with the opportunity to serve his community by operating within
these parameters. He gradually came to understand the nature of Lebanese society and the
delicate relationship between the different communities. This early understanding on his part
was later to prove fruitful, and his political shrewdness explains how he was able to broaden
his appeal for change in Lebanese society well beyond his own community, which assured
him of the support from non-Sh?ites.
Until and long after al-Sack's arrival, the position of the Shiite `ulama during the 1960s was
not much different from that of the early twentieth century in the sense that the `ulama
community was generally both "economically depressed and politically quiescent". They
Judith Hank, The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias, Centre for Lebanese
Studies, Paper No. 14, 1994, p. 12.
2 Interview, Sayyid al-Raiisi, London, 1994.
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accepted the pre-eminence of the zu'ama, and in return they were treated respectfully when
they came into their presence.' Sharaf al-Din had been an exception among the `ulama since
he took an independent line, and did not rely upon a za'im to bring about change in society.
We have seen how the independent line he followed brought him much enmity from many of
the zu'ama and `ulama, and how he still managed to utilize the differences in political
atmosphere to his favour. However, apart from Sharaf al-Din in Tyre, the reputation of
' ulama in the rest of the south was a by word for stagnation, which did not win them
popularity among people Shaikh Mughniyya has best described how the `ulama were seen
in the eyes of the people when he said:
Some youngsters, and some of the elders as well, are always complaining that
the men of religion do not fulfill their duties, do not visit and guide the faithful.
But when a man of religion comes their way they escape from him as a
healthy man avoids a man with a contagious disease.2
al-Sadr's awareness of this axiomatic statement pushed him to pursue a different style in order
to appeal to a broad spectrum of people, and thus to win their trust and support. In order to
do so, he began establishing a string of social welfare organizations.
3.1 Social welfare activities
al-Sack's social welfare activities ranged from a direct involvement in improving the condition
of the Shiites in Tyre to simultaneously improving relations with the other religious
l Ajami, The Vanished ..., p. 73.
2 Mughniyya, 'ila `ulama al-Sharia fi Jabal 'Amil', al-Irfan, Vol., 47, 1959, p. 77.
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communities. On a wider scale he worked to establish a religious council for the Shiites,
resulting in his acquiring the label of the principal founder of Shiite identity.
On many occasions al-Sadr would openly reveal his feelings regarding the traditional
approach of the 'ulama, a prime example being the occasion of 'Ashura. This occasion was
celebrated every year in the traditional fashion, the effects of which regularly imposed upon
the ShPites a negative image. However, al-Sadr strove upon such occasions to create
opportunities for a constructive image of the Shiites. He declared that there was a particular
kind of enemy, (ie. meaning traditional ulama) who wanted to make the example of
Husain's martyrdom a traditional and rigid ceremony and which made this kind of enemy
particularly dangerous.'
The events of 'Ashura were always presented in a manner which ended in tears and defeat. al-
Sack however brought a new attitude to 'Ashura which skipped it of its sorrow and made it
an episode of political choice and courage on the part of Imam Husain and his companions.
The following two chapters will demonstrate how al-Sack's major political activities were
announced on 'Ashura and at other Shiite occasions related to the twelve imams. Under his
auspices the celebration of 'Ashura was to become a celebration of defiance against injustice.
He worked to revitalize this occasion, about which he said on many occasions in the 1960s:
Crying and participating in funerals must not become a substitute for action or
as a way of avoiding hardship, or an excuse for not doing constructive work.2
In a more assertive voice he advocated the need to change the way 'Ashura was celebrated:
A Lecture given by al-Sadr and recorded on audio tapes.
2 Aucagne, op.cit, p. 47
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We do not act according to truth, we don't abstain from lies. I wonder if
Husain was amongst us, and saw that the truth was not respected, that we
persist not to act according to truth, that we neglect it, what would he do? If
we have contented ourselves with the traditional representation and if we have
not learnt anything on the ways of competing against lies and of making truth
triumph, then we have been insensitive to this commemoration: it is
negligence, it is burying the aims pursued by Husain. We must leam something
from this lamp which lights us, whose oil is drawn from Husain's blood; we
must side by the righteous and compete against lies of any form.'
However, simply improving the status of the Shiite community on a sectarian basis would
have made al-Sadr just another traditional personality, who aimed only at improving the
position of his own community rather than working towards achieving a sense of national
integration. And yet, here lies the essence of al-Sadfs desire, an improvement of the Shiite
lot through the pursuit of a heightened of national allegiance rather than relying purely upon
local loyalties. It is this attitude that will be discussed in the next chapter.
In the early days of al-Sadr's residence in Tyre he was struck by the appalling status of the
Shiites in the city. He depended upon his own observations while traveling through Lebanon
as well as by making use of the IRFED2 reports which clearly showed considerable income
disparities in Lebanon. He utilized his own researches and the government's data to start
implementing a number of social projects in Tyre, building bridges with the other
communities, and demanding government involvement in his projects. He set about his social
reforms by using existing institutions, which had been established by Sharaf al-Din, namely the
Jama'iyyat	 w'al- lhsan.
2 IRFED is a French organisation which President Shihab requested to undertake a study of
social and economic conditions in Lebanon in 1959. Hanf, op.cit., pp. 100-101.
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In the first three years of his residence in the city al-Sadr managed to put an end to begging
on the streets of Tyre'. He preached that the followers of Imam Husain were not beggars,
that they should rather die than beg. 2 In addition, he also advocated a number of comma]
activities, urging people not to donate individually to the poor but to form a trust which
would offer services and create jobs for people in need.' The services of this society were
to be available not only to the Sh?ite community in Tyre but to all the communities in the
city. In the 1960s and 1970s he established a stung of social organizations in order to improve
the social standards of the Shiites such as vocational, nursing, and tailoring schools. Also he
founded al-Zahra hospital, an orphanage and an institute for religious teaching.
His activities were financed in different ways and he was partly assisted by the government
especially as Shilab was aiming at improving Lebanon's infrastructure. Shiliab's attitudes made
it easier for al-Sadr to extract money from the Bureau for Social Reconstruction, and the
Ministry of Education. In addition to taking out a bank loan, al-Sark also contacted the Shiite
emigrants in West Africa, who donated money.4
1 a1-Sadr, Manbar ..., p. 12.
2 Harakat Amal, Al-Qiada al-Muassasiya, Beirut,n.d., p. 14.
3 al-Sadr, Manbar ..., p. 12.
4 Report of Jam'aiyyat In'ash al-Qura, al-Talchalluf al-Ijtima i i fi Sur wa Qadaiha, 1963. It was
obtained from private papers of Ja sfar Sharaf al-Din, in Tyre, spring, 1992.
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3.2 Relations with other communities
In 1962 al-Sadr formed the Haraka ljtima'iyya (Social Movement) jointly with the Greek
Orthodox Archbishop, Gregoire Haddad for the purpose of promoting literacy and health
programmes in the south.' To justify this cooperation, he referred to the hadith of the
Prophet which says that all people are children of God, and the most beloved for God are his
children who serve the people best. He wanted to stress the prophet's word 'people' which
did not have any sectarian connotation and, therefore, that all people are worthy of being
served. This understanding with the Christians reached its peak in the early 1970s, and until
the beginning of the civil war in 1975 al-Sadr preached frequently in churches. A photograph
of him preaching while standing under a cross, was often used by his opponents in order to
bring doubt as to his religious sincerity. 2 Indifferent to such allegations, he spoke at a
church in Rashaiyya al-Fakhar hi the south urging the southerners to stand firm against
continuous Israeli attacks.' Later on, he moved his efforts to the churches of Beirut,
particularly the Cathedral of St. Louis des Capucins where he was invited by the Maronite
Patriarch Antonius Bulus Khuraysh. 4 In reply to such attacks al-Sack always recited from
the Quran and the hadith of the prophet, in order to justify his actions.
When al-Sack became the official religious leader of the commnnity, 5
 he gave a new
interpretation to the meaning and duties of such leadership:
1 Hanf, op.cit., p. 189.
2 Such as the case of Shaikh Mughniyya.
3 al-Nahar, Beirut, 3 September, 1974.
4 Ibid., 20 February, 1975.
5 al-Sadr, Lectures from audio tapes.
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...the responsibility of an Imam of the community knows no limits: an Imam
has to protect the interests of his people; he has to be generous; he has to serve
his community persistently; he has to be willing to undergo martyrdom on their
behalf No leader can claim Islam who ignores the daily affairs of the
community.
al-Sadr's activities were not confined only to social and political issue. He was also an active
religious intellectual It was important for him to show the creative face of the religious
personality, and the practical importance of religion in daily life. Although this approach was
welcomed by various segments of society, it also flew in the face of the advocates of
secularism, most notably Kamal Junblat, as we shall see in the last chapter.
3.3 The intellectual activities of al-Sadr
On an intellectual level, he gave lectures in various parts of Lebanon, as well as in Egypt and
Algeria. Before discussing his local activities, it is appropriate to shed some light upon these
intellectual activities abroad, as this helped him to establish contacts with some Arab leaders.
In 1970 al-Sadr was invited to attend a conference organized by the Islamic Research Council
in Cairo, where he met with Muhammad Haikal of al-Ahram who arranged a meeting with
President Nasser. No details of this meeting, have survived but it appears that President
Nasser strongly recommended that al-Sadr should become a permanent member of the Islamic
Research Council.' Egypt was to become an important place of refuge for al-Sadr in the
years to come, especially during the Lebanese civil war.
'al-Anwar, 7 March, 1970.
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Algeria became another important platform for al-Sadr, beginning in the early 1970s, when an
annual conference on Islamic Thought was held. It was important for him to participate in
order to explain his interpretation of the duties of the `ulama, and the Shiite school of
thought in a constructive way to his audience. In one session he gave a paper which became
the focal point of discussion for the entire conference.'
In Lebanon itself al-Sadr was consistently building bridges with intellectuals, regardless of
their religious orientation. Meeting with intellectuals on a regular basis provided him with an
arena in which to express his opinion and subsequently those participants would often
become supporters of al-Sadr's movement Harakat al-Mahrumin. An opportunity came in
1964 when he received an invitation from al-Nadwa al-Lubnaniyya, a club which organized
regular seminars and talks The reason for this invitation was that the Shiite marja'
Taqlid Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim was on his way to the Hajj, and this had prompted al-
Nadwa al-Lubnaniyya to organize a talk on Shfism. al-Sack delivered a comprehensive
lecture covering various Shiite concepts, such as the notion of marja' al-taqlid2 and how the
marja' assumes this position, his position among other maraji'a and the scope of the marja'
al-taqlid's authority within society. 3 The last issue was a major focus of debate among
Shiite 'ulama especially after Khumaini came to power in Iran in 1979 Khumaini was then
the main advocate of the notion of Wilayat al-Faqih which gives `ulama who have political
al-Sadr, 'Ruh al-Shari'aa al-Islamiyya wa wagi'a al-Tashri'a al-Yawm fi al-'Alam al-Islazni',
Al- Multaqa al-Sabi 'a Litta'rruf 'ala al-Fikr al-Islami, Ministry of Education, Algeria, Vol. 1, 1973,
pp. 210-223.
2 In Shi'ism there are what is called the Mukallid and the Mukallad. The first are the ordinary
people who should look to the second to get religious advice upon different matters.
3 al-Sadr, Manbar p. 17-23.
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authority immense power similar to those of the infallible imams. In his lecture at al-Nadwa
al-Lubnaniyya al-Sadr advocated a widely used perception regarding this authority. He
said that the authority of the marja' did not entail political duties, as politics would divert
him from fulfilling his main duties, that is the learning and teaching of religion. However, he
considered that the marja' should give political opinions and authoritative pronouncement on
certain political issues in order to prevent what might otherwise be harmful to Islam  1
The platform at al-Nadwa al-Lubnaniyya added to al-Sack's popularity in intellectual circles,
which he utilized in the mid 1970s to support his social movement Harakat al-Mahrumin. In
his contacts with other intellectuals al-Sack advocated a new standard in relation to public
office. He argued that the individuals holding such offices should be appointed on the basis of
merit rather than connections so that a decent administration could be created where loyalty
was to the state rather than to the individual This attitude helped him form a committee
consisting of people from different backgrounds in order to advocate such an approach.2
As we have seen, three basic factors allowed al-Sack to consolidate his position and therefore
achieve his objectives in Lebanon. The first was the continued support of Najaf in attempting
to dissolve the tensions among the Shiite `ulama in Lebanon. This was achieved by sending
prominent `ulama from Najaf such as Muhammad Bahr al2Uhim, Mandi and Hadi al-Hakim
upon the initiative of the marja' al-taqlid Muhsin al-Hakim.
'Ibid., p.29.
2 The members of this committee were Father Yuwakim Mubarak, Michel al-Astnar, Fuad al-Bustani,
Marwan Hamadeh, Jubran Hailc, Pierre Hilu, and Basim al-Jisr. Interview, Basim al-Jisr, Oxford, summer,
1994.
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The second factor was the socio-economic situation which saw a large migration of Shiites
from rural areas to urban centres. This had a dramatic effect upon traditional family,
communal and local allegiances, which assisted al-Sack in his attempt to create a sense of
national rather than regional identity amongst the Shiites.
Lastly and perhaps most importantly al-Sadr's constant and energetic efforts at regional, and
national levels which were genuine attempts to raise the standing of not only the Shiite
community but also of all deprived elements within Lebanese society, especially in certain
regions in the north such as Akkar, Balbek and the south.
His general socio-political approach stemmed from the way he interpreted religious faith 
For him faith was not simply a set of rituals but rather, a set of social concerns regarding
the needs of people. Ahmad Qubaisi l states that al-Sack asserted that the end does not
always justify the means, and that ends and means must be complementary.
Having established these factors the political activities of al-Sack will be discussed in the next
chapter in order to find out whether he was successful in his attempts to establish a degree of
national allegiance in Lebanon, and, if not the reasons for his failure to do so.
1 Interview, Alunad Qubaisi, personal interpreter of al-Sadr, Beirut, 1987. This interview was
conducted for the purpose of MA dissertation.
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The Basis of Shi'ite Transformation:
The Rise and Decline of National Leadership
Having established himself in Lebanon, al-Sadr began working towards a larger goal ie.,
the establishment of a Shiite identity. He also aimed at creating allegiance to the
Lebanese state. This chapter will discuss the role of the institutions that al-Sadr
established and their effect on the Shi'ites in particular and the Lebanese in general, and
on himself. Contradictory as these aims might seem, he had a clear vision of how to
implement his policies in Lebanese society. The period from 1967 until 1975 was
something of a golden period for al-Sadr for he succeeded in breaking almost all the
barriers between the Shiites and the other communities. This is despite the fact that this
period witnessed extreme political tensions between various politicians and parties which
eventually led to the civil war that began in 1975. The civil war was a major factor which
contributed to a decline in al-Sad?s prestige.
al-Sadr inaugurated a series of official and non-official institutions to fulfil the two above
objectives. First, he managed to establish a Shiite council in May 1967 to represent and
to look after Shiite interests throughout Lebanon. Secondly, as far as creating allegiance
to the state was concerned, he established Harakat al-Mahrumin, Movement of
Dispossessed, in March 1974, with the objective of achieving social and economic
reform. As a result of the establishment of these two institutions, al-Sadr was recognised
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as the official spiritual leader of the Shiite community and at the same time managed to
extend his leadership to the national stage. However, by the mid 1970s his popularity
suffered a setback, for two reasons: first, the civil war, which put an end to his peaceful
demands for social reform, and second, his establishment in July 1975 of a militia known
as Afivaj al-Mu qawama al-Lubnaniyya, (Lebanese Resistance Detachments), better
known by its acronym Amal (which also means "hope"), whose objective was to defend
the south against Israeli attacks. Establishing a militia meant that al-Sadr limited himself
to a single group; he was no longer a national leader but only a Shilte one. Unlike
national Shiite council and Harakat al-Mahrumin, the establishment of Amal was not
planned. al-Sadr was virtually forced to found it in response to the devastating Israeli
attacks on the south in the late 1960s and 1970s, in circumstances in which the Lebanese
authorities were virtually powerless to act. Originally, he had tried to force the Lebanese
authorities to take the responsibility of defending the south, but all his attempts were in
vain.
al-Sadr's motives in establishing the Shi'ite council, Harakat al-Mahrumin and Amal have
often been misinterpreted. My main objective here is to discuss the various circumstances
behind each of these activities. It is worthwhile first to discuss what others have written
on this subject to provide an overall view in order to show how inaccurate their
discussions were.
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Salim Nasr's study for instance did not distinguish between al-Sack's three objectives,
creating a Shiite identity through the SISC, creating national allegiance through Harakat
al-Mahrumin, and defending the south against Israeli attacks through Ama1. 1 As a result,
Nasr did not identify the various motivating factors for al-Sack's activities and instead
concentrated on one issue only, that is, improving the status of the Shi'ites. This also led
him to discuss the three objectives of al-Sack as one objective, causing more confusion
particularly when he did not provide accurate dates of establishment of al-Sack's
institutions. Consequently, he intermingled the three issues to the extent that it has
become difficult to draw distinctions between them. Nasr's confusion can best be
illustrated by the following:
The movement was called different names: the Movement of Imam Musa
al-Sack, the Movement of the Dispossessed ... whatever the name, it was a
mass movement in the Lebanese Shi'a community ....2
He carries on:
The movement used moral and religious language and themes based on the
Shiite tradition of protest.3
As for the date of establishing the movement he mentioned:
It is difficult to pinpoint the birth of the movement, but two dates in
particular stand out. On May 22, 1969, Imam Musa al-Sack was elected to
head the Supreme Shiite Council ... The second date, June 6, 1973, was
that of the special joint session of the Shar'ai committee and the executive
committee of the SSC ...4
Salim Nast, 'Roots of the Shi'ite Movements', MERIP Reports, Vol. 15, 1985, pp. 10-16.
2 Ibid., p. 12.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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Nasr's interpretation drove him to overlook al-Sadr's systematic approach. In fact, the
dates of establishment and the names of al-Sadr's institutions were, 1967 for the Shilte
Council, 1974 for Harakat al-Mahrumin, and 1975 for Amal More confusion was caused
by the definition of Norton,' Salibi, 2 and Halawi, 3 who believed that Amal was the
military arm of Harakat al-Mahrumin although al-Sadr never claimed any link between the
two apart from the fact that he was the founder of both.
In general Nasr, Norton, Halawi and Salibi dealt with the main issues. The concern of
this chapter is not to criticise their work as such, but it is rather to draw sharp lines
between these three issues, that is, the Shi'ite Council, Harakat al-Mahrumin and Amal,
as each one represented an objective by itself After having done so, we shall try to assess
their effects on the political transformation of the Shi'ites in Lebanon, which undermined
the authority of the zu 'ama, in particular the authority of Kamil al-As'ad.
1. The Supreme Islamic Shi'ite Council
The Shiite Council was established by Act 72/67 of the Lebanese Parliament in May 1967
and the bill became law in December. Since then the Shiite community has maintained its
independence in its religious affairs according to the Shar'ai and the jurisprudence of the Ja'fari
'Norton, 'Harakat Amal', in The Emergence of New Lebanon, Praeger Publisher, USA, 1984,
P . 171.
2 Salibi, Cross Road to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976, Dalmar, New York, 1976, P. 119.
3 Halawi, op.cit., p. 155.
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doctiine.' The official name of the council, al-Majlis al-Islami
	 al-A'ala (Supreme
Islamic Shiite Council, SISC) will be used.
al-Sadr attempted to recruit a wide and representative coalition of Shiites to the Council.
Deputies, clerics, former regime elements and men with wealth were all welcomed if they
were willing to help and clever enough to realise that their own interests were better
served by a body that served the Shiites of Lebanon. The Council had 43 seats on its
executive committee, 19 seats for Shiite parliamentary deputies, 12 seats for clerics and
12 for laymen. al-Sadr saw in the formation of the SISC an opportunity to endow the
Shiite community with an official voice in social and political issues, and to end
discrimination.
Prior to 1967, the Shiite community did not have a religious council representing its interests
vis-a-vis the state and other communities. The creation of Shiite identity required the
establishment of a Shiite body with the objective of protecting the interests of the
community. Such a council was not a new phenomenon in Lebanon, although the Shiites were
the last community to establish one. As far as the Muslims were concerned the Sunnis were
the first to establish their own council, al-Majlis al-Islami al-Shar'ai al-A'ala on 13 January
1959; according to this declaration the Sunni mufti was to be the representative of all
Muslims, Sunni and Shiite alike, and since have had the title Mufti al-Jamhuriyya, Mufti of
the Republic. In July 1962, a similar initiative was taken by the Druzes who established their
Sicking & Khairallah, op.cit., p. 98.
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own council. Two attempts were made in the middle and late 1950s to establish a Shi'ite
body, the first by a deputy from Balbek, Shafiq Murtada, in 1956 and the second by Shaikh 
Muhammad Taqi Sadiq. Both attempts failed due to opposition from the Shiite zu'ama.1
It was important for the Shiites to have their own council especially as, in broad terms,
political power in Lebanon was largely divided between the Maronite and the Sunni
communities, and without a council, the Shiles had no political weight. The council's first
objective was to create self-awareness amongst the Shiltes in order to force them to demand
and obtain their rights in Lebanese society. An official Shiite identity could not be created as
long as the Multi-ship of Lebanon remained in Sunni hands. However, al-Sadr was willing
to abandon the creation of a Shiite identity if he could succeed in creating a wider Muslim 
one. To achieve a wider Muslim identity meant that Sunni identity must also be abandoned,
and as this identity was already well established it would seem unlikely that the Simnis would
abandon it.2
 Eventually, al-Sadr opted to create a Shilte council to achieve his aim, but by
implication, the creation of the SISC symbolized his failure to establish 	 a wider Milslim body.
In 1967 the final decision to go ahead and establish the SISC came about when the &mills
rejected the Shiite request to amend Decree No. 18 which designated them as representatives
of all the Muslims in Lebanon.' The Sh?ites wanted a say in administering their own affairs
This is in contradiction to what Ajatni said that Shaikh M.T. Sadiq was a strict conservative
without political ambitions and who was against any reform within the Shi'ite community on the level of
official institutions. Ajami, The Vanished ..., p. 74.
2 Interview, Shaikh 'Abd al-Amir Qabalan, a Shi'ite Mufti and was elected deputy chairman of
SISC in 1994, Beirut, sununer,1987. This interview was conducted for the purpose of MA dissertation.
3 Interview, Shaikh Malunud Farahat, London, winter, 1992.
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and demanded a joint presidency alternating between Shiites and Sunnis. Shaikh Mahmud
Farahatl has given some details on Sunni-Shilte relations before and after the establishment
of the SISC. According to him, it was inconceivable for the Sunnis to meet Shiite demands,
particularly the issue of joint presidency. The Sunni rejection was motivated by the power
invested in the Sunni Mufti, who had the official title of Mufti of the Republic, and who was
considered the head of all Muslims.
When the SISC was established in 1967, it continued unsuccessfully to ask for Sunni
cooperation on various issues, such as participating in the special programmes in Ramadan
and the Friday sermons which were transmitted on television and radio. These programmes
were Sunni-dominated and supported by Charles Rizq, the Maronite director-general of the
Ministry of Information. This continuous rejection of Shi'ite requests by the Sunnis forced
the SISC to establish their own programmes, and in order to do so they had to seek the
support of the Shiite zu'ama, particularly Sabri Hamadeh who forced this issue through the
Ministry of Information. The SISC thus succeeded in organizing a programme of its own
during Ramadan.
The success of the programme encouraged the Sunnis to ask the SISC if they could
participate in its Ramadan programme Their request was welcomed on one condition that the
Sunnis mention from time to time in the azan, call for prayer, that 'Ali is wall Allah'. 2 Not
'Interview, Shaikh Mahmud Farahat, London, winter, 1992.
2 The Shi'ites use this phrase in the azan to assert their claim that 'Ali was the rightful successor
of Prophet Muhammad.
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surprisingly, this condition was rejected and each community continued to have its own
programmes.
In October 1969 al-Sadr, as president of SISC, invited the Mufti, Shaikh Hasan Khalid, to
cooperate in the unification of Islamic fiqh. 1 In his letter, al-Sadr cited previous attempts at
cooperation which had taken place between prominent scholars from al-Azhar and Shiite
scholars in order to urge Khalid to accept. 2 But Khalid replied veil, poiite1y that the matter
had been referred to a special committee for discussion and that the issue had since been
closed.3
al-Sadr's meteoric rise in Lebanon had clearly made many leading Lebanese personalities wary
of him. Khalid's hesitation was shared by many Sunnis and Shiites alike. They might have
thought that al-Sadr would overshadow them if they cooperated with him. Consequently,
many avoided doing so, while others realized that such cooperation would actually preserve
some of their influence. Shaikh 'Abd al-Amir Qabalan mentioned that al-Sadr went to Egypt
in order to assure President Nasser that the establishment of SISC was not directed against the
Sunnis but rather to achieve justice for the Shfites.4
 His awareness of the importance of
1 al-Muharrir, 9 October, 1969.
2 At the start of the century, the call for unity of Islamic Fiqh reached its height during the time
of Shaikh al-Azhar 'Abd al-Majid Salim, Shaikh Mahmud Shaltut, and the Dean of Shar'ai College at al-
Azhar Shaikh Muhammad Madani. From the Shi'ite side were Shi'ite Marja'a Sayyid Husain Brujurdi,
Sayyid 'Aix! al-Husain Sharaf al-Din, and Shaikh Muhammad Taqi Qununi.
3 al-Sadr, Manbar ..., p. 218.
4 Interview, Shaikh 'Abd al-Amir Qabalan, Beirut, summer, 1987.
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gaining Nasser's consent was essential, particularly since Kimlid was directly supported by
Nasser in his efforts to counter increasing Communist activity in Lebanon.'
However, such negative attitudes towards al-Sack changed as he began working for reform in
society in general This brought him enormous support from well known people from various
communities. Even members of the Sunni and Shiite communities who had not cooperated in
the beginning changed their position and lent him their support, particularly when he formed
Harakat al-Mahrumin. It was his efforts to achieve social justice that won al-Sack the
enormous popularity which reached its peak in 1974.
1.1 Social reforms of al-Sadr: consistency or contradiction?
The establishment of the SISC was a major step towards enhancing al-Sack's influence in
Lebanese politics. He used it to further his activities especially when he was elected
president of the Council on 22 May 1969 and acquired the title of imam_ After this he
became the leader of the Sh?ite community in Lebanon and could represent the
community before the authorities.
The council quickly made itself heard with demands in the military, social, economic and
political realms. For instance, it demanded strong measures for the defence of the south
through the establishment of an adequate Lebanese army, increasing the provision of
'Interview, Basim al-Jisr, son of the first Sunni prime minister in Lebanon Shaikh Muhammad
al-Jisr, Oxford, summer, 1994.
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development funds, constructing and improving schools and hospitals, and increasing
the number of Shiites appointed to senior government positions.
1.1.1 al-Sadr's moderate trend
Although al-Sadr presided over a sectarian institution, that is SISC, his talk was of
national integration and moderation. The year 1969 was particularly eventful, when
tensions began to surface between two groups, the representatives of sectarianism and
secularism, to which both internal and external factors contributed. He vehemently
rejected estrangement between communities and constantly called for dialogue to
eliminate tensions.
On 20 July 1969 the well known journalist 'Adil Malik interviewed al-Sadr and asked
him about the aims of the SISC. al-Sadr advocated a moderate approach and said that
the major trends that dominated Lebanese society were either sectarian or secular which
left no room for moderation. With the SISC al-Sadr wanted to use his official position to
establish a moderate trend which would compromise between sectarian and secular
ideas.'
al-Sack explained this moderate trend in a lecture in St. Joseph's University. He rejected
secularism because, he claimed, a society without a religion would become a society
Al-faridah, 21 June, 1969
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without morality. He rejected sectarianism because it discriminated between individuals
and prevented the creation of a sense of national identity. When he was asked what kind
of system he preferred, al-Sadr replied:
the Lebanese sectarian system would disappear only with the abolition of
the various personal status laws and their unification under a single law.
This answer was unexpected because the only way to abolish the existing personal status
laws would be to create a civil law which al-Sadr had always opposed. Secondly, if he
meant by a single law the Islamic one, this means that he would be ruling out the
Christians whom al-Sadr always assured of their status in Lebanon. Unfortunately, he
was not questioned further about this.'
What was clear however is that al-Sack believed that Lebanon could present a unique
example to the world as proof of the oneness of God despite its plurality of religion. For
him all religions have different ways of reaching God; he recognised that each way has its
own characteristics, but in their essence all are alike because they lead to the same end.
al Sack's positive attitudes towards the coexistence of the various Lebanese communities
was part of his new moderate interpretation of Islam. As another instance, he gave a
new interpretation regarding Muslim women during an interview with Hanan Maluf of
al-Nahar. Asked about polygamy, and his opinion of the Tunisian government's recent
1 Lisan al-Hal, 24 December, 1970.
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prohibition, al-Sadr stated that he disagreed with the Tunisian authorities, but he also
made it clear that polygamy should not be left uncontrolled. "It is important that the
religious courts should play a part". al-Sadr's opinion was different from conventional
Islamic practice which left marriage and divorce totally subject to men's wishes. He
suggested that religious courts should have a wider authority to evaluate whether more
than one marriage is necessary.'
Among interpretations attributed to al-Sadr, Ajami mentioned al-Sack's belief that
Muslim women should be able to many Christian men. 2 This was an exaggeration. al-
Sack clearly stated that only those who believe in Allah and the Prophet Muhammad are
allowed to marry Muslim women. He also clearly said that marriage conditions are stated
in Islamic fiqh, according to which Muslim women are only allowed to many Muslims.3
al-Sack also touched an another issue, that of; Muslims eating food offered by Christians.
This new interpretation was intended to enhance coexistence between the Muslims and
Christians in Tyre. Early signs of this began when he bought ice cream from a shop
owned by a Christian at a time when Shi'ites were wary of food offered by Christians in
generaL
al-Sadr, Manbar p. 185.
2 Ajami, The Vanished p. 94.
3 a1-Sadr, Manbar p. 185.
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1.1.2 Political upheaval
The establishment of the SISC coincided with the Six Day War in 1967 between the
Arab states and Israel, in which the Arabs suffered a tremendous defeat. This war caused
mass emigration from Palestine to neighbouring countries, and Lebanon was a major
recipient as the refugees found shelter in the south of Lebanon. One year later Israel
turned its attention to Lebanon and a new era of conflict began.
The major confrontation between Lebanon and Israel started almost immediately after
1967, although it was not as dramatic as the confrontation between Israel and other
neighbouring countries in 1956 and 1967. Until Israel achieved its objectives in 1967, the
south had enjoyed a stable existence, that is to say that there were no confrontations
between Israel and Lebanon. After 1967, Lebanon became a major Israeli target. In June
1968 this new interest became clear when Israel shelled the village of Mays al-Jabal,
leaving many casualties.'
Israel's excuse for its aggression in Lebanon was its need to stop Palestinian attacks.
Confrontations after 1967 between Israeli and Palestinian forces had dramatic effects on
the Shiites of the south. This period was one of great disorder in the country and
provided al-Sack with the opportunity he needed to take political action particularly when
the traditional zu rama were passive. He found a direct route to the aspirations and
t Halawi, op.cit., p. 143.
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resentments of the Shi'ite masses and also increased his popularity in the country as a
whole. With his new platform, the SISC, he began his full political involvement in
Lebanese society. This increased involvement brought him a lot of support but at the
same time many enemies, particularly from well established Shi'ite zu'ama. The
involvement of al-Sack in the major political issues drew him a wide support from antes
and non-Shi'ites, while the immobility of the Shi'ite zu'ama, mainly al-As'ad, caused a
dramatic decline in their popularity and, as a result, hastened the transfer of leadership
from al-As' ad to al-Sack.
Because of the increased Israeli aggression, Lebanon was torn between two extremes: the
Rightist on one side, and the Leftist and their Palestinian resistance supporters on the
other, al-Sack tried to avoid direct involvement in this tension and to adopt a moderate
line, hoping to reduce tensions between them through dialogue. He gave the Palestinian
resistance his full support, but advised it not to get involved in the existing tension. al-
Sack thought that the best way to reduce tensions was to press the government to pursue
reform at all levels in society. By such reforms the Lebanese would feel more secure, and
this in turn would increase allegiance to the state.
1.1.3 al-Sadr's criticism of the state
Since his arrival in Lebanon al-Sachs approach had been heavily influenced by the misery
of the Shiite community and its neglect in comparison with others; therefore, his main
concern was to achieve social justice. This drove him to demand social and political
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change, but on the condition that such change would be brought about by peaceful, moral
and non-violent means.
After 1967 there was an added motivation for his efforts, namely the security of the south
after the continuous military escalation between the Palestinians and Israel From this date
al-Sadr's co-operation with others was increasingly motivated less by general principle
and more by his concern for the welfare and security of the south.
al-Sadr's political agenda emerged from the way he interpreted the faith. For him faith
was not just about rituals, but about social concerns and social needs. He repeatedly
stated 'for us Lebanon is a single homeland', not to appease the government but as a
sincere belief which became a major slogan of Harakat al-Mahrumin Moreover, and in
order to protect the unity of Lebanon, "al-Sadr recognised the insecurity of the
Maronites and he acknowledged their need to maintain their monopoly of the
presidency"! However, he was critical of them for their arrogant stance towards
Muslims in general and Shiites in particular. He argued that Lebanon's Maronite-
dominated governments had neglected the south and the Shiites since independence.
al-Sadr's belief in the Lebanese system encouraged him to advocate coexistence and
harmony among the various sects. 2 This attitude would certainly benefit the Shiite
i Norton, `Shi'ism and Social Protest in Lebanon', in J.R. Cole and N. Keddie (ed.), Shi'ism and
Social Protest, Yale University Press, 1986. p. 164.
2 al-'Asr, Saida, 5 December, 1969. Norton, 'Changing actors and leadership among the Shiites
of Lebanon', AAPSS, 482, November, 1985, p. 113.
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community as the Shiites were a minority in the Arab world. The best way for them to
prosper would be to adhere to Lebanon and to preserve its traditional coexistence,
despite the fact that the demographic shift in Lebanon would continue to favour the
Shiite side. al-Sack's efforts to improve coexistence in Lebanon was faced by the
growing tension between the Palestinians and Israel which was mainly taking place in the
south. This reality was an added burden on one side, with the Maronites on the other.
While the tension was growing between the two, the south had to bear the brunt of
Israeli aggression. The situation prompted al-Sack to work relentlessly to avoid further
disaster in the south of Lebanon.
On 26 December 1968, clashes between the Palestinians and Israel increased
dramatically as Israel attacked the south and Beirut in retaliation for a Palestinian attack
on an El Al airliner in Athens. Israel targeted Beirut International Airport where 13
aeroplanes were destroyed.' In April 1969, the escalation in the fighting between the
two sides prompted the Lebanese authorities to re-establish their control over the south.
This action by the Lebanese authorities was resisted by the Palestinians and their
Lebanese sympathisers. Tensions grew between them until clashes occurred at Dayr
Mimas. 2 From there, the situation went from bad to worse. On 18 October 1969 clashes
between them increased to the point that the Lebanese authorities had to seek Egyptian
advice about reaching an understanding with the PLO under Egyptian auspices; this
'Wade Goria, Sovereignty and Leadership in Lebanon 1943-1976, Ithaca Press, London, 1985
p. 95.
2 Ibid., p. 104.
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resulted in an agreement between the Lebanese state and the PLO known as the Cairo
Agreement.
Under this agreement Palestinian commandos were not allowed to launch operations
across the border with Israel, to wear military uniforms in public or to adopt positions on
Lebanese internal affairs. On the Lebanese side, the army would allow the commandos
free access to Syrian supply lines, and give their cause formal recognition. The
agreement was ratified by Parliament in December 1969. Ironically, the deputies did not
know the specific terms of the agreement when they ratified it. Three years later Prime
Minister Karami said "... the nature of the agreement compels us to keep it secret at this
stage ... we will expose its contents to parliament at the right time".' On the ground
nothing changed, and attacks and counter attacks between the Palestinians and Israel
continued.
Due to these political developments, the period from 1967 to 1969 witnessed political
confrontation between a number of Lebanese leaders. The main confrontation had three
aspects: pro-Palestinian armed struggle represented by Kamal Jimblat; pro-Western
policies represented by Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel, and a compromise position
represented by the Lebanese President Charles Helu. 2 Despite the fact that the main
Israeli reprisals were taking place in the south, none of the traditional Shiite leaders had
Daily Star, 18 January, 1972.
2 Goria, op.cit, pp. 95-100.
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sufficient political presence to advance the concerns of their areas. This absence left the
door wide open for al-Sadr to manoeuvre.
al-Sadr's political activities were in harmony with his aim of enhancing coexistence in
Lebanese society. The participation of other Lebanese communities in sharing
responsibility for what was happening in the south would most certainly consolidate
political allegiance to the state. He always reiterated the importance of complete devotion
to national sovereignty and the integration of the national territory.'
As president of the SISC, al-Sadr began discussing political issues. In a gathering with a
group of Lebanese emigrants from Africa al-Sadr stressed among other things the
importance of improving defence in the south, training and arming the people, and
improving the Lebanese army's ability to defend the southern border. 2 On 30 May 1969,
the same demands were stressed in the SISC in the presence of the Lebanese president.3
The more the tension and danger grew in the south the stronger al-Sadr's tone became.
During 1969 al-Sack tirelessly addressed the need to protect the south but he could not
change the situation and his demands were largely ignored. The Lebanese authorities
were hesitant to carry out major social or political projects for fear of displeasing an
important minority in the country Le. the Maronites, and policy decisions were often
1 1-laralcat al-Mahrumin's charter, principle 5.
2 Lisan al-Hal, 17 September, 1968.
3 Ibid., 23 & 30 May, 1969. al-Raqib newspaper, 2 June, 1969.
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only taken as a result of riots, strikes and demonstrations. The Lebanese governments,
therefore, 'reacts about as often as it acts'.1
Eventually al-Sadr had to resort to new measures to advance his demands. This happened
on 12 May 1970 when Israel launched a series of attacks on various southern villages,
leaving many people dead and wounded. 2 On 22 May the situation worsened as Israel
sent 100 tanks and 2,000 troops into the border villages, causing much death and
destruction and leading to the migration of nearly 50,000 people. 3 Israeli reprisals
became fiercer when more Palestinian fighters entered Lebanon after the Jordanian-
Palestinian crisis in Black September 1970. The Palestinians then had no other place but
Lebanon from which to continue their struggle. The transfer of the PLO leadership to
Lebanon caused an entirely new relationship between the Palestinians and the Lebanese,
especially in the south.
These events were a major concern for al-Sadr because of the huge migration from the
south which he viewed as extremely dangerous for the stability of the country. He
strongly believed that unpopulated land would be easy for Israel to occupy, and felt he
had to do something to compel the government to act quickly. He began by forming
Haya't Nusrat al-Janub, the Committee for the Aid of the South, in co-operation with
Suleiman, 'Crisis and Revolution in Lebanon', MES, Vol. 26, 1972, p. 22.
2 Israel attacked Tyre and the surrounding villages, Bint Jubail, Mad' ayun, Hasbaiyya,
`Aitarun, Kafr Shuba, and Rashaiyya al-Fakhar. In some villages the migration was 100 per cent. al-
Nahar, 21 May, 1970.
3 Halawi, op.cit, pp. 144-145.
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some religious leaders.' His aim was to arouse national concern for the south and he felt
that the best way to achieve this would be through co-operating with other communities.
On 25 May al-Sack issued a manifesto appealing for a collective consciousness, and
calling for a one day general strike to protest against the state's inaction. This was the
beginning of al-Sack's defiance of the government:
For two years ... we have been calling for the necessity of attending to the
situation in the south ... then the crisis began to advance .... killing,
destroying, dispersing and threatening the entire country.... After this,
what do the rulers expect? Do they want the southerners to keep silent
about this neglect? The strike is the minimum first step which we hope
will awaken in the rulers the spirit of responsibility and a sound national
conscience.2
The following day during the strike, al-Sack addressed nearly 50,000 demonstrators who
gathered in front of the SISC. This was Lebanon's first strike for two decades and it was
the first major public act of al-Sack. Demonstrators showed support for the Palestinians
and chanted slogans against the political zu'ama. They chanted, 'where is Sabri
Hamadeh? Where are the deputies of the south? Why does the parliament not convene?
They get paid and do not work.° These slogans although showing anger against the
'The committee was headed by Musa al-Sacir. The Christian member were Archbishop
Antonios Khuraysh, Gorgius Haddad, Ithnasius al-Sha'ir, Bulus al-Khuri and priest Ibrahim Daghir. The
Muslim members are, the Mufti of Saida Shaikh Muhammad Salim Hammud, Saida's Chief Judge
Shaikh Ahmad al-Zain, the Druze judge of Hasbaiyya Shaikh Najib Qays, Shaikh Salim Jalal al-Din,
Shaikh 'Ali al-Faquih and Shaikh `Abd al-Amir Qabalan. al-Nahar, 21 May, 1970.
2 al-Nahar, 26 May, 1970
Ibid., 27 June, 1970.
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authorities clearly projected the beginning of a transfer of popularity from the
traditional Shiite zu'ama to al-Sadr.
In this gathering the tone of his speech clearly showed a threat directed against the
government:
If our demands are not met, we who built the palaces of Beirut, shall
occupy them. The palaces should be the present homes of the children of
the south, and not Red Cross tents. Some are wondering what is intended
by this strike. I hope they listen well; we are demanding that the state take
responsibility for protecting the south, and that we co-operate with the
Arab armies. We are not military experts but we have given the state the
chance to exercise such responsibilities, and it has not done so.
The threat to occupy "palaces" was not merely to scare the authorities. al-Sadr was
stopped from doing so only when the Syrians advised him not to carry out the threat.'
The outcome of this strike was important as al-Sadr tested his popularity in the country
in general. He appeared as a national leader rather than merely a Shiite leader. In
addition, this strike and the threats forced Parliament to convene in order to draft a law
to establish a public office through which to address the specific economic, defence and
political concerns of the south. On 6 June Majlis Lubnan al-Jan ubi (Council of
Southern Lebanon) was created with a budget of LL30 million.2
During the years that followed, the south became a battle ground between Israel and the
Palestinians where Israeli might was intensely felt. Israeli forces carried out many
i 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Al-Shira'a, issue 666, 6 February, 1995.
2 al-Hayat, 2,4 June, 1970.
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"search-and-destroy" missions into Lebanese territory. On 25 February 1972, the Israeli
forces carried out a three-day armoured incursion into many villages. The second
invasion, on 16 September 1972, ended in a 36-hour occupation, extending over about
one-third of the south's territory.' During this second invasion the Lebanese Army
responded to the Israeli incursion and 18 Lebanese soldiers were killed and 46 wounded.2
The army's defensive role in the south did not last long and there were soon clashes
between the army and the Palestinians. These developments forced the Palestinians to
regroup in the south to the extent that they announced cancellation of all military
operations from Lebanese territory. This announcement aimed to ease the growing
frustration of the southerners in face of their inability to face up to Israeli aggression.
Despite Palestinian concessions, tensions with the Lebanese state escalated. In April 1973
Israeli commandos assassinated three PLO leaders Kamal 'Adwan, Yusuf Najjar and
Kamal Nasir. Pro-Palestinian members in the Lebanese government such as the Prime
Minister Sa'ib Salam, Kamal Junblat and Rashid Karami, accused the Lebanese army of
being incapable of defending Lebanese territory. On the other hand some Palestinian
commandos were arrested for causing explosions in various parts of Lebanon.
1 E. Hagopian & S. Farsoun, (ed.), South Lebanon, special report, No. 2, Association of Arab-
American University Graduates, august, 1978, P. 17.2 al-Hayat, 21 September, 1972.
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In May, the tensions between the two sides led to military conflict between them, which
stopped only when Syria intervened. The two sides signed the Melkart Protocol which
reaffirmed the principles of the Cairo Agreement.' The 1973 October War, in which
Arab sentiments and strength were high, signalled even stronger Palestinian military
operations from Lebanese territory. This in turn led to massive and frequent Israeli
retaliation in the south. At this stage the Palestinians received tremendous support from
the leftist political parties.
However, it was not long before both the Palestinians and the Lebanese authorities
began to violate the Cairo Agreement. The Lebanese authorities tried to regain full
control over Lebanon while the Palestinians began to display their military presence
openly and to erect check-points. The Palestinians had nowhere except Lebanon from
which to pursue their struggle, so that it was vital for them to hold on to it. Their
behaviour and attitudes towards Lebanon was due to their perception of Lebanon as "a
garden without a fence" as explained by one of their leaders Shafiq al-Hut.2
As a result of all these developments al-Sadr was in no position to give full support to
either side. Had he supported the authorities, it would have put him in an awkward
position with his people amongst whom the support of the Palestinians and the
progressive parties was high. On the other hand he could not and would not fully support
Hagopian, op.cit, p.17.
2 Mary A. Bateson, book review of the Vanished Imam, The New York Times Book Review, 25
May, 1986, P. 6. Halawi, op.cit, p. 146.
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the other side. al-Sadr had to be very careful in tackling this problem. He blamed the state
for its inadequate social, economic and security policies in the south. As for the
Palestinians and the Leftist parties, al-Sadr was careful to distinguish between the
Palestinian cause and Leftist ideology. He always supported the Palestinian resistance and
its right to liberate its land and always encouraged them to reach an understanding with
the Lebanese authorities. On the other hand he was a cleric and therefore at odds with
Leftist ideology because of its incompatibility with Islam. For a few years he managed to
keep a balance between all three: the state, the Palestinian resistance and the Leftists.
al-Sadr was convinced that the only way to maintain control of his momentum was by
continuing his social programme in order to widen his national popularity. Therefore, he
concentrated his efforts at this stage on reiterating his demands for social reform and
justice, but because of the sectarian nature of the Lebanese system, al-Sadr had to
maintain two approaches. As president of the SISC, he had to keep pressing the
government to secure the rights of the Shiite community. On the other hand, his co-
operation with intellectuals from other communities was as strong as before to achieve
social reform in the country by rejecting confessionalism.
Sicking and Kliairallah believe that al-Sadr pursued a contradictory policy, asserting that
he was not sincere in his rejection of confessionalism because he demanded special
rights for the Shiites. This has always been a common misunderstanding of Lebanese
politics as every political action is usually viewed from a sectarian stand point.
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However, it would have been utopian if al-Sadr had worked in one direction, that is,
rejecting confessionalism at a time when tensions between the secular Muslim and
Christian leaders was increasing. In addition, tensions between the state and the
Palestinians were going from bad to worse, and more importantly Israeli incursions and
bombing of the south were intensifying. At this time, rational dialogue rarely took place
between the conflicting parties. Each party was clearly trying to maintain power and
control over others.
Leading Maronite figures, such as Camille Chamoun and Pierre Gemayel, worked to
maintain Maronite supremacy. Kamal Junblat adamantly supported the Palestinians and
used leftist ideology to undermine Maronite dominance The Palestinians had no
alternative to Lebanon to carry on their resistance and hence, always worked to establish
their own authority in Lebanese territory. The Sunni leaders were more compromising as
they maintained good relations with their various rivals and always called for a wider
participation of Muslims in Lebanese affairs. As for the Shi'ites, they were fragmented,
without a dominant voice to present their demands in such a hostile environment,
especially as it was Shiite territory which was suffering Israeli reprisal attacks. The
combination of these factors forced al-Sadr to work simultaneously on two fronts:
securing the rights of the Shi'ite community, and co-operating with intellectuals to abolish
confessionalism. Over the next two years al-Sadr's popularity reached its height within
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the Shiite community and among intellectuals from other communities. This popularity
lasted until the start of the civil war in 1975.
1.1.4 Shi'ite demands
Shilte demands were forcefully triggered after the Lebanese army clashed with the
Palestinians in May 1973. On 22 June al-Sadr gathered the Shiite deputies for a meeting
in order to make them pledge to work for the full rights of the community and to
withdraw support from the government if these demands were not met within four
months.' Only 13 deputies2 out of 19 signed the pact, the remaining six being al-As'ad's
bloc who refused to co-operate with al-Sadr. He warned the government about the
chaotic security situation in the south, and the deprivation suffered by certain religious
communities and certain regions in the country. He also spoke of the rights of peasants
and the uncertain future for students.
At this meeting al-Sadr detailed to the members of the executive and legislative
committees of the SISC some instances of the deprivation being suffered by the Shiiite
community. For instance, the Shiites held only 40 percent of the first category of official
posts in the civil service designated for them, only 37 percent of the second category and
1 al-Sadr declared three possible sanctions. Shilte members of the new government of Taqi al-
Din al-Sulh would resign after four months if Shiite demands were not met. If they resign, these
deputies would undertake not to join any future government, and would refrain from giving it a vote of
confidence.
2 The 13 were Sabri Hamadeh, Adil `Usayran, Kazim al-Khalil, Abd al-Latif al-Zain, Ali al-
'Khalil, Husain Mansur, Mahmud 'Ammar, Husain al-Husaini, Muhammad Yusuf Baydun, Ahmad
-Asber, Yusuf Hammud, Subhi Yaghi, Abd al-Mawla Amhaz. al-farida, 11 December, 1973.
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18 percent of the third category. As for the budget, al-Sadr stated that between 1970 and
1972 the government spent nearly LL.946 million and, out of this amount, the south
received only LL.25 million through the council of the south (itself LL 5 million less than
its original budget). This money had not been spent to improve the infrastructure of the
south but rather as compensation to families who had lost their homes.'
In the event al-Sadr was unable to carry out his threat of urging the Shiite ministers not
to participate in the government if Shiite demands were not met, due to the opposition
of some Shiite deputies led by Kamil al-As'ad. The four month ultimatum given to the
government lapsed without result. Therefore, on 12 December 1973, the SISC met to
discuss the matter and ended up extending the threat for two more months. Five days
later in another meeting at the SISC al-Sadr admitted that his demands had not been
answered. 2
 In Yater during 'Ashura al-Sacir announced that he would use a new
approach for his demands,' promising that they would be supported by mass rallies, sit-
ins, and civil disobedience.
al-Sadr was criticised for attacking the government while receiving a salary from it. This
criticism prompted him to ask for his salary to be transferred to the budget of the SISC.
However, his request was rejected on the ground that all religious councils have equal
budgets so that with the addition of his salary the SISC's budget would be more than the
al-Sadr, Micro-film, the American University of Beirut.
2j( report, 17 December, 1973.
3 al-Nahar, 3 February, 1974.
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rest. Consequently, al-Sadr refused to take any salary from the government in order to be
free from criticism, and to enable him to carry on his attacks.' The continuation of al-
Sack's efforts needed to be organised in a social and political frame and to broaden the
Lebanese involvement in such effort. This was to be achieved by a new movement called
Harakat al-Mahrumin
2. Harakat al-Mahrumin
al-Sack would not have been able to embark on his reform or to achieve his demands if he
had not been part of the Lebanese system. To call for reform without actually being in
the system and without the agreement of the zu 'ama would be a waste of time.
Therefore, it was essential for al-Sack first to build himself a place in the system, which
he did by creating the SISC. Once in the system, the ability to manoeuvre towards a
wider objective would become more feasible.
In 1974 al-Sack's demands formed part of the programme of a social movement which he
was seeking to establish with the help of intellectuals from the various communities. As it
was his habit to prepare public opinion in advance, al-Sack gradually talked about the
need for a non-sectarian movement to represent the demands of deprived Lebanese. He
accompanied his words with action. His call for reform in Lebanon attracted a wide circle
of intellectuals who found that his demands summarised their aspirations.
1 Interview, Shaikh Malunud Farahat, London, winter, 1992.
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This policy would appear contradictory only to those who were totally committed
either to sectarianism or to secularism. It was difficult in times of crisis to understand the
possibility of reaching a compromise between the two concepts. In a society such as
Lebanon where a sense of national consensus is virtually non-existent, favouring one
concept would further aggravate tensions between the different communities.
His approach could be characterised as "step-by-step" policy to achieve his objectives.
The Soviet Union's policy towards the Egyptian Communist Party is an example of this
kind of approach. Despite the oppression the Communist Party had faced under Nasser,
the Soviet Union never ceased to support him. This was not a policy of double-standard
but rather a profound understanding of the nature of Egyptian society which Soviet
Union judged was not yet ready for radical change.
Hence al-Sadr considered that the first vital step was to establish a Shiite body to enable
the Shilte community to be considered on a par with the others. His call to abolish
sectarianism reached its height in 1974 when he formed and presided over a committee
composed of seven well known members belonging to different communities.' As a
member of this committee, Basim al-Tisr2 described why its members were encouraged
to join al-Sadr in his efforts. They believed that al-Sadr was seeking a reform movement
working for social and economic justice without throwing the country into revolution,
The members were Patriarch Yuwakim Mubarak, Michele Asmar, Fuad Bustani, Mann
Hamadeh, Pierre Hilu, Jubran Hailc, and Basim al-Jisr.
2 Interview, Basim al-Jisr, Oxford, summer, 1994.
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based on national rather than sectarian objectives. For this reason, as al-Jisr explained, al-
Sadr was viewed as a national leader rather than the leader of the Shi'ite community. al-
Jisr also described al-Sack as being open to all communities and ready to engage in
dialogue with whoever could help him achieve an acceptable political formula. He
indicated that al-Sadr in fact supported coexistence, as he never hesitated to preach and
pray in churches and monasteries, an activity which had previously been unheard of
When asked to elaborate on this issue, al-Jisr stated that he had visited France in 1974
along with al-Sack and Patriarch Mubarak. While they were visiting Jouras Monastery in
Yvelines, the time for prayer arrived and al-Sack prepared himself and conducted a prayer
within the monastery itself
al-Sack used to meet with this committee twice a month in order to formulate its
demands. On 17 March 1974 his demands received their widest level of support when he
announced the establishment of the Harakat al-Mahrumin during a mass rally in Balbek.
The charter of the movement contained seven principles.' Although the movement was
almost entirely composed of Shiites, it was not a confessional one in that it did not seek
to promote the ideology or interests of a religious confession as such. Leading Christian
Maronite intellectuals such as Michael Asmar and Albert Mansur also joined the
movement.2
The movement's principles are stated in Norton, Amal and The ..., pp. 144-166.
2 Interview, Shaikh Mahmud Farahat, London, winter, 1992.
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As the Shiites were the majority in the movement, al-Sadr was accused of enhancing
sectarian divisions. However, on 19 November, 190 intellectuals from various religious
communities signed a proclamation of support for the movement which was described as
"a movement that reaches beyond the Shi'ite community". ' Patriarch Khuraysh
considered al-Sadr the bearer of the banner of defending the south and considered the
SISC a haven for all Lebanese.2
The direct reasons behind the calling of the mass rally in Ba'lbek varied The occasion
was not only to announce the establishment of Harakat al-Mahrumin, but also because of
the rejection by the regime of the demands for full Shi'ite rights which al-Sadr had put
forward on 11 February. However, Shaikh Mahmud Farahat 3 gave a different reason for
al-Sadr's having organised the rally: al-Sadr met with President Sulaiman Franjiyya and
discussed the position of Director-General at the Ministry of Justice which was left
vacant by the retirement of the Sunni Director-General Hisham Qabalan. al-Sadr asked
Franjiyya to fill this vacancy with a Shiite but Franjiyya refused until he had consulted
Kamil al-As'ad. This deeply angered al-Sadr, who then called for the mass rally.
However, the real reasons were that on the one hand the regime had totally ignored all
the Shi'ite demands advocated by SISC, and on the other hand that it continued to
support the traditional Shiite zu 'ama represented by al-As'ad, identifying the interests of
the entire community with al-As'ad's own interests, apart from the fact that relations
Sicking and Khairallah, op.cit, p. 102.
2 al-Nahar, 30 March 1975.
3 Interview, Shaikh Malunud Farahat, London, winter, 1992.
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between al-Sadr and al-As' ad were rapidly deteriorating. The reasons why Franjiyya and
al-As'ad co-operated to such an extent are obvious, going back to their efforts to
undermine Shihabism between 1958 and Franjiyya's election to the Presidency in 1970.
The rally at Ba'lbek which coincided with the commemoration of the martyrdom of
Imam Husain was unprecedented in the history of Lebanon, as it was the first time that
75,000 people gathered. In addition, al-Sadr appeared stronger than ever as nearly 10,000
of them were armed. At this rally he declared:
I shall fight until there remains not one of you oppressed, whether Shiite
or not, and until every inch of lands is fully exploited.'
Ghassan Twaini2 described the rally of Ba'lbek as:
... a revolution on the part of a sect, but it was not a sectarian revolution
... the Shiite community was not interested in governing the country, but it
did not want to be ruled by unjust government. The Shiite revolution is
not sectarian because it is not directed against another community but
against the govemment.3
Nearly two weeks later on 5 April al-Sadr continued to put pressure on the government
when he was invited by Ma'ruf Sa'd4 to preach in the 'Umari mosque in Sidon on the
occasion of the Prophet's birthday. Sidon at that time was experiencing strained relations
with the state which made al-Sadr's call for unity against the government more easily
acceptable. He made it clear to his audience that men of religion are on the right path
when they face the wrath of the rulers. He asked them to stand on the side of the
al-Nahar, 18 March 1974.
2 a Christian editor of al-Nahar and a former ambassador.
3 al-Nahar, 18 March, 1974.
4 Ma'nd Sa'd was a deputy and a prominent leaders in Saida.
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wretched of the earth. He also made his famous remark "Weapons are the adornments of
men". This was interpreted by his opponents as meaning that al-Sadr was advocating the
use of weapons against the state. In fact, he meant using weapons to deter Israeli
attacks in the south rather than against Lebanese people. His attitude was shown clearly
during the civil war in 1975. After he finished his speech the Sunni clerics expressed their
support and emphasised the essential unity of Muslims Shaikh Fahim Abu 'Ubayh the
representative of al-Azhar in Lebanon expressed this best when he said:
The black turban of Sayyid al-Sadr and my white turban are but like the
black and the white of the eye, the one integrated with the other, the one
complementing the other. We are all the followers of Muhammad; there is
no difference between one doctrine and another.'
This was the first time that a Shiite cleric in Lebanon was received with such enthusiasm
by a Sunni crowd. The rally in Sidon represented a triumph for al-Sadr's efforts to strike
a balance between the need for an independent Shiite voice in the country and the
importance of overall Lebanese solidarity. Patriarch Khuraysh's support for Harakat al-
Mahrumin was completed by Sunni recognition. On 10 September, support for al-Sadr
was even further enhanced when the Executive Committee of the Islamic Association,
together with a group of six major Sunni organisations in the country, presented the
government with a list of Muslim demands that included the Shi'ite demands as
formulated by the SISC.2
al-Nahar, 4 April, 1994.
2 Halawi, op.cit, p. 190.
211
Chapter 6 	  Shi'ite Transformation
A month later, at a celebration for the Prophet's daughter Fatima, al-Sadr called for
another mass rally in Tyre. Nearly 100,000 people attended and the presence of weapons
was evident. During this rally al-Sack threatened to hold the next rally in Beirut itself if
the demands were not met.
These activities came to a head in late 1974. A political programme was on its way to
fruition but, due to the worsening of events in the country it never materialised. Basim al-
Jisr says that al-Sack continued meeting with the committee members and all agreed on
the programme which they were hoping to announce in Damascus.' The reason for
choosing Damascus was that a Lebanese activity week was to be held there in 1975. al-
Jisr himself was to read out the programme that the committee believed would suit
Lebanon, in which political and social reforms were the major issues. However, the
assassination of Ma'ruf Sa'd in Sidon on 26 February 1975 meant that the activity week
was cancelled.
The assassination of Ma'ruf Sa'd was one of the major sparks igniting the Lebanese civil
war which began on 13 April. The civil war put an end to al-Sad?s efforts to achieve
reform as the voice of reason was no match to the sound of cannons. Due to the civil
war, his main concern became to preserve the integrity of Lebanon and the coexistence
of its communities.
I Interview , Basim al-Jisr, Oxford, summer, 1994.
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3. Beginning of the decline
Although al-Sadr's fame reached its height in late 1974 when he received support from
various communities for his social reform programme presented under the Harakat al-
Mahrumin, two main factors caused his reputation to decline rapidly: the outbreak of the
civil war and the creation of Amal. As we have seen al-Sadr's popularity was based on
the peacefitl transformation of the Lebanese political community. But with the beginning
of the civil war, such an approach did not stand a chance. Hence, a new approach was
needed in order to cope with the warring factions.
3.1 The civil war
The dominant forces in the civil war were those of the Right which wanted to maintain
Maronite supremacy over Lebanon, and those of the Left which wanted to secularise the
political system. al-Sadr was not sympathetic to either. It was essential for him not to side
with any faction as this would undermine and perhaps even terminate his reform
programme.
In the circumstances all he could do was to condemn fighting between Lebanese, and
instead advocate fighting against Israel. He engaged in strenuous efforts to convince the
conflicting parties to control the situation and he started this process with the leftists and
the Palestinians. On 16 April 1975 he called intellectuals from various communities to a
meeting in the SISC to maintain bridges between them, including Hani al-Hasan from the
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Palestinian side. As a result, the Committee of National Reconciliation was founded. Its
main objective was to maintain good relations between the Palestinians and the Lebanese
authorities, and between the various Lebanese communities.
But on 26 April these efforts were disrupted when Kamal Junblat announced that Katalb
Party, the largest Maronite party, should be isolated politically, a call which escalated
the tension rather than controlling it. These two contradictory stands of Junblat and al-
Sadr aggravated the relationship between them, as we shall see in the next chapter.
On 27 June while the situation was worsening, al-Sadr took sanctuary in al-Safa
Mosque of al-'Amiliyya College in Beirut. He began a fast as a gesture of protest against
the increasing violence in the country.' His fast lasted for nearly a week where he
constantly stated:
Non-violence is our way and our answer. Let anyone who comes to us
with arms depart from us. I will not wield a sword. Our weapons are the
words of God.2
During his fast in al-Safa mosque a stream of visitors came to show support. Among
the visitors were the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, PLO, leader Yasir 'Arafat and
the Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam. The latter promised that a National
Unity Cabinet would be established in order to restore security in the country. As a result,
al-Sadr ended his fast. However, the tension did not cease but spread to various parts of
the country. al-Sadr set out for the Biqa' Valley in order to end a Muslim-Progressive
al-Anwar, 28 June, 1975.
2 rbid.
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siege of some Christian villages. He excoriated the besiegers and reminded his followers
that "every bullet fired at al-Qa'a, Dayr al-Ahmar or Shelifa [all are Christian populated
areas] is fired at my house and my pulpit".' He also visited the church in al-Qa'a
accompanied by the Roman Catholic archbishop Ilias al-Zughbi, Father Fransis Thamina,
Shaikh 'Abd al-Amir Qabalan and Shaikh Muhammad Ya'qub. Later, this gesture was
criticised by the Left who said "the turban and the pulpit have nothing to offer the
revolution".2
His peaceful approach was not considered relevant for Muslim-progressive factions, and
the south remained exposed to Israeli aggression. al-Sadr's major concern was the south
which eventually dictated his relations with the progressives. He was eventually left with
no other alternative but to create a militia to take on the responsibility of defending the
south. In 1975 the Amal militia was founded.
3.2 Amal and mobilisation of the Shi'ites
The existence of Amal came to light on 6 July 1975 when an anti-personnel land mine at
a secret training camp at 'Ayn Bunaya in the Biqa' exploded killing 26 commandos along
with their PLO instructor, and wounding 43 others. al-Sadr had no choice but to
announce somewhat prematurely the birth of Lebanon's newest militia . AmaL 3 It seems
al-Nahar, 5 July 1975.
2 Adil Rida, Ma' al-Itizar Ii! Imam Musa al-Sadr, Dar al-Hawra, Beirut, p. 135.
3 al-Nahar, 7 July 1975.
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ironic that at the time, he was in the midst of a hunger strike at al-Safi mosque
protesting against the proliferation of armed militias in the country.
This declaration resulted in the Shi'ite community once again being exposed to
manipulation. The leader of the Kata'ib Party, Pierre Gemayel regarded Amars links
with the Palestinians as a challenge and a provocation. Gemayers attitude towards Amal
contributed to al-Sadr's decreasing popularity among the Christians. On the other hand,
Kamal Junblat found in the dispute between Gemayel and Amal an opportunity to drive a
wedge between the Maronite and the Shiite communities.
Regardless of the immediate and long term factors which paved the way for Amal, its
formation lost al-Sadr much credibility among his non-Shiite supporters. With Amal he
laid down the basis for mobilisation of the Shiite community. At first, Amal sided with
the forces of the Lebanese National Movement, LNM, which was headed by Kamal
Junblat, but later it departed and adopted a distinctive political trend apart from that of
the LNM. al-Sadr departure caused antagonism between the two (al-Sack's political
involvement during the war will be discussed in the next chapter).What concerns us here
is to discuss the reasons why al-Sack established Amal rather than its activities during
the civil war.
Amal was established simply to defend the south against Israeli attacks and to gather the
Shiites under one leadership rather than being left to others to mobilise. Consequently,
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Amal represented the end of Harakat al-Mahnimin, because its social programme had to
be abandoned when the civil war began. However, as the war progressed people referred
to them as a single entity and both names were used interchangeably, probably because
they were established by the same person. In addition, the social programme outlined in
the charter of Harakat al-Mahrumin became essential part of Amal.
As shown above, the fundamental reasons for the creation of Amal were the collapse of
the authority of the state when the civil war started, the continuous Israeli attacks, and
increasing demands from within the Shiite community. Prior to the civil war it was easy
to refer to the authorities and demand protection of the southern frontiers with Israel
But the situation changed entirely when an opposition faction which was part of the
progressive forces eliminated all signs of the state's authority particularly when the
Palestinians joined it.
Basim al-Jisr confirmed that Shiltes urged al-Sadr to do something to stop the leftist and
the Palestinians from conscripting their sons, and also urged him to do something to
prevent the Israeli attacks.' These demands were enhanced by al-Sack's Iranian associate
Mustafa Chamran. 2 A group of Iranian opponents of the Shah's regime found refuge in
Lebanon where they co-operated with al-Sack. Chamran was working in the south of
Lebanon setting up a polytechnic near Tyre. He was disturbed by the increased
'Interview, Basim al-Jisr, Oxford, summer, 1994.
2 Mustafa Chamran was an American trained engineer and an Iranian by birth. He became the
director of the Burj al-Shamali Technical Institute in the south until 1979, when he departed for Iran to
become chairman of the Supreme Defence Council in the new Islamic Republic.
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Palestinian influence in the south as the Palestinians began to abuse Shiite hospitality and
to seize private property.
In the mid-1970s Chamran reported to al-Sadr the growing resentment over the
Palestinian presence in the south. He informed al-Sadr about the need to arm the Shrites,
'We'll have to arm. If we don't fight the Palestinians we'll certainly have to fight the
Israelis. It's inevitable". al-Sadr reply was straight forward "You know I don't want it to
come to that. It's not the way." Chamran was influenced by Imam Khumaini's teachings
which were out of harmony with al-Sadr's non-violence. On 21 March 1975 al-Sadr's
opinion was to change, after Israel had struck hard and destroyed Kafr Shuba village in
the south. In the village he laid down the foundation of a new house and then declared:
"This is the land of your fathers and grandfathers and here you must remain Migrating to
Beirut is extremely dangerous."2 It was then that he began advocating the use of arms:
"military training has become a duty."3 Amal was founded straight after this Israeli attack
but it remained secret for several months until the explosion. This is because al-Sadr
knew that announcing the formation of Amal would certainly undermine his popularity in
the country.
In order to assure his commitment to non-violence he declared:
... weapons are things to be used against the enemy, not against civilians,
friends and brothers. As we see, the Israeli enemy roams freely, doing as it
Carole Jerome, The Man in the Mirror, Biddies ltd, London, 1987, p. 81.
2 Daily Star, 22 March 1975.
3 al-Nahar, 26 March 1975.
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pleases in the south .... The enemy kills, blows up, and takes prisoners; and
no one responds. For years we have demanded that the south be defended.
When the Lebanese government abandoned its duty to defend the south,
we said, Why are we waiting for the Israelis to occupy our land? we
formed resistance groups to retake the occupied land in southern Lebanon.
It is better to prepare now, to bear arms and fight off the Israeli invader
before dangers come to a head.'
He issued this statement when he left for the Christian village of al-Qa'a in order to end
the siege. However, he considered that relations with the Palestinians should always
remain strong, and ensured this by co-operating with 'Arafat and the moderate factions
within the PLO which offered arms and training to Amal. Good relations between the two
lasted for a while and as a sign of this the PLO considered Amars martyrs as its own.2
However, the deterioration of the war situation and the changing interests and alliances of
the warring factions caused the termination of these relations, as will be discussed in the
next chapter.
As we have seen, the Shiite community had no choice but act to protect its own
interests. This happened despite continuous efforts on al-Sack's part to promote co-
operation with other communities through SISC and Harakat 1-Mahrumin The beginning
of the civil war made al-Sad?s peaceful approach redundant. Sectarian allegiance
intensified. In such an atmosphere, and with the absence of any Shiite political
movement they could turn to, the Shiites were drawn into the war by joining various
al-Nahar, 7 July 1975.
2 Ibid.
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existing militias. This amounted to mobilisation by the Left, and in the circumstances
could only be prevented by forming a Shi'ite militia.
Eventually, a1-Sadr's peaceful approach could not survive the civil war as each
community had its own objectives which differed from the other. Each one was
concerned how to advance its priorities. The civil war proved to be too difficult for one
person to tackle particularly when non-Lebanese forces intervened. Under such
circumstances al-Sadr had to depart from his pursuit of broad national objectives to
concentrate on the interest of the Shiite community. Amal signalled the real mobilisation
of the Shiites and this progress increased dramatically in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The following chapter will discuss al-Sadr's political involvement during the civil war
which began in 1975. During the war Lebanese integrity was at stake which prompted al-
Sadr to challenge almost every attempt to coexistence between the various communities,
and also to challenge those who used violence as a means of change. His political
involvement was vigorously challenged by traditional zu'ama who feared loss of power
to al-Sadr and also by leftist groups and their Palestinian allies.
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Setting Priorities:
al-Sadr's Attitudes Towards Lebanese Nationalism
and Palestinian Aspirations
In 1975 the Lebanese civil war developed to a point at which Lebanon's integrity became
endangered. This al-Sadr could not accept, since he was aware that the Shiite community
would not be able to establish an identity without preserving the Lebanese political
system. There were two principal opposing political view points during the war. One
sought the maintenance of Lebanon's existing political system and of Maronite
supremacy in the hand of the Kata'ib Party and its allies. The other sought to change the
Lebanese system to a socialist-secular one, a viewpoint held by Kamal Junblat and his
allies including the Palestinians.
In this situation al-Sadr was forced to become heavily involved in politics particularly
because the traditional Shiite zu'ama played very little part in these events. However,
the adoption of either one of these two political positions would dramatically undermine
his credibility in the country. His political line was two-fold: both to preserve the
Lebanese system, and to advocate social reform at all levels. In addition, he tried to reach
an acceptable solution for the Palestinian issue in Lebanon without throwing the country
into revolution.
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This chapter will deal with two main issues: first al-Sadr's attitude towards the traditional
Shiite zu'ama to show how he came to reflect the interests of the Shiite community. The
case of Kamil al-As'ad will be discussed because his family was the most influential in the
south. Secondly, being in the camp dominated by Junblat and the Palestinians, al-Sadr's
changing relations with them will be accounted for particularly when Lebanon's integrity
was at stake. In addition, a new group of Shiite 'ulama emerged and rejected al-Sad?s
peaceful approach. They allied with the Left, from which they received support in order
to counter al-Sadr. The case of Sayyid Hani Fahas will be discussed.
1. Fading power of the zu'ama
What concerns us here is the south, where the real suffering of the Shiite community was
increasing due to the military escalation. In the south it was al-As'ad who had supremacy
among the zu 'ama. The strength of this family was apparent during parliamentary
elections. They used to organise the electoral lists for the constituencies in the south:
Nabatiyya, Tyre, Bint Jubail and Marj'ayun. al-Zahrani was the only constituency which
was not under their control because it was 'Usayran's domain and only one Shiite
candidate could be elected there. In the late 1950s and 1960s the al-As'ads' capacity to
impose their candidates in Nabatiyya could only be done through compromise either with
al-Zain of Nabatiyya or 'Usayran who had considerable influence in the town. Overall,
the strength and weaknesses of these families were affected by their allegiance to the
various Lebanese presidents. This was apparent during the 1957 parliamentary elections,
when Chamoun made sure that Ahmad al-As'ad was not elected to the parliament and
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that the al-Khalil and `Usayran families gained more power. During the 1970s, due to the
activities of al-Sadr, Kamil al-As'ad's authority was seriously challenged.
1.1 al-Sadr and al-As'ad's struggle over the south
The al-As'ad family lost its supremacy gradually, over a number of years, and more
rapidly whenever the Shiite community was facing crisis. During his initial four years in
Lebanon, al-Sadr did not become directly involved in politics but was engaged in
promoting social welfare institutions. Whereas initially, almost all the traditional zu'ama
had welcomed his arrival in Lebanon, later things began to change. Signs of tension began
first with the 'ulama rather than the zu'ama, as has been shown in the case of Shaikh
Mughniyya in Chapter Five. However, al-Sadr attributed the misery of the Shi'ite
community first and foremost to negligence of their own zu'ama, and concluded that if
things were to improve the existing leadership must be changed. Tension with the zu'ama
began in 1964. al-Sadr challenged the supremacy of the most influential za'im, Kamil al-
As'ad, by refusing to vote for his candidates in that year's parliamentary elections in
Tyre. Although this was little more than a token gesture, and all al-As'ad's candidates
won the elections, al-Sadr's action nevertheless signalled the beginning of a strained
relationship between the two.'
The popularity that al-Sack achieved in his early residence in Lebanon helped him to a
great extent when he initiated the SISC. He was also helped by the power struggle
'Muhammad Safiy al-Din, al-Shira'a, 12 October, 1987, p.34. The electoral list for Tyre was
composed of Muhammad Safiy al-Din, Ja lfar Sharaf al-Din and 'Ali 'Arab.
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between the Shiite zu'ama. Originally, al-As'ad was in favour of establishing a Shiite
Council, unlike Sabri Hamadeh. According to al-As'ad, 1 Hamadeh did not want clerics
to become involved in politics because one day they might compete with the zu'ama. In
the 1970s attitudes changed as Hamadeh became a supporter of al-Sadr while al-As'ad
became his main opponent.
al-Sadr and al-As'ad tried to undermine each other's authority whenever the opportunity
arose. In 1970, al-Sadr supported Malimud 'Ammar against al-As'ad for the position of
Speaker of Parliament, although this did not succeed and al-As'ad was elected. The
successful strike that al-Sadr called for, also in 1970, after the migration of nearly 50,000
people from the south led the government to establish Majlis al-Janub. Although the
demonstrators showed their contempt for the Shi'ite zu'ama al-Sad?s success was not
complete, largely because Majlis al-Janub was directly linked with the Prime Minister's
office, which appointed officials from within the misting bureaucracy. The presidency of
the council was given to the Minister of Planning, Maurice al-Gemayel, who was partly
to blame for the inefficiency in the south. 2 This was despite al-Sad?s continuous demands
that "honest people" should run Majlis al-Janub. 3 To satisfy him one of his supporters,
1 Kamil	 al-Shira'a, 9 September 1991, Beirut, p. 20.
2 The Council of the South was composed of Maurice al-Gemayel, President; Sulaiman al-Zain,
Deputy President; Khalid Junblat, representative of the Ministry of Defence; Labib Ghelmiyya, member;
Robert Karam, member; Ghassan Qansu, member; John Debbanah, member; and Muhammad Shi'aitu,
Director General. al-Hayai, 3,4 June, 1975.
3 al-Hayat, 2 June 1970. al-Jamhur Mapzine, 4 June 1970.
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Muhammad Shi'aitu, was appointed director general of the Majlis, but he was removed
from office four years later and an As'adi, Hasan Farahat, was appointed to replace him.'
It was natural that a state organisation such as Majlis al-Janub should become an
instrument of those who collaborated closely with the government, particularly al-As'ad.
The more the tensions grew between al-Sadr and the government, the more al-As'ad
tightened his grip on Majlis al-Janub, and he tried to undermine al-Sad?s popularity
within the community by offering services and favours.
In turn, al-As'ad tried to undermine al-Sad?s increasing popularity in the SISC. On 11
November 1969, some Shiite deputies met with al-As'ad to discuss a draft law in order to
oppose changes in the regulations of SISC, most notably the extension of the tenure of
President of SISC from six years to life or until the age of 65. On 14 December 1973,
al-Sadr demanded that al-As'ad should withdraw the draft law because it was invalid as
the SISC was not consulted when it was presented.2
On 9 March 1974, Shaikh 'Abd al-Hamid al-Hur, President of the Ja'fari Tribunal, led
35 dissatisfied 'ulama who opposed al-Sadr, and called upon al-As'ad to maintain the
clause referring to the six-year term for the president of SISC. To counter this, al-Sadr
offered his resignation as President of the SISC, but it was rejected by the assembly. In
fact, he was given a vote of confidence which was consolidated when the Executive
I Interview , Mahmud Farahat, London, winter, 1992.
2 Sicldng 8c Khairallah, op.cit, p.99.
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Committee of the SISC decided that its regulations could only be changed by a vote of
the General Assembly without recourse to Parliament.'
On 29 March 1974, al-Sadr strengthened his position as the General Assembly extended
his presidency of the SISC until he was 65 years old. By then, many of the traditional
Shiite zu'ama who had been wary of him in the beginning had changed position and
became supportive. This was apparent with Hamadeh who called for an immediate vote
on the issue. al-Sadr was also supported by al-Husaini, 'Usayran, and al-Zain. On the
other side, al-As'ad proved, as al-Sadr predicted, to be the strongest of those who
opposed him all the way. al-As'ad and his bloc did not attend this meeting as a sign of
their rejection of the change.2
The differences between the two were beyond reconciliation especially when al-As'ad
began to launch a stream of accusations at al-Sadr through the media.
Sayyid Musa's strength does not come from his position as a man of
religion; it is unimportant whether he wears the turban or not. His strength
comes from the contributions by expatriates and the money that the state
accords the SISC, which he spends to buy men's support. There is more
than one question mark concerning the plan being executed by al-Sack and
the persons behind him here and abroad, and the dimensions of this plan,
both in Lebanon and abroad.3
'Ibid., p. 102.
2 al-Nahar, 30 March 1975.
3 Katnil	 al-Hawadith, issue 947, 3 January 1975.
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One of al-As'ad's closest friends Riyad Taha l criticised him for these accusations and
stated that he could not prove any of his charges. Re-stating the reasons for the increase
in al-Sack's popularity within the Shiite community while al-As'ad's was in decline, Taha
advised al-As'ad to stop his unnecessary and one sided enmity and to follow al-Sack
because the people had already done so.2
al-As'ad and his bloc attempted to use the situation in the south to advance their
opposition against al-Sack. When the government did not comply with al-Sack's demands
of 22 June 1973,3 al-As'ad's spokesman Hamid Dakrub formulated the bloc's demands
vis-Ci-vis al-Sack's, demanding that the government should hasten to give the necessary
funds to the Litani Project,4 to allocate at least five percent of the national budget to
projects of economic and social improvement in the south, and should give due
recognition to Shiites in the distribution of public posts. Dakrub threatened that if these
demands were not met al-As'ad's bloc would withdraw their representatives from the
government. This attempt was premature and ineffective in comparison with al-Sack's
demands and was widely criticised:
it was a question of 'catching the train'. Speaker al-As'ad felt his loss of
speed, after the campaign launched by Imam al-Sack more than four
1 Riyad Taha was Head of Lebanese Journalists.
2 Riyad Taha, al-Hawadith, issue 950, 24 January 1975.
3 al-Arida, 11 December, 1973.
4 The Litani project was supposed to improve irrigation, electricity and drinking water in the
south. In 1947 Ahmad al-As'ad stressed the importance of the project to Bishara al-Khuri, but the
president's view was that it did not entail improvements in services but would "upset" the sectarian
formula of the country. This comment by President Khuri made the Litani project a political rather than a
social issue. al-Hay at, 22 May 1965.
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months before for the defence of Shia rights, a campaign which the al-
As'adists refused to answer.'
al-As'ad desperation to regain his lost popularity became apparent when his followers
physically attacked the deputy Husain al-Husaini and Shaikh 'Abd al-Amir Qabalan for
their public support of al-Sadr.
On 12 December 1974, al-Sadr managed to defeat al-As'ad's candidate in the
Parliamentary by-election in Nabatiyya for the first time. As usual al-As'ad nominated his
candidate, Kamil 'Ali Ahmad, to replace the deceased deputy Fahmi Shahin. al-Sadr did
not directly nominate a candidate but organised a political and social programme and
asked candidates to adopt it. He urged people not to base their decision when choosing a
candidate on kinship ties, patronage or personal likes and dislikes but to what they can
offer to their people. One of the candidates, Rafiq Shahin, adopted al-Sadr's programme
and as a result won the by-election by a two-to-one majority.
This tense but peaceful transfer of power from al-As'ad to al-Sadr was disrupted by the
start of the civil war, which Left al-Sack in a position where he was unable to demand
anything but preservation of the unity of the country.
Sicking & Khairallah, op.cit. pp. 113-114.
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2. al-Sadr's political stands during the civil war
al-Sack's political stands concentrated on three levels: the Palestinian issue, the integrity
of Lebanon, and countering leftist activities. The Palestinian issue was a major concern
for him during the civil war, especially as the military base of the Palestinian resistance
was in the Shiite-dominated south of Lebanon. This made him very wary of how to
approach the issue, mainly because both the Palestinians and the Shiites felt some sort
of allegiance to one another, and began to unite their organisations together with those of
the leftists in order to advocate social and political equality. Moreover, until the mid
1970s the Shiites lacked a movement which would lead them and to translate their
numerical strength into community power, and hence appeared susceptible to Palestinian
influence. This lack of focus forced al-Sack to organize them under the auspices of AmaL
With the beginning of the Israeli attacks and the transfer of the Palestinian leadership to
Lebanon, the south had entered a new era, and the military escalation had subjected the
Shiites to tremendous suffering. For a while, the close Palestinian-Shiite relationship and
the threats of Israel were sufficient to make al-Sack a strong supporter of the Palestinian
cause, although this relationship underwent considerable strains for a variety of reasons.
In particular, the Shiites gradually became disillusioned with the Palestinians' continuing
disregard of Shi'ite's welfare affairs, al-Sack's relations with them suffered due to
Palestinian support for Junblat and the leftist parties, contrary to his advice not to
become involved in Lebanese politics. Further, al-Sack's support for the Syrian effort to
229
Chapter 7 	
 Lebanese Nationalism
end the civil war and to preserve the Lebanese system was naturally rejected by the
leftists. Other factors contributed to increasing antagonism between the two, such as the
Libyan support for the progressive parties, and the challenge to al-Sack by some Shfite
'ulama who supported the activities of the Left in general
2.1 The integrity of Lebanon and al-Sadr's support for the Palestinians
al-Sad?s efforts to promote his community to a status equal to that of the other main
Lebanese communities would not have become feasible without complete allegiance to
the state. That is to say, that he believed that national solidarity should come first. When
he first arrived in Lebanon in 1960 he found his community very much drawn towards
pan-Arab nationalism rather than to Lebanese nationalism. This increased after the 1967
war as the Shfites joined Palestinian organisations in great numbers. Shiite support for
the Palestinians went through four different stages. The first stage was characterised by
full support from the Shiite grass-roots, especially when Fatah was established.
Subsequently, this support began to decline after 1970 because the Shiites felt the heavy
burden they had to put up with, being caught in the cross fire between the Palestinians
and Israel. Thirdly, there was a serious decline in 1975 when the civil war began,
particularly because of the increasing intensity of Israeli reprisals and the increasing
Palestinian disregard of the welfare of the Shiites. The final break with the Palestinians
came in 1976 when al-Sack sided with the Syrian initiatives which aimed at preserving the
unity of Lebanon and its system; his commitment to preserving the unity of Lebanon
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was strengthened further when the leftist forces failed to face up to the Israeli invasion in
1978.1
To begin with, the Arabs needed sometime to raise their morale after the defeat and
humiliation they had suffered in 1967. The establishment of the PLO was therefore
received with great enthusiasm in the Arab world. Pro-Palestinian sentiment among the
Shiites was high, and al-Sadr never tried to oppose it. On the contrary, as a spiritual
leader of the community, he lent unconditional support to the Palestinians, and considered
their cause morally binding on all Arabs and Muslims
His attitudes towards the Palestinians were affected not only by the general feeling of the
community but also by the feeling of the Shi iite religious leadership in the world, as
represented by Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim in Najaf. In 1968 Sayyid al-Hakim issued a
fatwa in support of Fatah stating that it was wajib, a duty, incumbent upon all Muslims,
to join them in their struggle as long as this support did not cause more damage than
benefit to the Muslims in generaL2
On 17 December 1968, during Ramadan, al-Sadr organised a gathering in support of
Fatah at the Beirut International Hote1. 3 He advocated the need to work collectively in
order to support the legitimate Palestinian resistance in their struggle to liberate their
'David Owen, 'Lebanon Inflame', in J. Pimlott, (ed.), Middle East Conflict from 1945 to the
present, Orbis Publishing, London, 1983, p. 115.
2 Fatwa al- Imam al-Halcim fi dam Fatah, al-Mawsim, issue 18, 1994, p. 193.
3 al-Hayat, 17 December 1968.
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land. In this party he managed to collect LL. 90,000 1 in donations for the resistance. He
considered that the main danger came from Israel and that it was important to face up to
it by all means available. This attitude towards Israel became even more firmly
established when Israel began to look at Lebanon as its next target. On 14 June 1968,
Israel shelled the southern Lebanese village of Mays al-Jabal and nine days after al-
Sadr's gathering, Israeli commandos attacked Beirut airport and destroyed thirteen
ATEA aeroplanes on the ground.
The Shi'ites continued to give strong support to the Palestinians throughout 1968,
although this was disrupted when clashes between the Palestinians and the Lebanese army
began. In April 1969 a series of armed conflicts occurred, first near the village of Kafar
Kila in the south, and subsequently in other parts of the country. As a result, a wave of
pro-Palestinian sentiment triggered off a number of demonstrations in the cities of
Lebanon. Therefore, the Palestinian issue became a major element in Lebanese politics,
causing friction among the main political figures. Supporters of the Palestinians were led
by Kamal Junblat who did not hesitate to attack the government on every possible
occasion. He emerged as the champion of the Palestinians which gained him great
popularity among them, and among the Shiites and the pan-Arabists in general. The
faction against establishing a strong Palestinian presence in the country was led by Pierre
Gemayel and Camille Chamoun.
'One US Dollar was then equal to three Lebanese pounds.
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On 3 November 1969, the tension between the Palestinians and the Lebanese authorities
was halted temporarily by the Cairo Agreement. While the conflicting parties
concentrated either on re-establishing the authority of the state in the country as a
whole, or on lending unconditional support to the Palestinians, the real danger facing the
people of the south was never mentioned.
Politically, al-Sadr was in no position to play a MA* part in these events and &lie could
do was to adopt a moderate line. `Adil Malik interviewed him after a series of serious
clashes between the Lebanese army and the Palestinians, which had led to great friction
between Lebanese Muslims and Christians. He explained that the feeling of the Muslims
of being second class citizens was a major factor that increased Muslim's antagonism
towards the Christians. al-Sadr also added that the formula of "No vanquished, no
victor" between Muslims and Christians which had dominated Lebanese politics was no
longer appropriate.' He explained that this formula might work between two enemies
that each pose a threat to the other. He continued: "in order to build a nation, trust
between the citizens should be the major element, not winning or losing".
It was not only that al-Sadr could not ease the increasing tension between the leftist and
the rightist but also had to confront the champion of the Palestinians and the leaders of
the Progressive parties, Kamal Junblat, over mobilisation of the Shi'ites.
al-farida, 21 June 1969.
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2.2 al-Sadr-Junblat relationships and the integrity of Lebanon
The Israeli attack on south Lebanon on 12 May 1970 caused heavy destruction and led to
the migration of 50,000 people. Despite this tragedy, al-Sadr did not point to a single
cause for these events. On 26 May, he was invited to the American University where he
attacked the authorities for their indifference towards the south, and at the same time he
condemned the Palestinians for launching rockets across the border.' For the first time al-
Sadr mentioned Palestinian misconduct, but, as he noted 'Palestinian misconduct does
not require capital punishment". 2 He also called for co-ordination between the
Palestinians and the Lebanese government in order to spare the south the disastrous
results of their misunderstandings.
Alienation of the Shi'ites continued due to neglect of their affairs by radical Palestinian
groups, and from 1970 onward because of the Palestinians' continued refusal to accept
that it was legitimate for the Lebanese to be concerned about their security vis4vis
Israel In order to ease the situation in the south, negotiations took place on 30 May 1972
between the Prime Minister, Sa'ib Salam, and Yasir 'Arafat, in which they agreed that the
Palestinians would freeze all operations against Israel from Lebanon. However, the more
radical leaders such as fibril and Habash failed to give Salam the same commitment.3
al-Nahar, 27 May 1970.
2 al-Muharrir, 20 April 1971.
3 Goria, op.cit, p. 137.
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Radical Lebanese groups played a major role in deepening the rift between al-Sadr and
the Palestinians. They were dissatisfied with the Lebanese system and they anticipated
that the time had come to change it. Their point of view coincided with that of Junblat
who continued to demand change to a secular system. In addition, the mobilisation of the
Shiites contributed to deepening the antagonism between Junblat and al-Sadr. Junblat
assured the Shi'ites that justice in the country could only come about by changing the
sectarian system, while al-Sadr warned that changing the system would divide the country
and produce a situation where there would be no winners but only losers. Therefore, he
advocated dialogue and called for preservation of the unity of the country. Later on,
various issues increased the enmity between the two men, such as their attitudes towards
religion and towards Syrian involvement in Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Israel continued its aggression and launched a series of attacks in the south,
notably on 16 September 1972. Israeli forces stayed on Lebanese soil for two days in
revenge for the Palestinian attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games. This
time the Lebanese army attempted to stand firm against the advancing Israeli forces but
was no match for them. However, al-Sadr praised the Lebanese army as he saw that the
authorities were at last taking responsibility for the frontiers. He appealed to both the
authorities and the Palestinians to reach an understanding and offered to mediate between
them.' Unfortunately, al-Sack's attempt was unsuccessful due to Junblat's anti-
1 al-Hayat, 21 September 1972.
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government attitudes, and because of the support the latter received from leftist groups
in general.
2.2.1 Junblat's path to revolution
Since 1969 Junblat had had his own particular view towards the Palestinian Resistance
and the Lebanese role in the struggle against Israel:
We deplore the repressive and savage measures of the Lebanese authorities
against the heroes of the Resistance and we affirm that this was a plot
against Lebanon's independence, its pan-Arabism and against the
Progressive Movement ... We unanimously agree to resist this criminal
scheme being designed by the government ... which continues to submit to
imperial pressures aiming at liquidating the Palestinian question ... and
isolating Lebanon's people from the Arab struggle.'
It is important to show how Junblat's political ideas had changed and eventually led him
to become the strongest opponent of the Lebanese system. He started as a defender of
the extreme right wing Emile Edde's National Bloc, but by the time of the Palestine war
of 1948 he was beginning to identify himself as an Arab nationalist, believing that
secularism was the only viable future for Lebanon. Despite this, he refused to relinquish
the prestige and influence which the title Lord of the Druzes gave him within his
community, as he did not see any paradox in a Druze lord advancing the cause of
secularism.
al-Anwar, 23 October 1969.
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In 1949 Junblat established the Progressive Socialist Party, PSP, to promote his ideas in
the Lebanese cultural renaissance. In the 1960s, when a number of revolutionary
movements had seized power in different parts of the world, Junblat believed that secular
revolutionary change in Lebanon was feasible. In order to achieve this he allied with the
Balthists, Arab Nationalists, Communists and Socialist, and also with members of the
radical Palestinian parties. In 1975 he presided over the LNM which contained all these
radical groups. Junblat's views benefited the Palestinians who needed a champion for their
cause, particularly after their resistance was confined to Lebanon.
Secularism was Junblat's main aim, possibly because that would be the best way for him
to reach high office. Junblat's approach to national issues generally can be described as
rigid.' He had a tendency to impose preconditions, and to boycott or isolate other parties
if they had different views from his own. In January 1969 this was shown when he
refused to participate in a government that included Chamoun or a representative of his
party, the National Liberal Party, NLP. 2 During the civil war he also called for the
isolation of the Kataib Party. Eventually, he rejected the Syrian initiative which aimed to
end the civil war and persisted in carrying on the war until the defeat of the Kataib and
its allies.
Junblat's unreserved support for the PLO stemmed not only from
ideological motives but also from practical considerations; he was well
aware that without their military strength he had little prospect of
changing the existing regime 3
'Hank, 'Voting participation and political integration in Lebanon 1943-1974,' MES, Vol. 16,
1980, P. 34.
2 Goria, op.cit, p. 97.
3 Zamir, 'Politics and Violence in Lebanon', Jerusalem Quarterly, Vol. 25, 1982, p. 22.
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During the civil war Junblat waged a campaign against al-Sadr particularly when they
differed on the issue of al-Wathiqa al-Dusturiyya, the Constitutional Document, which
was initiated under the auspices of Damascus, to maintain the integrity of the Lebanese
government and to stop the civil war. Junblat's strong political views were challenged
by al-Sadr who had a different set of ideas.
Mobilising the Shi'ite was another major issue that caused friction between Junblat and
al-Sadr. The former possessed another advantage which helped him to challenge al-Sadr
in this respect, that is, outside support. In 1976, for example, Libya offered to buy
tobacco from the Shi'ite peasants' but only through the radical groups and the Lebanese
Arab Army, LAA, through whom they were closely linked with Junblat. The Latter also
made considerable use of student scholarships. He received nearly 600 scholarships 2 a
year from the Soviet Union and many Shiites gained access to them through their
involvement in the radical groups.
al-Sadr's resentment began to increase slowly with each major events which took place.
However, his resentment and anger was not directed towards the Palestinian resistance as
such, but against the radical groups. On 29 June 1973, in a press conference, he did not
conceal what he thought of these groups when he announced that some of their
ideologies contradicted the Lebanese system. This announcement came after the clashes
al-Nahar, 28 May 1976.
2 Interview, Basim al-Jisr, Oxford, summer, 1994.
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between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian resistance in May. He defended the state
against Junblat's point of view, stating that the Lebanese authorities did not intend to
liquidate the Resistance, but at the same time he chastised the government for failing to
defend the south from Israeli aggression. Simultaneously, he maintained good relations
with 'Arafat and stressed that the Palestinians had no wish to interfere in Lebanese affairs,
although this did not stop him from criticising them:
The problem was not one of fida'iyin infiltration but of launching rockets
and grenades against Israel across the south. This is something that is
totally impermissible. The launching of rockets and grenades is not at all a
revolutionary fida'iyin action. This also means that Lebanon is in a state of
war with Israel Who is opening fire is not important. The gist of the
matter is that Lebanese territory has become a base for launching missiles
and grenades.'
al-Sadr directed this speech towards a representative from the General Command of
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PFLP, who was present, saying: "you have
the right to adopt whatever ideologies you like, but you do not have the right to
implement them in Lebanon"? This was the beginning of a serious clash with these
ideological groups and with their main champion Kamal Junblat.
What also separated the two men was their perception of religion and the role of the
'ulama in society. al-Sadr opposed communism and socialism because they meant a
single party, repression of freedom, and negation of God. For him the role of the 'ulama
was "defined by God". From the beginning al-Sadr launched a campaign to increase
'Norton, Amal and the Shi'a ...,p. 43.
2 Sul Shai, 30 June 1973.
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religious teaching in schools, mainly in the south. This was apparent when he established
Jam'aiyat	 al-Dini (Committee for Religious Education) in 1966. The main
task of this committee was to send teachers to schools in the south in order to teach the
Islamic religion. This was contrary to Junblat's policy of marginalizing religious teaching
which he had put forward as Minister of Education in 1961. Critics called upon him to
implement at least a minimum of religious teaching to preserve morality in the society.'
2.2.2 The position of al-Sadr and Junblat towards the Syrian initiative in Lebanon
Keeping abreast of the situation in Lebanon has always been an essential part of Syria's
policy and in time of crisis this interest has tended to increase. Syria took a keen interest
in what was happening in Lebanon in the 1970s and senior Syrian civilians and military
leaders paid frequent visits to Beirut to discuss the differences between the warring
factions. For their part, almost all Lebanese leaders made regular visits to Damascus in
order to consult President Mad. Despite Syrian support for the leftist groups, President
Asad did not believe in nor want a military solution in Lebanon. Instead, Syria wanted a
compromise which would be acceptable to a majority of the Lebanese factions, and one
which would not over-antagonise Israel
Syria's efforts came to fruition on 14 February 1976 when President Franjiyya announced
the Constitutional Document. This Syrian-backed compromise maintained the top three
1 Mashaldl	 al-ibtidai', (The problems of Primary Education), al-Hay at, 21 January
1961.
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positions in the Lebanese system as before, but called for parity of Muslim and Christian
representation in Parliament and a reduction in the President's powers. It also enhanced
the position of the prime minister, who was to be elected by Parliament instead of being
chosen by the president.'
By the beginning of 1976 the balance of power during the war had shifted in favour of the
leftists, and Junblat was looking for a military solution. This occurred in June when Syria
sent in the Palestinian Liberation Army, PLA, and Sa i qa to assist Juablat and Ids allies
against the advancing Christian militias who stormed the two Muslim slum districts of
Beirut, Maslakh and Karantina.2
Junblat's rejection of the Syrian initiative was a turning point in the leftists' relations with
Syria. In contrast to the Constitutional Document he issued a ten-point declaration urging
secularism as the most desirable political system.3
To maintain or to change the Lebanese system became the major issue which dictated the
actions of al-Sadr and Junblat. The latter had the support of the Lebanese radical groups
and, later on, of Fatah, and also of Libya which gave him increased determination to
oppose Syria, and contributed to the prolongation of the civil war. In turn, Fatah support
for Junblat damaged their relations with al-Sadr.
Salibi, Cross Roads to Civil War, New York, 1976, pp. 163-4.
2 Adeed Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis, Macmillan Press, 1980, p. 99-100.
3 Hanf, op.cit., pp. 135-6.
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In January 1976 Junblat supported Lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib, who split from the
Lebanese army and announced the founding of the LAA. 1
 Junblat commented that a
"kind of military and social democracy was emerging and the movement steadily grew".2
On 14 March Junblat intensified his hostile attitude when he called for an emergency
meeting of progressive and Palestinian leaders including Ahrnad al-Khatib, and warned
that President Franjiyya should step down or the "Progressive-Palestinian forces would
take over power and change the Lebanese system within the framework of total
revolution".3
The Palestinian groups were a major target for Junblat as he tried to utilise them to
achieve his aim of secularism. He later wrote:
Our idealism, our loyalty towards the young people and the Palestinians,
forced us to continue the struggle until we had won a decisive victory.
The evidence of large-scale destruction forced us to seek the most rapid
conclusion to hostilities, as did an ever-present concern at the mass-
murders perpetrated by the isolationists upon the civilian population.4
One explanation of the steadfastness of Junblat's stand was that the only way that a
Druze could assume leadership of the country would be through full secularism.5
'The Lebanese Arab Army was headed by Ahmad al-Khatib, who rebelled against the
established leadership of the Lebanese army in March 1976 straight after the Constitutional Document
had been initiated. He argued that the Document failed to address the question of reform of the army,
which had lost its neutrality during the war.
2 Kamal Junblat, I Speak for Lebanon, London, Zed Press, 1982, p. 95.
3 Goria, op.cit, p. 223.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 220. Hanf, op.cit, p. 213.
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On 15 March 1976 Junblat ordered Palestinian and LAA units to advance on the
presidential palace in Ba'bda from three directions, Hammana, Sidon and the Biqa'. As a
result, fighting between the waning factions increased but this time the Syrian-backed
forces such as Sa'iqa and the PLA intervened to counter Junblat's attack. The Syrian
change of position regarding the warring factors reflected its view that a balance of
power should be maintained between the Lebanese communities in which none should be
allowed to overrun the other.' Syria was wary of a decisive military action by one
faction against another because the losers might attract international support and as a
consequence the most likely result would be partition of Lebanon. Moreover, the victory
of one faction over another would be detrimental not only to Lebanon's internal cohesion
but also to stability in Syria itself 2 This could be attributed to the fact that Syrian and
other regimes in the region could not afford a new secular system in Lebanon.
In response, Junblat described the Syrian forces as foreign, protested against "meddling in
Lebanon's internal affairs"3 and demanded their withdrawal. On an administrative level,
he presided over a newly-established politburo which consisted of the Lebanese Left and
various Palestinian parties. The politburo established local administrative committees, as
well as popular army and various local security forces in order to replace the legal
Lebanese ones.
i Dawisha, Syria and Lebanese p. 8.
2 Ibid., p. 104.
3 al-Nahar, 17 March 1976.
243
Chapter 7 	  Lebanese Nationalism
Junblat's actions were totally rejected by al-Sadr. He supported the Syrian initiatives and
called for reconciliation between the Lebanese factions on one side, and between the
Palestinians and the Lebanese authorities on the other. This increased Junblat's
resentment towards him, especially as Junblat had opposed clerical intervention in
politics.
For al-Sadr the time had come to choose his ally. This was Syria. In an open letter, al-
Sack called on Asad to intervene to put an end to the war in Beirut.' He split with the
national progressive groups, as a result of which the Arab Socialist Union, the pro-
Junblat Regional Committee and Junblat all attacked him. The strongest attacks came
from the PLO on 8 August and Junblat on 11 August. The former declared:
The CIA inflicted Musa al-Sack on Lebanon. He is the servant of a
sectarian conspiracy to split Muslim ranks. The masses of Lebanon and
the south, however, know how he came to Lebanon. Every move of al-
Sadr's will be struck at with an iron hand, for we well know the goals of
the conspiracy.2
Junblat denounced al-Sadr's relationship with Syria:
Co-operation with the Syrian occupation is a crime ... the policy of some
persons in the Biqa' [where al-Sack was then residing] is not in the interest
of steadfastness, and blemishes the honour of patriotism. Let those voices
trying to partition Lebanon in the name of religious sectarianism be
silent.3
al-Nahar, 9 June 1976.
2 'Adil Rida, Ma' al-Patizar Iii Imam Musa al-Sadr, al-Hawra Press, Beirut, p. 153.
3 Ibid. p. 154.
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Junblat's attacks came as a response to al-Sadr's speech in Balbek on 10 August 1976
when al-Sadr blamed the radical Palestinian factions for prolonging the war:
Some of the parties forced the Palestinian Resistance to become a
movement more interested in toppling the Arab regimes than in liberating
Palestine.
He also stated:
Social and political reform in Lebanon will not occur by military action.
On the contrary, militancy will jeopardise the course of reform which we
should pursue peacefully.2
Concerning the integrity of Lebanon, al-Sadr rejected anything that would lead to the
dismantling of the Lebanese state. Thus he rejected the Local Administration Committees
which Junblat had worked to establish. "it is the beginning of the disintegration of
Lebanon and the establishment of a new and unacceptable authority". He even declared
that he was against decentralisation:
decentralisation is the most proper way to administer the country but this
will happen only when the country is politically stable and not in a divided
country which Lebanon is today.'
From the mid-1970s onward Libyan involvement in Lebanon increased in support of
Junblat and the progressive faction. The Libyan role will be shown later as it played an
al-Anwar, 12 August 1976. al-Qabas, Kuwait, 25 December 1976.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
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essential role in increasing the level of tension between al-Sadr and Junblat on one side
and between the progressive faction and Syria on the other.
On 11 May 1977, contrary to Junblat's policy, the SISC issued a working paper which
stated unequivocally the position of the Shiite community with regard to Lebanon.
Observing that "Lebanon is the definitive homeland within its present boundaries, and is
sovereign, free and independent", ' the community was committed to "renew its faith in a
unified Lebanon".
As shown above, the understanding between the PLO in general and Fatah in particular
and al-Sadr did not last long. This was due to the attitude of Fatah towards the
Constitutional Document. It supported Junblat's call to go all the way for a full victory.2
As a result of this co-operation the Joint Forces were established 3 Salah Khalaf
announced that:
the road to Palestine should pass through 'Uyun al-Siman, 'Aintura and
even Jimiya, [all are Christian dominated areas], itself to prevent any
further threat to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.4
They believed that it was worthwhile to "sacrifice" Lebanon for the Palestinian struggle
because it was a corrupt society.5
al-Nahar, 12 May 1977.
2 James A. Reilly, 'Israel in Lebanon', 1975-82, MERIP Report, September / October, 1982, p.
16.
3 Hanf, op.cit, p. 215.
4 Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War, Praeger, New York, 1980, p. 111.
5 Nurit Kliot, The Territorial Disintegration of a State: the case of Lebanon, University of
Durham, CMEIS, 1986, p. 26.
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The participation of Fatah in the assault on the presidential palace in Ba'bda was totally
unacceptable to al-Sadr. On 23 May, he warned 'Arafat against sliding into the Lebanese
civil war and stressed that 'The honour of Jerusalem refuses to be liberated by the
unbelievers",' implying that 'Arafat should be aware that Junblat was using the
Palestinian Resistance to achieve his own objectives. He suggested to 'Arafat that Amal
should go to the front line to be the first to face the Israelis while the Palestinian forces
pulled back. The aim of this plan was to activate a Lebanese defence of the south and
also not to give Israel the excuse to attack the south on the grounds that it was simply
preserving its security against terrorists. However, this plan was rejected by Palestinian
hard-liners such as Abu Musa. 2 This continued rejection by the progressive and radical
groups was strengthened even more by Libya, which itself opposed Syria's role in
Lebanon.
2.3 Libya's involvement in Lebanese civil war
Junblat and the radical groups managed to draw Libya to their side. 3 Libya's interest was
first shown by the long visit of its prime minister 'Abd al-Salam Jallud in Lebanon from 5
June until 29 July 1976. He acted as an observer for Qaddafi who had a different attitude
toward the progressive and radical groups in Lebanon from that of Syria. Qaddafi
rejected the Syrian intervention and its policy of balancing the Lebanese factions,
al-Nahar, 24 May 1976.
2 Interview, Hani Fahas, Beirut, spring, 1992. Fahas is a close associate of Arafat and Ham al-
Hasan.
'A. Kelidar & M. Burrell, 'Lebanon: The collapse of a state', Conflict Studies, No. 74, August,
1976, p.4.
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announcing on several occasions that he would support the progressive groups and the
IAA until they achieved a full victory.'
Qaddafi's announcement of 11 April 1976 that he would not allow the Syrians to stop the
Left and the PLO might have been one of the main factors which drove the PLO to
become heavily involved in the Lebanese civil war. In October Qaddafi stepped up his
opposition to reconciliation between the Lebanese particularly when he terminated
diplomatic relations with Syria one day prior to the Riyadh Summit of 21 October 1976.
It was al-Sadr and his movement Amal who remained the only opposing faction in the
Joint Forces' domain. As a result, they were targeted and al-Sack became the object of
assassination attempts. Initially, al-Sack's attitude towards Qaddafi was free of
antagonism. In a press conference in September 1975 he praised Qaddafi's concern for
Lebanon:
I saw with my own eyes the clear conscience of President Qaddafi and the
pain and suffering he is going through for what Lebanon is experiencing.
President Qaddafi offered any assistance that might be needed to savage
Lebanon.2
This attitude changed quickly as the civil war progressed and Libya supported the Left
and the Palestinians against the Syrian initiative, al-Sack then clearly stated that Libya did
not have any political or military weight in Lebanon. 3 He condemned Qaddafi
al-Nahar, 13 April 1976. al-Safir, 5 June 1976. al-Nida, 12 June 1976.
2 al-Safir, 11 September 1975.
3 Rida, op.cit, 112.
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particularly for his support for the Communists, since they recruited many Shiites and it
was al-Sadr's mission to alter this situation.'
The Communists had a prominent role in kindling the Lebanese war and
pushing the Palestinian resistance to keep fighting. They used dirty
methods such as the seizure of shops and houses, considering them the
spoils of war. The Communists also tried to exploit sectarianism. Actually
their number is very small. The Lebanese know them for what they are,
and no longer trust them. They were given the chance to become active by
the negative role played by Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafi.2
The Israeli occupation of the south on 14 March 1978 was the final stroke that broke al-
Sadf s relations with the Left and the Palestinians alike. In a Friday sermon he attributed
the fall of the south to an international conspiracy and Arab incompetence. He then asked
the Shiites to go back to their villages:
It is our responsibility to liberate our land. We do not need our Arab
brothers nor the Palestinian resistance to participate in this, we are capable
of doing so alone.3
Consequently, more Shiites began to enrol in Amal to take part in the civil war and to
support the Syrians in Lebanon. This was considered to be the only effective policy that
would keep Lebanon and the coexistence of its communities intact. al-Sadr maintained
this policy until he disappeared in Libya on 31 August 1978.
Norton, 'Lebanon', Year book on International Communist Affairs, 1987, p. 450. Reilly,
op.cit, p. 15.
2 Rida., op.cit., p. 113.
3 al-Nahar, 31 March 1978.
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In retrospect, al-Sadr had to break relations with any faction that disregarded the interests
of the Shi'ites, mainly those of the south, and the integrity and the coexistence of
Lebanon. al-Sadr's determination to improve the Shi'ite position in Lebanon and to
preserve Lebanon itself forced him to confront Kamil al-As'ad and the progressive
groups. He did not stop at that but continued to face any element which might stand
between him achieving his objective. This was apparent when he had to stand against
Shi'ite 'ulama who supported the progressive groups.
Some Shi'ite 'ulama were attracted to Pan-Arabism and thus found some common
ground with the leftists. In addition, the liberation of Palestine was their ultimate goaL
However, they became confused because of the rapid development during the civil war.
Their enthusiasm for Pan-Arabism went through different stages. It changed from
complete support to neutrality and, eventually, to abandoning it particularly after the
Israeli invasion in 1978. This group of 'ulama then preferred to concentrate on
communal activities to counter the Israeli occupation, while other 'ulama remained
inactive until they changed to Pan-Islamism as a result of the Islamic Revolution in Iran
in 1979. What concerns us here is to concentrate on the `ulama who were identified with
Pan-Arabism in order to explain their relationship with al-Sadr.
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2.4 Leftist oriented Shi'ite 'ulama
The main leftist oriented 'ulama were Sayyid Hani Fahas, Shaikh Hasan Malak, Sayyid
Muhammad Hasan al-Amin' and Shaikh Muhammad Farahat. 2 I shall concentrate on
Sayyid Hani Fahas as he entered into direct confrontation with al-Sadr on two major
issues, the tobacco planters, and the parliamentary by-election at Nabatiyya in 1974.
Fahas was born in 1946 in the village of Ebshit in the south and began his education in
Nabatiyya schooL In 1963 he went to Najaf to continue his religious education. His
interest in politics began to develop as early as 1958, the year of unity between Syria
and Egypt, so that his orientation was with pan-Arabism rather than being confined to
Lebanon. 3 While in Najaf he began to develop a special interest in the Palestinian cause
and he reflected this interest in Majallat al-Najaf His feeling was strengthened more
when Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim issued a fatwa in support of Fatah. In 1972 he had to
leave Najaf for two reasons. First, he was targeted by Hizb al-Da'wa whose policies
were more concentrated on Iraq's affairs rather than on wider Arab causes. Secondly, he
had to leave because of continuous demand from the Iraqi government that he should
participate in some of their ceremonies.4
I Sayyid Muhammad H. al-Amin became chief Shar'ai Judge of Sidon.
2 Interview, Shaikh Mahmud Farahat, London, winter, 1992.
3 Interview, Sayyid Ham Fahas, Beirut, spring, 1992.
4 Ibid.
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When Fahas returned to Lebanon in 1972 the country was going through a dramatic
period and it was natural then that he should develop his pan-Arabism by associating
himself with the Palestinian issue rather than confining himself to Lebanese politics. One
year later he found himself in the midst of one of the most contentious issues against
the Lebanese government, that is, the tobacco planters issue.
The problem of the tobacco planters was part of the decline of agriculture in general in
Lebanon visvis other economic activities. However, because of the insecurity of
tobacco cultivation in the south the problem was particularly heavily felt.
Over the years tobacco had grown to play a distinctive role in the economy of the south,
as it employed 72 percent of its peasantry by the mid 1970s.' The original tobacco
monopoly had developed since 1883 when the Ottoman government granted control of
that industry to the Regie Co-intiressie des Tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman . 2 The
concession was renewed over and over again until the planters' grievances against the
Regie's policies in the buying and selling of tobacco came to a head in the early 1970s.
When the Regie became a mixed state-private controlled company after independence in
1943, its relationship with the peasants was one of exploitation. Through its absolute
control over every aspect of the tobacco industry, from the auctioning of licenses for the
1 Halawi, op.cit, p. 57.
2 Ibid. Ali Zain al-Din, 'Zira'at al-Tibgh fi Lubnan 1881-1873', al-Manabir, Beirut, February
1987, p.47.
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cultivation of the plant to the processing and marketing of the final product, the company
wielded immense power and influence over the peasants.
The Rágie perpetuated the classic forms of political patronage in the south
by promoting the dependency of the peasants on their zu'ama,
traditionally also the major landowners, both for granting licenses and
pricing the crop. Favoured and well-connected absentee growers received
the bulk of the auctioned licenses and in turn sold them to their
constituents and political supporters at a substantial profit which was
compounded by the Rigie's pricing policy.'
The price per kilo of tobacco the Regie offered its clients who were
recommended by zu'ama in 1973 was more than three times the price
paid to the non-preferred majority, thus enabling the former to buy the
latter's crop at little more than the official price and in turn sell it to the
company at a higher rate.2
This blatantly unfair and exploitative pricing and other practices by the Rágie prompted
the peasants to stage mass demonstrations in Nabatiyya on 24 January 1973. 3 Prime
minister Sa'ib Salam ordered the security forces to end the demonstration by force and as
a result, two peasants were killed.
In the midst of the decline in relations between the Lebanese authorities and the leftists,
the peasants' anger was easy to exploit, particularly by Kamal Junblat. He led 1,500
1 Nasr, 'The Crisis ..., pp. 8-9. Halawi, op.cit., p. 58.
2 ibid.
3 For detailed information of prior and after the demonstration, see. A. Zain al-Din, 'Zira'at al-
Tibgh ..., pp. 47-58.
253
Chapter 7 	  Lebanese Nationalism
demonstrators in Nabatiyya to the funeral of the two men killed and declared that Salam's
resignation was a "national duty".'
After his return from Najaf Fahas found fertile ground for his political ambitions. Unlike
al-Sack, he became close to Fatah and adopted general pan-Arabist ideas rather than a
more limited Lebanese nationalism. 2 His role in the tobacco issue brought him into direct
confrontation, however mild, with al-Sack. The attitudes of the leftist parties and al-Sack
towards the issue of tobacco varied. In the beginning the Communist Party was against
the demonstrations, unlike the Syrian and Iraqi Ba ith parties. For al-Sack the peasant
movement came at an awkward moment especially as he was working for broader Shiite
demands.' This difference between the two men did not stop al-Sack from joining the sk-
in at the husainiyya of Nabatiyya to protest against the government.
Fahas was well connected and played a major role in helping the tobacco planters to sell
their products. To this effect he managed to bring LL. 10,000,000 4 from Libya to
purchase the tobacco. This achievement was supported initially by 'Arafat and Hani al-
Hasan who paved the way with the Libyans.' In another attempt, Fahas met with the
Libyan ambassador in Cairo, but his efforts to bring more money failed as the Libyans
1 Goria, op.cit, p. 140.
2 Interview, Sayyid Ham Fahas, Beirut, spring, 1992.
3 Ibid.
4 One Dollar was then equal to 3 Lebanese pounds.
5 Interview, Sayyid Ham Fahas, Beirut, spring, 1992.
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favoured the leftists, and the LAA, who were given LL. 10,000,000. Therefore, he turned
to the Iraqis and managed to obtain LL.6,000,000.
In 1973 Fahas needed a platform through which to enhance his political activities. He
achieved this by establishing al-Tanzim al-Sha'bi al-Lubnani (the Lebanese Popular
Organisation). This organisation gained special support also from 'Arafat and Ham al-
Ha san.1
The more Fahas allied with the Left the more distant he became from al-Sadr. In 1974
another issue brought the two men into confront, this time far more seriously. As
mentioned before, the parliamentary by-elections in Nabatiyya represented a struggle
between al-As'ad and al-Sadr. al-Sadr also had to counter the leftists who were becoming
prominent with Fahas's support Some leading leftists such as Hasib 'Abd al-Jawad, 'Ali
al-'Abd and Muhsin Ibrahim nominated Fahas for the vacant seat. This nomination was
supported by Amblat but rejected by the Communist party which had its own candidate,
'Adil al-Sabbah. The nomination was also rejected by the Iraqi Ba'th party which had
Musa Shu'aib as its candidate. 2 Junblat gave his support to Fahas in order to counter al-
Sadr's activity, despite his criticisms of 'ulama involvement in politics.
'Ibid.
2 Ibid.
255
Chapter 7 	  Lebanese Nationalism
al-Sadr perceived this nomination as a challenge to him personally and warned Fahas that
if he went along with the election he would fight him with his "turban".' This threat was
taken seriously by Fahas as it would place him in conflict with the main representative of
the Shiite community whose popularity was rocketing and against whom Fahas would
not be able to sustain his opposition, especially in view of the fragmentation and
indecisiveness of the leftists as to which candidate they should support. Unsure of
winning, Fahas withdraw from the elections.
In 1975 relations between Fahas and the Palestinians began to deteriorate when the latter
agreed to support Fahas's organisation materially but on condition that the Palestinians
imposed total control This condition was rejected and consequently he disbanded the
organisation. In Fahas's view Palestinian hegemony was a common factor in all leftist
organisations. After the disappearance of al-Sadr, Fahas reviewed his thoughts and
presented them in a book where he recognised the success and tolerance of al-Sadr's
approach in Lebanon.2
Although Fahas's ideas contradicted and conflicted with those of al-Sadr, it was not a
major issue to reckon with in comparison to the hostility of Kamil al-As'ad within the
community. However, Fahas's case reflected the political orientation of some younger
'Ibid.
2 H  Fahas, Mashru'at As'ila Qabla Iran Kanat Kha Va, al-Tawjih al-Islaini Press, Beirut,
1980, p. 46-47.
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'ulama who affiliated themselves with leftist ideology and a wider pan-Arabism, rejecting
the sectarian formula of the Lebanese policy which al-Sadr was working to maintain.
As we have seen, al-Sadr's moderate policy towards the various factions in Lebanon
could not be carried out when the interests of the Shiite community were at stake. These
interests were intertwined with the integrity of the Lebanese system which he adamantly
defended. Eventually, he had to ally himself with whoever supported his beliefs and had
to distance himself from those who jeopardised them.
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Conclusion
Socio-economic changes played an essential role in transforming the Shiite community
from being almost an irrelevant entity in Lebanese politics to being a major player. This
transformation occurred within the space of a century. However, although socio-
economic factors were the background for this transformation, it was the individual
personalities - Sayyid 'Abd al-Husain Sharaf al-Din and Sayyid Musa al-Sadr - who
utilised whatever means were at hand to create a sense of identity among the Shiites.
Each of these two individuals played specific role in transforming the Shi'ite community
and if it had not been for them, things would have been different. Nevertheless, each had
his own approach as to how to tackle changes in society for the benefit of the community.
Both realised the need for social services which prompted them to establish various
benevolent institutions. In addition, the position of spiritual leader of the community
entailed serious responsibilities whenever the Arab cause was at stake. Shilte spiritual
leadership was at the forefront of support for the Arab cause, and the relationship of the
Shiite leadership with the Arab world rendered the community unable to come to terms
with foreign influences and be above suspicion. In the case of Sayyid Sharaf al-Din and
Sayyid al-Sadr, although both were working to improve the position of the Shi'ites
through national allegiance rather than sectarian allegiance, they had different approaches
as how to achieve their objective. This was due to the changing nature of each man's
circumstances.
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Sayyid 'Abd al-Husain Sharaf al-Din
In the early twentieth century the rural Shiites were dominated politically by a handful of
zu'ama who represented them in government. This domination was accompanied by an
internal power struggle amongst Shi'ite zu'ama strong enough to hinder their progress
vis:a-vis other communities. At that time the Shiite 'ulama were financially dependant
on the zu'ama, and as a result, could not influence the power struggle in a direction
which would benefit the community. Due to financial dependence the 'ulama's hands
were tied and they could not succeed in any initiative to improve the position of the
Shi'ites.
This situation was the principal factor that forced Sharaf al-Din to isolate himself
financially in order to establish different welfare-orientated institutions to improve the
status of the Shi'ites in Jabal `Amil in general and Tyre in particular. However, at the
same time he was considered an As'adi, i.e., supporter of al-As'ad. As explained above,
his backing of al-As'ad was a matter of principle rather than a matter of personal choice,
based on his goal of creating a sense of Shiite identity, and as a spiritual leader of the
Shrites he had to take a political stand in the rivalry between al-Sulh, who was backed by
some Shiite `ulama and intellectuals, and al-As'ad. Unlike the Sulhi `ulama, it was not
possible for Sharaf al-Din to hand over the political leadership of the Shi'ites to a Sunni
and therefore he opted for al-As'ad.
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Maintaining the leadership of al-As'ad was a primary objective of Sharaf al-Din, a task
which he successfidly achieved. He then concentrated his activities upon social issues as
his second target. He believed that modem education was the key for change and
therefore established the al-Ja'fariyya school. He succeeded in doing so with the financial
assistance of Shiite emigrants in West Africa. It has been shown how al-Ja'fariyya
contributed greatly to the political awareness of Shiltes and by 1955 had become a base
for opposition to the regime's anti-Arab policies as well as a base for guerrilla groups who
launched attacks on northern Israel.
Despite Sharaf al-Din's social and political activities, as a mujtahid, he remained dedicated
to teaching and learning and his books are widely used in hawzat, Shiite religious
schools, among the Shi'ites throughout the world. His political involvement reached its
peak in the first two decades of the twentieth century as his loyalty to independent Syria
was demonstrated. From the 1930s onwards he chose to give his blessing to pro-Arab-
cause movements as they happened, rather than become directly involved. This shift in
political involvement was totally based on his iitihad as he evaluated circumstances and
then decided whether it was appropriate to be politically active. This is linlike the
common understanding that there is a division in Shi'ism between the activist and the
quietist.
Rapid socio-economic development in the 1960s caused a massive migration towards the
urban centres. Shiltes from the Biqa' and the south abandoned their villages trying to find
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a better living in the cities. However, being rural and largely illiterate, it was difficult for
them to find decent jobs. Eventually they were left occupying the worst paid jobs while
living in the suburbs where public services were almost non-existent.
Migration had an immense effect upon the social structure of the community. The old
family-zalm tie disintegrated and the zu'ama could no longer expect to have the same
influence. Being far from their villages and not under any direct control from their
zu'ama, the Shiites in the suburbs of Beirut began forming new ties based on religion
which was very much apparent in the southern suburb of Beirut al-Shiyah and al-
Ghobairi. Paradoxically, mixing with other communities began to create a sense of
Shiite identity.
Political developments in the Middle East and the influx of Palestinians into Lebanon as
well as the spread of new ideologies were of some attraction to the Shiites. In addition,
their low standard of living, compared with other Lebanese communities, proved to be a
major factor in alienating the community from the system and made them a fruitful
ground for leftist ideologies which voiced their ordeal and under-representation. The
ordeal of the community continued as it was torn between various ideologies in the cities
and local zu'ama in rural areas. This situation lasted until long after the arrival of Musa
al-Sadr from Iran.
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Sayyid Musa al-Sadr
Like his predecessor al-Sadr established a number of benevolent institutions to provide
services, which subsequently proved beneficial to the people and to himself Through
such institutions, al-Sadr began building his own power base within the community. This
took place in conjunction with the successful building of bridges with other communities.
He displayed great energy and a capacity to achieve his social and political objectives,
whereas most Shi'ite 'ulama had been content to dwell exclusively on spiritual matters.
He began by combating illiteracy, improving the status of women, and building schools,
recreational centres and hospitals. Many of his speeches contained emotive reference to
the need for Shiites to unite collectively in order to improve their social and economic
status. However, he was very much concerned to prevent these activities from becoming
an exclusively Shilite affair. A case in point is his close co-operation as early as 1960 with
bishop Gregoire Haddad, and he continued to build on this through co-operation with
other leading individuals, all of which culminated in 1974 with his establishment of
Harakat al-Mahnimin
He was a pragmatist in the sense that as long as other factions did not clash with his own
objectives, he found no problem in co-operating with them, regardless of the religious or
political orientation. His attitude was based on a belief that Lebanon's integrity and
coexistence should be preserved and promoted, and any attempt to undermine the
Lebanese state should be fought off Lebanon was for him the ideal place for the Shiite
262
Conclusion
community to prosper. But still, preserving Lebanon's integrity could not be properly
achieved unless the Shiites were properly represented. He therefore established a Shi'ite
council in 1967. His power was founded on the base of these benevolent institutions as
well as on his being the official head of the Shilte council.
Being head of a religious council provided al-Sadr with a platform to demand reform in
Lebanon in general and the rights of the Shi'ites in particular. In practice he began
gradually to do what was supposed to be the zu'ama's role. This began to increase
straight after the 1967 war as Israel diverted its attentions to Lebanon. As a result, the
Shilte community was caught in cross-fire which caused massive destruction of property
and loss of lives as attacks and counter-attacks increased between the Palestinians and
IsraeL Shiite support for the Palestinians began to falter as Palestinian organisations
failed to pay attention to the plight of the Shi'ites. In addition, during the bitter conflict
between Israel and the Palestinians, the Lebanese government offered only minimal
support to the Shiites. Huge migration, this time compulsory, from the south to Beirut
began as early as 1970 and tens of thousands were forced out of their homes. This
situation required urgent action by the Shi'ite leaders to deal with what was a growing
problem. The zu'ama in general were passive and could not respond, and as for political
parties, they could not ease the pressure simply because they were also part of the
problem which caused the Shiite ordeal In this stalemate the ground was almost free for
al-Sadr to manoeuvre. He succeeded in becoming the voice of the Shiltes, and his
continuous pressure on the government forced it to establish a Council of the South.
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Lebanese integrity began to disintegrate by 1975 when the civil war started. al-Sadf s
support for the Palestinians decreased. Their involvement in the civil war on the Leftist
sides under the leadership of Kamal Junblat, who was aiming at changing the Lebanese
system in favour of a socialist oriented secular system, was enough reason for al-Sadr to
oppose Junblat's plan and consequently the Palestinians. The Syrian involvement in
Lebanon, which produced the Constitutional Document in 1976, was welcomed by al-
Sadr but rejected by Junblat and the Palestinians. This Syrian initiative coincided with al-
Sadfs belief of preserving Lebanon's integrity and formed the basis of a new affiance with
the Syrians. In such disarray al-Sadr envisaged the need for a movement which could
mobilise the Shiites. This was Harakat al-Mahrumin, followed by Amal. al-Sad?s
disappearance in 1978 did not weaken the community; rather it gave the community
stronger a motivation to work collectively under the Amal leadership.
Various factors such as migration, socio-economic conditions, the Palestinian presence,
Israeli reprisals and government neglect were enough to give al-Sadr the opportunity to
lead the community. Unlike his predecessor Sayyid Sharaf al-Din, al-Sadr had no need to
support a za iim in order to maintain Shiite leadership for the community. In fact he
became part of the power struggle and succeeded in becoming the community leader as
he depended on their mass popular support.
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To sum up, the Shiite leadership today has managed to capitalise on the different
organisations that al-Sadr founded, mainly through Amal. In brief unlike the Sunnis or
the Maronites who had external patrons to advance their interests in Lebanon, the Shi'ites
managed to build up their leading status in Lebanon by depending on socio-economic and
political development within the country, as well as on the past initiatives of Sharaf al-
Din and al-Sadr in establishing various benevolent, official and political organisations.
Had not been for these two individuals, Shi'ite awareness would not have occurred
perhaps until the late 1990s. A number of issues can be raised as to what would have
happened to the Shi'ites if Sayyid Sharaf al-Din and Sayyid al-Sadr were not there. These
issues are the position of the Shi'ite zu'ama, particularly al-As'ad, the effects of
ideological parties among the Shi'ites, and the effects of the Iranian revolution.
Sharaf al-Din was a precedent for al-Sadr to work independently in order to improve the
status of the Shi'ites. However, the real challenge to the zu'ama in general and al-As'ad
in particular occurred due to al-Sadr's activities. They would have maintained their
control over Shi'ite affair because they had access, through government, to favours and
assistance for their followers. The strength of the zu'ama was evident even in the 1970s,
although the ideological parties managed to recruit a great number of Shi'ites. The
strength of the zu'ama was shown, particularly, during parliamentary elections in 1972
and the by-elections in 1974. It was always al-As'ad's list, and the co-ordination between
various zu'ama and the government that won most seats. In 1974, although al-As'ad's
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candidates lost the election to al-Sadr's candidate, the number of voters in favour of al-
As'ad was much higher than those in favour of the ideological parties.
The zu'ama's strength would have increased even more during the major crisis which the
south went through, mainly during the Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982. The Shi'ites
support for these ideological parties would have decreased due to their ineffectiveness in
confronting the Israelis. Certainly the Shi'ite zu'ama would have capitalised on the
situation to increase their control over the affairs of the Shi'ites. This was apparent in
1982 when the Lebanese President Amin Gemayel co-operated with the zu'ama, mainly
al-As'ad, in order to build his new system. This new system in Beirut was challenged
only by Anal, which undermined the authority of the Lebanese government and its
supporters in February 1984 when it took over control of West Beirut.
In 1979 the Iranian revolution would have definitely changed the life of the Shi'ites, but
how effectively, and how long this change would have taken? Certainly, this change
would have taken a long time to happen because the main concern of the Iranian
authorities after the revolution was to establish stability in Iran. Therefore, it was unlikely
that Iran would sponsor Lebanese groups to advance its interests for a number of years
at least. Rather Iran herself needed support and what others could offer her. In addition,
the Iran-Iraq war was another major problem for Iran to solve, as most of her resources
were directed towards this war.
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When Iran thought of sponsoring a Lebanese Shi'ite faction, this was not to improve the
status of the Shi'ites as such vis-a-vis other Lebanese communities, but rather to advance
its own interests regionally, particularly when Iran-Iraq war was intensifying, and Iran
was increasingly isolated. As has always been the case, Lebanon has been a place where
foreign intervention finds fertile ground for its objectives. In the first few years of the
revolution, the majority of the Shi'ites whole-heartedly supported Iran in its war with
Iraq. Some Amal members also participated in the war against Iraq knowing that Mustafa
Shamran, Minister of Defence in revolutionary Iran, had been in charge of the military
training of Amal However, this harmony between Iran and Amal changed. The Amal
leadership refused to be completely drawn into Iran's affairs, for fear this might affect its
status in Lebanon. By 1982 Iran realised that Amal was of no use to it and a new
organisation was needed to carry out Iran's regional objectives in Lebanon and the
region.
Iran succeeded in establishing a new party named Hizbullah, Party of God, whose
leadership and members were committed to follow wilayat al-Faqih as represented by
Imam Khumaini. Establishing Hizbullah was relatively easy because the back bone of its
members were Amal's. Amal faced a problem of keeping its Lebanese identity particularly
when some of its members believed that their religious duty was to side with the Shi'ite
state of Iran. Iran did not make a big effort to recruit members for the new party, but
rather it was a simple shift of loyalty from Amal to Hizbullah. The main question here is
how long it would have taken Iran to establish Hizbullah and how long it would have
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taken to be influential in Lebanon if Amal had not been there? Certainly establishing
Hizbullah would have faced enormous difficulties because there had not been any
Iranian social or economic roots or support for the Shi'ites in Lebanon. Even if Iran had
succeeded in establishing Hizbullah, the party would have been considered a foreign
party similar, for instance, to the Communist, and consequently, its activities would have
been hindered by the Lebanese authorities and the Shi'ite zu'ama.
Today, the identity of Hizbullah, whether Lebanese or Iranian, is still going through
tremendous change in Lebanon. It is this identity which the party leadership is trying to
settle, and consequently, the political tone of Hizbullah has been changing from
extremism to moderation, that is to say, to what al-Sadr had always advocated:
maintaining coexistence among the Lebanese communities and loyalty to Lebanon. But
how far Hizbullah can change is a different matter because the reason for its creation
was not the concern of the Shi'ites of Lebanon but rather to advance Iran's interests in
the region.
The early efforts of Sayyid Sharaf al-Din and Sayyid al-Sadr were essential for the
revival of the Shi'ite community. Without this revival the community would still be
developing today, and its position vis-a-vis the other Lebanese communities would be far
behind.
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